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Cover
Original caption: “Vice Admiral Friedrick 
Ruge, Inspector of the Federal German 
Navy (left) receives the Legion of Merit 
(Degree of Commander) from Chief of 
U.S. Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh 
A. Burke, USN (right). The award was 
presented to Admiral Ruge on February 
21, 1961.” Burke and Ruge established 
a relationship of friendship and trust 
as they worked together to integrate the 
German navy rebuilt after World War 
II into the Western alliance system. In 
“German Navies from 1848 to 2016: 
Their Development and Courses from 
Confrontation to Cooperation,” author 
Werner Rahn recounts the arc of the 
history of German navies.
Credit: Official U.S. Navy photo. The Cit-
adel Archives and Museum, Charleston, 
South Carolina, Ruge Collection
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FROM THE EDITORS
For a nation to come to grips in a serious way with its own military history is 
never easy, particularly after a disastrous defeat (although victory is not without 
its own challenges)� It is all the more impressive, then, that the modern German 
navy has institutionalized the study of its own history in a manner that bears 
testimony to the best traditions of German scholarship� In “German Navies from 
1848 to 2016: Their Development and Courses from Confrontation to Coopera-
tion,” Werner Rahn provides an authoritative overview of the German navy, from 
its rise in imperial times, through its role in the two world wars of the last century, 
to its reconstitution after the defeat of Hitler and the establishment of the Federal 
Republic of Germany� In a period when major-power naval conflict once again 
has become thinkable, it is well to be reminded of the strategic importance of 
naval power—and of the gross blunders nations can make in wielding it� Perhaps 
the most telling insight he offers from the German experience is the navy’s failure 
to take sufficient account of the severe geographical limitations it faced� In this, as 
in other respects, there may be lessons here for a rising maritime China� Werner 
Rahn, a retired captain in the German navy and former director of the German 
Armed Forces Military History Research Office, was awarded the Hattendorf 
Prize for Distinguished Original Research in Maritime History by the Naval War 
College in 2016�
In the contemporary strategic environment, the most urgent challenge is not 
so much the threat of traditional major-power war as it is the aggressive use of 
nontraditional measures short of war by revisionist powers such as China and 
Russia� In “The New Time and Space: Dimensions of a Maritime Defense Strat-
egy,” Tomohisa Takei argues that status quo powers such as Japan and the United 
States must be resolute in resisting these measures, stressing the importance of 
concerted multinational responses� Admiral Tomohisa Takei (Ret�), a former 
chief of staff of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, is currently a professor 
and distinguished international fellow at the Naval War College�
In “Rebuilding the Ukrainian Navy,” Deborah Sanders reviews the challenges 
facing Ukraine in reconstituting its naval forces following the devastating losses 
Russia inflicted on them in the course of its occupation of Crimea in 2014� She 
does so in the context of Russia’s ongoing proxy war in Ukraine’s eastern prov-
inces, and notes in particular the threat this poses to the important port of 
NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb   1 8/7/17   11:58 AM
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Mariupol’� She argues that, given the desperate condition of the Ukrainian econ-
omy, for the foreseeable future the rebuilding effort should be limited to creating 
a “mosquito fleet” for coastal defense� Deborah Sanders is a reader in defense and 
security studies at King’s College London�
Perhaps in part because it had no very clear winner or loser, the War of 1812 
has received relatively little attention in either British or American military histo-
riography, particularly at the operational or campaign level� Kevin D� McCranie, 
in “Confronting Uncertainty with Decentralized Command: British Naval Deci-
sion Making at the Outbreak of the War of 1812,” makes the case that this neglect 
is unwarranted� At first sight, this history seems to lack contemporary relevance, 
given the poor communications available to maritime forces during that early pe-
riod; but this assumes that today’s instantaneous electronic communications will 
not be subject to serious degradation at the outset of hostilities between major 
powers� Kevin McCranie is a professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at 
the Naval War College�
In “Money, Motivation, and Terrorism: Rewards-for-Information Programs,” 
Christopher M� Ford addresses the neglected subject of the efficacy of the long-
standing U�S� government programs that generate information on terrorist 
activities by offering monetary rewards, using as a historical case study the very 
successful program the British instituted during the Malayan Emergency� He 
argues that much more attention needs to be given to the impact of such rewards 
on the particular situation and expectations of the recipients� Lieutenant Colonel 
Christopher Ford, USA, is currently a military professor at the Stockton Center 
for the Study of International Law at the Naval War College�
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters 
Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335, 309)� 
For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main en-
trance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-841-2236)�
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Rear Admiral Jeff Harley is the fifty-sixth President 
of the U.S. Naval War College. The College is respon-
sible for educating future leaders, developing their 
strategic perspective and critical thinking, and en-
hancing their capability to advise senior leaders and 
policy makers.
Admiral Harley is a career surface warfare officer 
whose sea-duty assignments have included command 
of USS Milius (DDG 69), Destroyer Squadron 9, and 
Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet / Expeditionary 
Strike Group 7 / Task Force 76. During his command 
of Milius, the ship participated in combat operations 
supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and his crew 
won the Battle Efficiency Award and the Marjorie 
Sterrett Battleship Fund Award for overall combat 
readiness.
Admiral Harley attended the University of Minne-
sota, graduating with a bachelor of arts in political 
science, and received master of arts degrees from the 
Naval War College and the Fletcher School of Law 
and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Additionally, he 
served as a military fellow at the Council on Foreign 
Relations in New York City.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
AFTER I ASSUMED MY POSITION as President of the Naval War 
College last year, I identified four broad elements of a vision 
for the institution. We will operationalize, navalize, futurize, and internationalize 
the College’s education and research efforts, with an overall goal of contributing 
to the professionalism and capabilities of the nation’s future leaders. Previously 
I laid out an overview in the Naval War College Review’s Autumn 2016 edition 
and addressed aspects of the vision’s operationalization component in the Winter 
2017 issue, navalization in the Spring 2017 issue, and futurization in the Summer 
2017 issue. I would like to round out the discussion of our vision by reviewing our 
ongoing efforts in the areas of international education and engagement.
Accelerating a process begun sixty-one years ago when the Naval Com-
mand College was established, and forty-eight years after the first International 
Seapower Symposium (ISS) was convened in Newport, the College will strive to 
internationalize itself further so that it becomes the veritable locus of internation-
al maritime cooperation. Over the past six decades, the participation of topflight 
international officers in the classroom greatly broadened and enhanced the edu-
cational experience of the College’s U.S. alumni. But that was never the sole nor 
the overriding reason it first opened its doors to the international community; 
educating international officers always has been a goal in itself. On any given 
day, the College’s international alumni command about 40 percent of the world’s 
navies and coast guards. That these leaders possess a sophisticated understand-
ing of international politics, a thorough familiarity with the United States and its 
military forces, and a shared appreciation for the profession’s norms of behavior is 
of inestimable value to both the United States and the international community. 
The bonds of understanding, friendship, and trust forged in Newport have made 
On Internationalization
7032_President'sForum.indd   2 8/10/17   9:15 AM
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the College “neutral ground,” where the personnel of navies from around the 
world not only feel welcome but are inspired to work together�
Through a series of initiatives undertaken in the spirit of this internation-
alization, the College seeks to promote ever-greater levels of cooperation and 
interoperability among the world’s navies and coast guards� Key steps include 
the following: 
• Expand the Presidential Fellows Program to include four former heads of 
navy� We are incredibly blessed to have Admiral Guillermo Barrera, former 
head of the Colombian navy; Admiral Nirmal Verma, former head of the 
Indian navy; and Admiral Tomohisa Takei, recently retired head of the Japan 
Maritime Self-Defense Force, currently aboard� Rear Admiral Lars Saunes, 
former head of the Royal Norwegian Navy, will join us in the fall of 2017� In 
addition to writing, teaching, and mentoring students, they will advise the 
President of the College and, in coordination with the dean of International 
Programs, will develop and execute a plan that maintains policy momentum 
between the regularly scheduled International Seapower Symposia� Admi-
ral Barrera notes: “When I give lectures for the College of Naval Warfare 
and the College of Naval Command and Staff, I stress the usefulness of the 
themes and tools that the NWC [Naval War College] uses and teaches, as 
well as the contributions of the theorists in helping to understand the finer 
points of maritime strategy and operations� I illustrate this by citing suc-
cesses and failures that have occurred in real life� I also love supporting other 
areas of education at the College, such as the Combined Forces Maritime 
Component Commander course and the regional alumni symposia� These 
two initiatives are a significant part of the education of both the U�S� person-
nel and their global partners�”
• Bring the International Maritime Staff Operators Course (I-MSOC) to full 
output by 2020� This spring, fifteen officers from thirteen countries attended 
a “beta test” for the twelve-week course� Students were taught the funda-
mental concepts and processes necessary to support a coalition or combined 
maritime component commander, with emphasis on the U�S� Navy Planning 
Process and the organization and functions of a U�S� maritime operations 
center� Graduates of I-MSOC will serve as catalysts for greater interoper-
ability of coalition forces brought together to meet the challenges of the next 
maritime crisis� The course will be held three times a year, for an annual 
throughput of seventy-five students�
• Increase the frequency of the College’s regional alumni symposia (RASs) from 
one to two annually. These symposia are international academic conferences 
premised on the belief that military education is not solely the product of a 
NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb   3 8/7/17   11:58 AM
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 4, Art. 23
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/23
P R E S I D E N T ’ S  F O RU M  1 1
schoolhouse, but rather a lifelong attempt to acquire knowledge about the 
profession of arms� RASs also foster professional interaction among up-and-
coming military leaders within a region� This network promotes profession-
al linkages among military officers at a crucial juncture in their careers when 
international contacts prove invaluable� Usually cohosted with a war college 
from another country, RASs offer an excellent opportunity to interact with 
and influence a wide range of naval professionals around the world—like a 
“mini-ISS�”
• Institutionalize student military-to-military exchange efforts with China and
other nations� Building understanding, friendship, and trust is a slow, labori-
ous process that begins with small steps—particularly with countries that
harbor deep suspicions of the United States� Midlevel student exchanges are
an ideal means to that end�
• Increase the capacity of the College to conduct sustained, purposeful engage-
ment with our international partners, particularly its war college counterparts�
The cost-effective means of influencing future generations of naval officers
is through their professional military education� By adding a small cadre of
active and retired foreign area officers, the College aims to expand its contacts
abroad and facilitate faculty exchanges, curriculum development, and war
gaming�
The return on investment of these small yet critical initiatives can be signifi-
cant� The Naval War College will continue to seek ways to enhance its interna-
tionalization mission� It has been said that, while the sleek, gray hulls wrought by 
the skilled hands of patriotic shipwrights are important, we also must be vigilant 
in our efforts to build friend-ships, relation-ships, and partner-ships!
As noted in the opening paragraph of this President’s Forum, the College is 
moving out smartly to execute a four-part vision for the institution to make it 
more supportive of the needs of the operating forces; more attentive to the unique 
challenges and opportunities represented by our naval heritage and focus; more 
cognizant of and attuned to the impact that technological change will have on our 
maritime and joint forces; and more assiduous in its efforts to enhance maritime 
cooperation and friendship around the globe� I can assure you that all hands are 
“turning to” to make this vision a reality�
JEFFREY A� HARLEY
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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Their Development and Courses from Confrontation  
to Cooperation
Werner Rahn
GERMAN NAVIES FROM 1848 TO 2016
 Military history deals with the evolution and structure of armed forces and their position in state and society� In this sense, naval history is taken 
to mean that part of military history that concentrates its studies on the navy� 
However, when dealing with fields of research, one sphere provides the greatest 
challenge for military and naval historians: warfare in the widest sense�1
In his book The Face of Battle, British historian John Keegan points out that many 
historians are shy about exploring the profundities and realities of war�2 Generally 
speaking, we can expect naval or other military historians to have a certain affin-
ity for the subject of their research� They should have a basic knowledge about the 
military, in the same way that we expect an economic historian to have a sound 
basic knowledge of economic theory� But Keegan is justified in demanding that 
the military historian spend as much time as possible among military personnel, 
“because the quite chance observation of trivial incidents may illuminate his � � � 
understanding of all sorts of problems from the past which will otherwise almost 
certainly remain obscured�”3 Like any historian, the naval historian bears a great 
responsibility in his striving after historical truth, if he wants to be taken seri-
ously� The uncritical patriotic history that used to glorify naval actions should be 
a thing of the past�
Today, some historians tend to judge personalities, events, and structures ac-
cording to today’s moral categories� They end up “putting the past on trial, and 
since the critical historian, armed with his generation’s self-confidence or with 
his progressive concept of the future, knows everything better, in this trial he will 
be prosecutor, judge, and legislator all in one�”4
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In 1957, the German navy began to develop a new approach to studying its 
own history� That year, the first fleet commander in chief, Rear Admiral Rolf 
Johannesson (1900–89), organized the Historical-Tactical Conference� Since 
then it has been held every year, and is now a standard element of the naval of-
ficer’s historical education� Johannesson’s aim was to distance his service from 
subjective naval history about World War I�5 He hoped that a critical discussion of 
the past would teach his officers truth, loyalty, and moral courage, and that they 
would determine their own position more solidly by recourse to history and the 
federal constitution� Through 2016, fifty-six conferences have been held, covering 
a wide variety of subjects�6 Papers usually are presented by junior officers from 
the fleet, assisted by naval historians� The presentation of the papers and the can-
did discussion of subjects relevant to the business of the day usually provide testi-
mony to the intellectual talents among the navy’s officer corps� Many an admiral-
to-be made a mark when as a lieutenant he presented some critical theory about 
history—provoking the older generation’s opposition�
It is a perennial challenge to historians even to come close to historical truth� 
The commercial success of popular publications, as well as the large number 
of visitors attracted to museums, indicates how many people have historical 
interests� Such continuing interest is a stimulating challenge for professional 
historians� We should continue to try to present our findings about background 
information and structures from the past in such a way that the message gets 
across—meaning that historical knowledge and historical sensitivity become 
factors serving to help stabilize a liberal society�
THE BIRTH OF A GERMAN NAVY
The first German navy worthy to bear such designation was established in 1848, 
when a conflict over the duchy of Schleswig resulted in a war with Denmark�7 At 
that time, Germany could do nothing against the Danes’ efficient blockade; ocean 
trade came to a standstill� This dilemma resulted in a rather emotional movement 
that advocated building up a fleet� The issue soon captivated the members of the 
national assembly that had convened at Frankfurt’s Saint Paul’s Cathedral only a 
short time before� On June 14, 1848, by an overwhelming majority, the first Ger-
man parliament voted a large appropriation to build a fleet�8
Prince Adalbert of Prussia (1811–73), who had concerned himself with 
maritime problems rather early, played an important part in those first maritime 
plans� In May 1848, he published a memorandum on the buildup of a German 
fleet that became, so to speak, the Magna Carta of the German navy� By analyz-
ing the maritime-strategic situation of Prussia and Germany and having taken 
into consideration already the imminent technical revolution, it formed the first 
theoretical basis for a German naval concept� The memorandum included three 
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models on which Germany might establish a navy: (1) providing mere coastal 
defense; (2) defending sea lines of communication (SLOCs); or (3) building up 
an independent sea power� Prince Adalbert, however, clearly emphasized that 
even steps leading toward the buildup of an independent sea power would in-
volve many risks, and that once this option had been chosen there could be no 
stopping halfway�9
During the preparations for the buildup of a fleet, it soon became clear that 
almost all requirements—in personnel, matériel, and organization—could not be 
met� It was, therefore, only natural to ask for foreign assistance� Arnold Duckwitz 
(1802–81), the first German secretary of the navy, in October 1848 forwarded an 
official request to the American government for assistance in building up, with 
regard to personnel and matériel, a German fleet� In the United States, the Ger-
man liberal revolution had been observed with interest and with an open mind� 
Thus, the German requests met with a positive response within both private and 
official circles� First contacts were established by the frigate USS St. Lawrence, 
commanded by Captain Hiram Paulding (1797–1878), which was visiting 
Bremerhaven in the fall of 1848� The ship and crew were received enthusiasti-
cally as envoys of a hoped-for ally� The U�S� Navy immediately began personnel- 
support activities by rendering assistance with training: the frigate took aboard 
four Prussian sea cadets for practical exposure� Captain Paulding, as an adviser, 
was for weeks the center of attention during all discussions on the fleet buildup, 
which were held in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Hannover� The matériel support con-
centrated on providing a modern frigate, which was equipped at the New York 
Naval Yard and transferred to Europe in the summer of 1849�10
Even though the duration and the scope of this first American military aid to 
Germany were limited, that assistance provided early evidence of an American 
policy of being ready and able to support, across the Atlantic, the principles of 
democracy and liberalism� On both sides of that ocean, common goals and mu-
tual sympathy for the liberal-democratic forces resulted in the first steps toward 
cooperation� How close these idealistic ties actually were became evident after 
the Frankfurt National Assembly failed, when high emigration rates resulted 
from disappointed democrats finding their spiritual home in the United States� 
One example was Carl Schurz (1829–1906), who later became Secretary of the 
Interior� Such a “brain drain” strengthened the hand of conservative forces in 
Germany—the consequences of which are well known�
The German navy remained in existence even after the dream of a united 
Reich had long gone and the reality of particularism governed German poli-
tics� However, in 1853 the fleet was disbanded and its few ships were sold or 
scrapped�11 Only Prussia, with its relatively longer coastline, still had available a 
limited number of naval forces, proudly named the Royal Prussian Navy�
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Yet the idea of the navy as an instrument of national unification stayed alive 
even after 1848� After the foundation of the Reich in 1871, the navy’s function 
as a symbol of German unity was stressed officially, in contrast to the army’s 
organization by individual states� The very term Imperial Navy emphasized that 
this instrument of power was subject directly to the Reich� The personnel of the 
Imperial German Navy (IGN) came from all parts of Germany, and the fleet be-
came, as Tirpitz (see below) once put it, a “melting pot of teutonicism�”12
However, until 1897 the navy’s development was overshadowed by that of the 
army� The navy’s contributions to the wars against Denmark in 1864, Austria in 
1866, and France in 1870–71 seemingly were of no importance� Strategically, the 
IGN concentrated on providing a forward coastal defense�13
STRATEGIC ROOTS OF BUILDING A GERMAN BATTLE FLEET
In 1894, spurred by the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), the 
German naval high command prepared a strategic concept for the buildup of a 
battle fleet�14 Captain Alfred von Tirpitz (1849–1930), then chief of staff of the 
naval high command, seems to have taken the initiative to formulate the famous 
Dienstschrift (Service Memorandum) No� IX, under the misleading title “Gen-
eral Lessons Learned from the Fleet Autumn Exercise�”15
In this memorandum, Tirpitz resolutely pleads that strategic offensive ac-
tions should be considered “normal tasks of a fleet�”16 Such actions should aim 
at bringing about “the earliest possible initiation of a battle,” a battle that would 
reach the “main decision” of naval warfare� That decision could not be reached by 
a cruiser war, such as was prescribed under the tenets of the French Jeune École 
school of thought, but “only by permanent naval supremacy and lasting pressure 
on the enemy�”17
Owing to Germany’s position in the heart of Central Europe, its long coasts 
on the North and Baltic Seas, and its borders with eight neighboring nations, any 
strategy of the Reich that did not rely on strong alliance partners required it to 
decide whether a threat should be neutralized defensively or eliminated offen-
sively� As long as Germany considered only France as a potential enemy (and later 
Russia as well), the offensive strategic concept for naval operations that Tirpitz 
laid down in Service Memorandum No� IX seemed appropriate�
In June 1897, Tirpitz was appointed state secretary in the Reichsmarineamt 
(Imperial Naval Office)�18 Not least because of his influence, the politics of the 
Reich gradually expanded to consider the risks involved in confronting Britain� 
For Tirpitz, England was, from the beginning, “the most dangerous naval enemy,” 
against which Germany “most urgently required a certain measure of naval force 
as a political power factor�” Since Tirpitz considered cruiser warfare a lost cause, 
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owing to Germany’s lack of naval bases, he asked for the buildup of a fleet that 
“can unfold its greatest military potential between Heligoland and the Thames�”19
Elsewhere within the IGN there were well-founded doubts regarding this 
conceptualization� Captain Curt Freiherr von Maltzahn (1849–1930), who at 
that time taught tactics and naval history at the German naval academy, warned 
as early as 1898 that reaching “Seeherrschaft” (sea control) by means of a battle 
would not suffice by itself to impose peace on the opponent, for such sea control 
would have to be maintained and exploited� This would require a surplus of 
strength� As long as neither party achieved sea control, the weaker party would be 
confined to fighting against the achievement of sea control by its enemy, forgoing 
victory as the goal of its own combat actions� It would be important to maintain a 
national seaborne trade “corresponding in strength to the means deployed for de-
fense�”20 Maltzahn considered a combination of squadron operations and cruiser 
war to be the most suitable naval strategy� “Squadron operations are indispens-
able in this type of warfare, but they are only a means and not an end, and they 
become only really valuable if the freedom of action thus gained is exploited�”21
However, such a foresighted and realistic alternative, one that combined a 
balanced defensive fleet with strong cruiser elements, stood no chance in the 
IGN� Tirpitz repressed any further strategic discussions so as not to jeopardize 
the buildup of the fleet, which had received legislative backing and thereafter was 
scheduled to be accomplished over an extended period�22
CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE: THE NAVAL ARMAMENT RACE
The objectives and planning principles of the German battle fleet construction 
can be summarized as follows: The basic prerequisite for gaining sea control was 
the destruction, or at least the decisive weakening, of the enemy battle fleet� Thus, 
planning focused on the fleet’s capability to impose a decision in battle� The battle 
fleet also was considered a political means of power that could enable Germany 
to defend its overseas interests adequately� Britain, the most dangerous potential 
opponent, was to be deterred from a war with Germany by means of a strong 
fleet, or, should deterrence fail, was to be engaged successfully�
Among the liberal bourgeoisie, the naval policy met with strong support, 
which was increased even further by propaganda skillfully directed� However, 
while drawing up its ambitious armament program, Germany misjudged the 
dangers arising from its geographical situation in Central Europe� Any German 
approach that strove to establish an international maritime stature and adopt a 
counterpoint stance toward Britain was bound to be met with profound suspicion 
from Britain� After the German-British alliance talks in 1901 failed to produce 
any tangible results—the two sides were pursuing incompatible objectives—the 
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buildup of the German battle fleet became and remained a crucial disruptive 
factor, preventing any subsequent arrangement with Britain and resulting in an 
arms race�
From 1905 onward, that escalatory dynamic was characterized by an enor-
mous increase in the combat power of battleships� With the construction of HMS 
Dreadnought in 1905–1906, the Royal Navy set a new standard� Tirpitz had to 
keep pace if the IGN was to remain equal, ship for ship, with its potential enemy� 
As a result, his long-term financial planning had been in vain, for the construc-
tion of capital ships involved ever-increasing costs�
Britain could cope with the cost increases involved in the construction of capi-
tal ships, or at least it had to do so since its security was exclusively dependent 
on the superiority of the Royal 
Navy� In contrast, the defense 
of Germany was primarily 
an army responsibility, with 
the navy playing a secondary 
role� Britain’s first lord of the 
Admiralty Winston Churchill 
(1874–1965) explained this in a public speech in February 1912� The strategic 
situations of both countries, Churchill pointed out, made his own fleet a vital 
necessity to the British Empire, whereas “from some points of view, the German 
Navy is to them more in the nature of a luxury�”23
Groaning under the burden of high naval expenditures, in 1912 both govern-
ments tried again to come to an agreement that they hoped would reduce the 
building rates of capital ships� In February 1912, the British cabinet sent Secretary 
of State for War Richard B� Haldane, 1st Viscount Haldane (1856–1928), to Berlin 
to try to reach a general settlement in these matters� However, Lord Haldane’s 
talks with the German side never converted into real negotiations, and the ef-
fort failed after a few days� The British were unwilling “to commit themselves to 
neutrality,” and the German side—under pressure from Tirpitz—was unwilling 
to modify the country’s planned building rate�24 Tirpitz appreciated that for Eng-
land “the Entente with France gives her the best security against a too powerful 
Germany,” he said� “I no longer believe that we can get out of this vicious circle�”25 
As Germany did not have enough resources to fulfill all the requirements of both 
the army and the navy, the IGN could not keep up in the unconstrained arms 
race that commenced thereafter, even though by 1914 it had become the world’s 
second-strongest navy�
Before 1914, modern warships, such as capital ships, cruisers, and torpedo 
boats, were not only part of a nation’s military potential but striking evidence 
We should continue to try to present our find-
ings about . . . the past in such a way that . . . 
historical knowledge and . . . sensitivity be-
come factors serving to help stabilize a liberal 
society.
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of its industrial and technological capability� Only highly industrialized nations 
could solve on their own the complex technological problems that the transition 
to modern capital ships involved� This was particularly true for the new technolo-
gies of engines and weapons, as well as for the improvement in ship survivability 
achieved through the use of high-quality steel armor�26
The period between 1905 and 1914 was characterized by a technological revo-
lution that made naval weapons obsolete rapidly� This applied to cruisers, tor-
pedo boats, and submarines as well as larger units� During the first major naval 
battles of World War I, the decisive effects of superior speed and more powerful 
guns became apparent�
STRATEGY AND GEOGRAPHY
Tirpitz based his strategic concept on the assumption that the Royal Navy always 
would act offensively in a war against Germany; in particular, it would establish 
a close blockade of the German coast� Such a blockade near Heligoland “would 
provide abundant opportunities to equalize naval strength” or to “enter into a 
decisive battle�”27 For the IGN, this hypothetical battle became an element of 
dogma—the focal point of its operational concept and fleet training� For this 
reason, knowledge of and experience with weapons technology, tactics, and 
shiphandling were more-decisive factors in the careers of naval officers than 
qualification in staff assignments—which had a long-term effect on the choice of 
personnel for command-and-control appointments� The work of the Admiral-
stab (naval staff), established in 1899, and the creation of a specialized corps of 
staff officers to man it, seemed secondary in importance� As a consequence, the 
naval officer corps remained unprepared for the complex strategic dimensions of 
a naval war against Britain�28
Although all the preparations focused on the “decisive battle,” a great deal of 
confusion existed regarding the true purpose of the battle�29 While those staffing 
the German naval command had adopted Mahan’s theory of sea power willingly, 
they paid only lip service to a central element of that theory: the importance of 
geographical position and the resultant strategic options� By throttling Germany’s 
seaborne trade, an opponent could decide a “war by severing an artery essential 
to the existence of Germany�”30
An incorrect assessment of the effects of geography on British naval opera-
tions led the German naval leadership to a faulty assessment of British strategy� 
Britain had never attempted to eliminate an opponent’s navy at any price; it did so 
only when the British Isles and their SLOCs in the Atlantic were threatened� And 
these SLOCs remained outside the range of the German naval forces, except for a 
few cruisers and, later, submarines� To maintain a close blockade of the German 
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coast, the Royal Navy would have found it useful to eliminate the German fleet 
at an early date, but the Admiralty was well aware that such a strategic offensive 
would involve considerable losses� Especially cognizant of the threat that German 
torpedo boats, submarines, and mines represented, after 1911–12 the Royal Navy 
no longer considered deploying its Grand Fleet to the southern North Sea�31 In 
November 1912, the Admiralty issued a set of “General Instructions” to its war 
plans against Germany, summarizing Britain’s strategic approach as follows:
The general idea is to use our geographical advantage of position to cut off all Ger-
man shipping from oceanic trade and to secure the British coasts from any serious 
military enterprise and incidentally but effectually to cover the transport across the 
Channel of an Expeditionary Force to France� � � � It is believed that the prolongation 
of a distant blockade will inflict injury upon German interests� � � � To relieve such a 
situation, Germany would be tempted to send into the North Sea a force sufficient  
� � � to offer a general action� Such an action or actions would take place far from the 
German coast and close to our own�32
This plan implied a new wartime deployment for the Grand Fleet: basing it at 
Scapa Flow, in the Scottish Orkneys�
When in 1912 the German naval staff discovered the new orientation of its 
potential enemy, the chief of naval staff, Vice Admiral August von Heeringen 
(1855–1927), examined in a war game whether and how Germany’s High Seas 
Fleet could counter a distant blockade� The result was sobering� The Blue (i�e�, 
German) war-gaming party had advanced its squadrons as far as the Firth of 
Forth, but there they encountered difficulties and suffered considerable losses 
while withdrawing� The admiral concluded: “If the British really restrict their 
activities to the remote blockade and consistently hold back their battle fleet, then 
the role of our beautiful High Seas Fleet could be a very sad one in wartime� The 
submarines will have to do the job�”33
It must be left open what type of submarine employment Heeringen had in 
mind, but his estimate hit the central strategic problem for German naval war-
fare during World War I� Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the role of the submarine as a naval weapon “had grown from base to 
coast defence and from this to an offensive task in enemy waters�”34 Basically, the 
submarine was a mobile torpedo boat with long endurance� Submerged, a subma-
rine made only slow progress—but it had the ability to vanish below the surface 
of the sea for several hours�
In comparison with other naval powers, the IGN came late to building sub-
marines� The first one, U-1 (282 tons), was commissioned in December 1906� 
Obviously, Tirpitz had waited until he was sure that submarines were an effective 
offensive weapon� After 1908, he ordered more than forty oceangoing subma-
rines, of which twenty-eight had been completed before war broke out�35
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WORLD WAR I
When Britain joined the war on the side of France and Russia in August 1914, 
it became clear that the German High Seas Fleet could not perform its politi-
cal function of deterrence� Britain, relying on its superior fleet and the strategic 
positions the country and its empire held worldwide to protect its vital SLOCs, 
considered the German fleet, which could operate only from the North Sea, to 
be an acceptable risk�36
In August 1914, the IGN lay under the spell of great enemy superiority� The 
naval command placed all its hopes on reducing enemy forces through offensive 
submarine and minelaying operations� The assumption was that the opponent 
would seek battle, but Germany’s fleet was to be employed in such a battle only 
“under favorable conditions�”37
Although the few German cruisers stationed overseas at the outbreak of war 
were quite successful in guerre de course (warfare against merchant vessels), the 
Royal Navy soon neutralized them� Germany’s East Asiatic Squadron, under Vice 
Admiral Maximilian von Spee (1861–1914) moved across the Pacific Ocean and 
destroyed a British squadron off Chile, but its advance to the Falkland Islands 
in the South Atlantic on December 8, 1914, proved fatal�38 The example demon-
strates that the IGN neither recognized nor made use of the strategic advantages 
it might have derived from coordinating the operations of its naval forces over-
seas with those at home�
However, one small but powerful German squadron did influence the balance 
of forces and the overall course of World War I: the Mediterranean Division, 
comprising the battle cruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau, under Rear 
Admiral Wilhelm A� Souchon (1864–1946)� The breakthrough of the two units to 
Constantinople and their formal handover to Turkey in August 1914 influenced 
Turkey to join the war on the side of the Central powers in October 1914� The 
Turkish straits (the Dardanelles and the Bosporus) became impassable for the 
Allies; all their attempts to penetrate them failed, with heavy losses�39 Thus, the 
second important route to Russia, other than the Baltic Sea, remained blocked, 
contributing to Russia’s loss as an ally of the Entente in 1917� After the war, Sir 
Julian S� Corbett commented as follows on this German strategic success:
When we consider that the Dardanelles was mined, that no permission to enter it 
had been ratified, and that everything depended on the German powers of cajolery at 
Constantinople, when we also recall the world wide results that ensued, it is not too 
much to say that few naval decisions more bold and well-judged were ever taken� So 
completely, indeed, did the risky venture turn a desperate situation into one of high 
moral and material advantage, that for the credit of German statesmanship it goes far 
to balance the cardinal blunder of attacking France through Belgium�40
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The various operations the High Seas Fleet conducted in the North and Baltic 
Seas, which culminated in the battle of Jutland in May 1916, cannot conceal the 
fact that primarily it performed the functions of a “fleet in being”: securing the 
German coast, blocking the Baltic approaches, and keeping clear the submarines’ 
sailing routes�41
In the first few months of the war, the submarine gave a striking demon-
stration of its power� On September 22, 1914, U-9 (Lieutenant Otto Weddigen 
[1880–1915], commanding) sank three aged armored cruisers in an hour� At 
first, the Royal Navy could not believe the cruisers “had been attacked by a single 
submarine and attributed the disaster to a whole flotilla�”42 Over the next couple 
of weeks, the U-boats extended their patrols; by October 1914, U-20 had pen-
etrated the Channel to attack transports on their way to France, circumnavigated 
the British Isles, and returned to Germany, having cruised 2,200 miles in eighteen 
days�43
Commerce Raiding by U-boats, 1915–18
The varied arguments concerning the degree of success German submarines 
achieved in their raiding against Britain’s maritime commerce are a classic exam-
ple of the civil-military struggle of a nation at war� At the time, this struggle was 
influenced greatly by public opinion, for submarine warfare became a popular 
myth to which a large number of Germans subscribed; they believed the U-boat 
was some sort of infallible, magic weapon that would bring victory� Because of 
some successful surprise raids, not only the public but the naval command over-
estimated the efficiency of submarines�
Initial considerations within the IGN regarding the employment of subma-
rines against British shipping had not yielded a clear picture by the time Tirpitz 
spoke publicly on the issue—which he did without consulting Chancellor Theo-
bald von Bethmann-Hollweg (1856–1921) or chief of naval staff Admiral Hugo 
von Pohl (1855–1916)� In response to the British threat to “strangulate the [Ger-
man] economy with the help of a blockade,” as Churchill had put it in a speech 
on November 9, Tirpitz responded in an interview that Germany could “play the 
same game”—by torpedoing all British shipping�44
This triggered a passionate public debate that had repercussions for the naval 
command� The young historian Gerhard Ritter (1888–1967) knew from his own 
experience during the war that
[i]t was Tirpitz’s interview that poured more oil on the fire when it was published in 
late December� Thenceforth the question of submarine warfare was no longer a naval 
problem for the experts to judge, but a political issue of the first order, with everyone 
having his say� A “U-boat movement” quickly came into being� � � � Again the aca-
demic superpatriots were in the forefront with plans and petitions to the Chancellor 
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and the navy on how to starve Britain into submission� Some of the most renowned 
names at the University of Berlin were among them�45
The naval staff encouraged support for commerce warfare from the govern-
ment; however, the method’s prospects for success could not be assessed, because 
so few submarines were available� Of the twenty-two submarines in the North Sea 
in early 1915, only fourteen (those with diesel engines) could operate west of the 
British Isles� The chancellor came under both public and naval pressure while 
making his decision, and he relied too much on the navy staff ’s optimistic fore-
cast� Early in February 1915, Bethmann-Hollweg gave his consent to submarine 
warfare—without either the government or the naval command having analyzed 
thoroughly the methodology of commerce raiding itself or the associated politi-
cal risks and international complications�
The German proclamation of February 4, 1915, declared “the waters around 
Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, to be a war 
zone in which every merchant ship encountered would be destroyed, without it 
always being possible to assure the safety of passengers and crew� Because of the 
British misuse of neutral flags, it might not always be possible to prevent attacks 
meant for hostile ships from falling on neutrals�”46 By conducting commerce war-
fare in this way, Germany opened new issues in international law, because subma-
rines could not adhere adequately to the classic prize rules� This was particularly 
so after the British began arming merchant vessels, and later created disguised 
British auxiliary cruisers (Q-ships), which were a great threat to U-boats�
Despite these challenges, the commanding officers of German submarines, 
displaying a combination of caution and skill, achieved remarkable results with 
their deck guns while managing to comply with the prize regulations� Owing to 
a lack of space, submarines could not embark survivors, but in many cases they 
towed lifeboats to nearby coasts� However, the German naval staff criticized this 
practice: “The deterring effect of the submarine war will be lost if it is felt that 
passing the blockade zone is no longer a serious risk to the lives of the crews�”47 
Without providing its submarine commanding officers with clear instructions, 
the naval command obviously assumed that most ships would be sunk by torpe-
does without warning, further deterring neutral shipping�
When the U�S� government raised concerns about the way the war was being 
waged and referred to the international principles of naval warfare, the chief of 
the general staff, General Erich von Falkenhayn (1861–1922), feared the United 
States might enter the war� He wanted a guarantee that submarine warfare would 
force England “to give in” within six weeks� When the kaiser inquired about the 
matter, Tirpitz and the new chief of naval staff, Vice Admiral Gustav Bachmann 
(1860–1943), confirmed this amazing forecast—without explaining what they 
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meant by England’s “giving in�” On February 12, Bachmann wrote to Admiral 
Pohl, then commander in chief of the High Seas Fleet: “It is in the military inter-
est to make submarine warfare as effective as possible� Do not shy away from 
sinking enemy passenger liners� Their loss will cause the greatest impact�”48
The first serious instances of confrontation with the United States arose from 
German naval activities� On May 7, 1915, the submarine U-20 sank the British 
passenger liner Lusitania (31,550 gross registered tons [GRT]), using only one 
torpedo� This attack was conducted without warning and claimed the lives of 
1,198 civilians, including 126 Americans; however, it was established later that 
Lusitania had been carrying some war matériel in its forecastle�
This incident caused a severe diplomatic rift with the United States� President 
Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) called on Germany to adhere to the accepted 
principles of naval warfare and to respect the safety of American citizens travel-
ing in the war zone� Following a similar incident in August 1915, the German 
government yielded� In September, over the objection of the naval command, 
commerce raiding was ordered stopped west of the British Isles; only in the 
North and Mediterranean Seas was commerce raiding continued, and then in 
accordance with the prize regulations�
By early 1916, the number of operational U-boats had risen to fifty-one� In-
tensified submarine warfare, as demanded by the chief of general staff, resumed 
in February 1916� It aimed at sinking armed British merchant vessels, without 
warning, while sparing passenger liners� But the French Channel steamer Sussex 
was torpedoed on March 24, 1916, and another severe crisis between Germany 
and the United States ensued� On April 18, 1916, Washington threatened to sever 
diplomatic relations�49
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg now saw his earlier pessimistic assessment of 
the situation confirmed� From the onset of the new stage of submarine warfare, 
he had doubted the need for such a hazardous venture, “which would claim as a 
stake our existence as a great power and the future of our nation in its entirety, 
while the chance of winning, that is, the prospect of bringing England down by 
fall, is a rather uncertain one�”50
So the chancellor provided assurance to Washington that merchant vessels 
“would not be sunk without warning or without saving people’s lives�”51 As a 
result, the frontline commanders of the IGN (i�e�, of the High Seas Fleet and the 
German marine corps in Flanders), acting on their own initiative—later backed 
up by the naval command—moved their submarines out of the western operating 
areas because they felt that operating under prize regulations exposed their ves-
sels to great danger� Commerce raiding under the prize regulations was contin-
ued only in the Mediterranean� In the North Sea, the submarines operated against 
military targets until September 1916, without achieving any significant results�
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This extreme reaction—transferring submarines out of the operating areas 
entirely—was inconsistent with the actual situation� Of the thirty-five subma-
rines that had been lost by June 1916, only four had been destroyed by Q-ships, 
and none had been destroyed by armed merchant vessels�
Submarines’ promising capabilities for commerce raiding, even under the 
prize regulations, became more discernible in summer 1916�52 The resumption of 
submarine warfare under the prize regulations provoked no political risks while 
achieving considerable results: the monthly average of sinkings between October 
1916 and January 1917 was 189 merchant vessels, of 324,742 GRT� This was not 
enough to force a decision 
in the war against Britain, 
but the war economy of the 
Allies was damaged heavily 
enough to produce a chance 
for a negotiated peace� Still, 
the naval command, in a rigid 
and dogmatic manner, repeat-
edly demanded “unrestricted submarine warfare�” The IGN was convinced that 
this would result in decisive victory, even presuming the expected break with the 
United States�
The naval staff decided to test the U�S� government by sending a submarine 
to the U�S� East Coast� On October 7, 1916, thirty-one-year-old Lieutenant Hans 
Rose (1885–1969), endowed with powers equivalent to those of an ancient Ro-
man proconsul (his wording), headed his submarine, U-53, for Newport, Rhode 
Island, as a demonstration of the efficiency of German submarines—and as a 
warning to the U�S� Navy� After a three-hour visit to the Naval War College, Rose 
departed Newport—and sank five enemy merchant ships off the American coast, 
under prize rules� Sixteen U�S� destroyers observed this action at close range�53
The atmosphere and attitude among German naval officers at that time were 
portrayed in a diary entry by Lieutenant Ernst von Weizsäcker (1882–1951) of 
September 27, 1916� “The naval officers are sitting around, drinking, talking 
politics, hatching plots, and into the bargain feel patriotic, trying, in a dishonest 
way, to force submarine warfare� Submarine warfare is designed to conceal the 
foolish things done in developing the fleet and employing the fleet in war� This 
inadmissible propaganda evidences their bad consciences�”54
However, the propaganda Weizsäcker mentioned was effective� This was es-
pecially significant since the new general headquarters of all army forces, under 
Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934) and General Erich Ludendorff 
(1865–1937), realized that the attrition campaign had failed and that, as things 
stood, victory in France was becoming less and less likely�
[T]he first German secretary of the navy in 
October 1848 forwarded an official request 
to the American government for assistance 
in building up . . . a German fleet. . . . [T]he 
German requests met with a positive response 
within both private and official circles.
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Unlike the military, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg intended to avoid U�S� 
entry into the war on the Allied side� He hoped that President Wilson would ar-
range a negotiated peace� However, when the British government in December 
1916 harshly rejected a German peace offer, German leaders changed their opin-
ion� Now the military leaders, especially Hindenburg and Ludendorff, categori-
cally demanded “unrestricted submarine warfare,” claiming it was the last means 
of gaining victory� At a conference on January 9, 1917, after heated discussion, 
the chancellor supported their demand, and the German high command recom-
menced unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917�55 A few weeks later, 
at a meeting of the Main Parliament Committee, Admiral Eduard von Capelle 
(1855–1931), Tirpitz’s successor, “went so far as to insist that the effect of Ameri-
can entry into war would be ‘zero’! American troops would not even be able to 
cross the ocean for lack of transport�”56
In response to unrestricted warfare, the United States broke relations with 
Germany, announcing “armed neutrality�” However, the Entente wanted the Unit-
ed States to enter the war, so the alliance could take utmost advantage of a fully 
mobilized American war economy� Thanks to maladroit German diplomacy, this 
goal soon was accomplished�
Seeking to keep the Americans militarily engaged on their continent and in 
the Pacific Ocean, Germany proposed an alliance with Japan and Mexico� The 
proposal was sent by cable to Mexico in the so-called Zimmermann telegram on 
January 16, 1917� With the aid of captured German codebooks, British naval intel-
ligence managed to decrypt all the German diplomatic cables transmitted among 
Berlin, Washington, and Mexico City� To expedite the U�S� decision-making 
process, the British government transmitted the pertinent cables to Washington, 
and President Wilson had them released to the press on February 28�57
Germany’s offer to Mexico of an alliance inflamed American public opinion 
against Germany� Early in April, the United States entered the war on the side 
of the Allies� Thus, unrestricted submarine warfare alone did not trigger the 
American declaration of war, but Germany’s naval stance contributed to it in a 
substantial way�
On February 1, 1917, Germany had 105 operational submarines available to 
conduct unrestricted submarine warfare� By June 1917, their number had been 
increased to only 129� Because of the increase in operations between February 
and July 1917, repair periods gradually were prolonged, leading to a decrease in 
the number of operationally ready submarines�58
On the other hand, in April 1917 alone, 458 Allied ships totaling 840,000 GRT 
were sunk� This led to a severe crisis for the Allies, who momentarily doubted 
their ability to continue the war� However, Germany did not achieve its strate-
gic objective—effective disruption of British shipping� The Allies introduced 
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convoying in the summer of 1917, and thereafter far fewer ships were sunk. 
Between February and June 1917, an average of 363 ships of 629,863 GRT were 
sunk per month, whereas during the last quarter of 1917 sinkings averaged 159 
per month, totaling 365,489 GRT. In 1918, the numbers of ships sunk decreased 
even further. Because of this, the German naval staff was not able to keep the 
promise it had made: by the autumn of 1918, about 1.4 million American soldiers 
had made it to France. U.S. entry into the war proved to be the decisive factor in 
the defeat of Germany.59
After the Allies introduced the convoy system, German submarines faced seri-
ous operational and tactical problems. The concentration of merchant ships in 
a convoy had to be countered with a concentration of submarines. Even before 
GERMAN SUBMARINE LOSSES 1914–18
Cause 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 Total
Ramming
• By warships
• By merchant vessels
2  1 —
—
 8
 2
 3
 2
 14
 4
Artillery
• By warships
• By merchant vessels
• By Q-ships
—
—
—
 2
 —
 3
 3
—
 2
—
—
 6
 3
 1
—
 
 8
 1
 11
Searching gear with petard —  1  1 —  1  3
Explosion of ammunition aboard a  
merchant vessel
—  — —  1 —  1
Attack by aircraft —  — —  1 —  1
Depth charges —  —  2  7  21  30
Torpedoing —  4  1  7  6  18
Mines 2  2  6  21  23  54
Accidents
• By German mines
• By German torpedoes
• By beaching
• During diving
• Collision with German submarine
—
—
—
—
—
 2
 1
 1
 —
—
 1
—
 2
—
—
 6
—
 2
 1
 1
 1
 1
—
—
—
 10
 2
 5
 1
 1
Unknown 1  2  4 —  7  14
Total 5 19 22 63 69 178
Note: excludes accidents in home waters.
Sources: Robert M. Grant, U-boats Destroyed: The Effect of Anti-submarine Warfare 1914–1918 (London: Putnam, 1964); Robert M. Grant, U-boat Intel-
ligence (London: Putnam, 1969). Cf. Joachim Schröder, Die U-Boote des Kaisers: Die Geschichte des deutschen U-Boot-Krieges gegen Großbritannien im 
Ersten Weltkrieg (Bonn: Bernard & Graefe, 2003), and Rahn, “Die Kaiserliche Marine und der Erste Weltkrieg,” p. 72.
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that, reconnaissance was required—the convoys had to be detected� The few 
boats available west of the British Isles could not cover the entire operating area, 
allowing many convoys to reach Britain undetected� When a submarine sighted 
a convoy, it could conduct a submerged attack, with torpedoes� The gun arma-
ment, which until the institution of convoying had achieved most results, fell 
into disuse�
Along with introducing the convoy system, the Allies enhanced antisubma-
rine defense by developing more efficient depth charges and the first underwater 
locating devices� But above all, it was the intensive mining of the shipping lanes 
in the North Sea and the English Channel that caused most U-boat casualties� 
Of the 132 German submarines lost in 1917–18, at least fifty sank after hitting 
mines�60
At the end of September 1918, the army’s supreme command admitted 
military defeat and demanded an immediate armistice� The United States made 
termination of unrestricted submarine warfare a precondition for reestablishing 
diplomatic contact� Yet the German naval command—to justify its existence—
prepared to send the fleet out for one final battle� The ships’ companies discerned 
that the naval command was acting arbitrarily and refused to obey� Within a few 
days, this mutiny developed into a revolt that led to the collapse and end of the 
IGN, which accelerated a general uprising in Germany�61
The Lessons of the Great War
In spite of outstanding achievements and successes against a superior opponent 
in various war theaters, the outcome of German naval operations was negative 
at the end of World War I� Not only did the IGN’s strategic concepts for fleet 
employment and for commerce warfare using submarines fail, but those failures 
were the starting point for a revolt that triggered the political overthrow of the 
government� Nevertheless, the High Seas Fleet effectively operated as a fleet in 
being� Its presence pinned down the British Grand Fleet in the North Sea, includ-
ing lighter naval forces, which consequently were not available for convoy-escort 
duty in the Atlantic� The fleet protected the German coast, blocked the Baltic 
against Allied resupply shipments to Russia, and, to a certain extent, backed up 
submarine warfare by keeping the departure and return routes clear� Contrary to 
the current view of historians who entirely deny the fleet’s strategic importance, 
the fleet was an asset for the German war effort; but a realistic cost-benefit analy-
sis shows that, in the end, the fleet did not achieve what it was expected to�
One of the fundamental lessons learned during World War I was that, over the 
long run, an effective blockade could so weaken the German war potential and 
economy, which were greatly dependent on the importation of raw materials, that 
not even defensive operations could be conducted� The German naval command 
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had not realized that sea power, i�e�, the ability to control and successfully use the 
sea, essentially is the product of both fleet strength and geographical position� If 
either factor were deficient, the entire result suffered� This was one of the essential 
reasons the High Seas Fleet did not bring about a decision in the overall conduct 
of the war� It failed to develop a concept in which the two components of naval 
warfare—surface forces and submarines—were integrated to enable timely and ef-
fective deployment against the two key strategic weak points in the enemy alliance: 
Allied merchant shipping in the Atlantic and the Russian coastline in the Baltic�
During the submarine war against Allied merchant shipping, the naval com-
mand rigidly relied on a one-sided and, in the end, inadequate naval concept that 
ignored the possibility and reality of U�S� entry into the war, thereby contributing 
to Germany’s defeat� During the operations against Russia, Germany hardly ever 
exploited its naval superiority� However, Germany’s blocking of access to the 
Baltic, in parallel with its ally’s control of the Turkish straits, diminished Russia’s 
war potential considerably� This success in the economic war, which Germany 
had not foreseen, relieved the country of the necessity to prosecute the war on 
two fronts by the spring of 1918; but that was too late to bring about success for 
the overall war effort�
The result Germany experienced in World War I was due not only to insuf-
ficient concepts and means but to the naval command’s strategic incompetence� 
The leadership seemed to be incapable of recognizing the natural limits that 
existed—limits that would have to be imposed on any German naval strategy 
within the overall strategic concept�
THE INTERWAR PERIOD, 1919–39
The Treaty of Versailles reduced Germany to the status of a third-rate naval 
power�62 Submarines and military aircraft were forbidden to it altogether� As a 
result, the navy lacked the weapons that modern naval warfare required� How-
ever, French opposition thwarted the British attempt to abolish the submarine 
entirely; Paris became the champion of minor naval powers by emphasizing the 
importance of the submarine as a naval weapon for weaker nations�63 During 
the preparation of the peace treaty, Admiral William S� Benson (1855–1932), 
the American Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), advocated only moderate cuts 
in the strength of the future German navy so as to maintain a counterbalance to 
the British fleet in the North Sea�64 The British never considered taking over the 
German ships for their own fleet—too costly; they simply wanted to sink them� 
However, France and Italy dismissed this idea� The problem was solved when the 
Germans themselves sank the major part of their fleet at Scapa Flow on June 21, 
1919�65 The German naval command regarded this accomplishment primarily 
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as a moral success� The consequences of the scuttling were severe: the Allies 
demanded full compensation, and claimed 80 percent of all German port equip-
ment; and the navy had to surrender its last five modern light cruisers�
German naval forces came to seem superfluous, given the total military de-
feat of 1918, the domestic unrest of 1919, and the ongoing border conflicts with 
Poland� However, for the navy to continue in existence and preserve its indepen-
dence from the army, the service required a plausible long-run mission� When, 
during the peace negotiations in the spring of 1919, the German government 
offered to renounce its force of six old battleships so as to achieve concessions 
in other areas, the victorious powers refused, pointing out that Germany should 
retain some limited naval forces for its own protection� They projected a small 
German fleet as a stabilizing factor in the Baltic area� Thus, Germany’s former en-
emies contributed considerably to the continued existence—modest as it was—of 
the German navy�66
The naval command argued that a navy was necessary because of the territo-
rial changes in eastern Europe, referring primarily to the alterations to Poland’s 
borders and the resultant isolation of East Prussia� In 1919–21, a Polish-Russian 
border dispute led to war, and future border conflicts could not be ruled out�67 If 
Germany had no naval forces at all, it would be impossible to defend East Prussia; 
the Poles would be able to cut the sea route across the Baltic—the only reliable 
line of supply for the German enclave�
The navy’s deliberations, unlike those of the army, soon expanded to consider 
other possible conflicts� As early as 1922 they took into account Poland’s ties with 
France� Once again, German naval strategy focused its attention on the North 
Sea� Given the German economy’s great dependence on seaborne supplies, the 
prerequisites for conducting defensive operations could be achieved only if Ger-
man shipping in the North and Baltic Seas continued unhindered�
The navy considered itself to be an instrument of territorial defense against 
France and Poland, while hoping, in better times to come, for an end to arma-
ment restrictions� When it became apparent that the limitations on their own 
arms that the victorious powers had announced at Versailles were not going to 
materialize, the German government consistently aspired to equal rights and na-
tional sovereignty in the military sphere, such that it could develop the country’s 
armed forces into an effective instrument of national defense�
In terms of matériel, a new start gradually was made, by constructing some 
torpedo boats and light cruisers� However, the challenge of developing a ten-
thousand-ton armored vessel (permitted by the peace treaty) that had sufficient 
combat power to survive an engagement with French capital ships was a tough 
nut to crack� Given the displacement limitation, it was not possible to meet nor-
mal requirements for armament and armor plating� When the changes in the 
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armament limitations for which the naval command had hoped failed to materi-
alize, the navy was forced to concentrate on designing a ship that was more like 
a cruiser than a battleship�
The decisive elements that influenced this change in planning lay on two 
levels, the tactical-operational and the political-military� In the tactical- 
operational sphere, exercises showed that heavy naval forces needed more 
speed� In the political-military sphere, the naval command thought it impera-
tive that every German ship 
constructed be superior in at 
least one respect to the war-
ship categories defined in the 
Washington Naval Agreement 
(encompassing multiple trea-
ties) of 1922� For battleships, 
it sought speed; for cruisers, heavy guns� To replace the old battleships while 
remaining under the terms of the peace treaty, the naval command planned a 
ship carrying six twenty-eight-centimeter (cm) guns and capable of twenty-eight 
knots�
To understand the German line of reasoning, it is necessary to look at the sta-
tus of international naval armaments at the end of the 1920s� The countries that 
had signed the Washington Naval Treaty (Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the 
United States) had navies dominated by capital ships having eight to twelve heavy 
guns (with calibers between 30�5 and 40�6 cm) and speeds of twenty to twenty-
three knots� Only Britain and Japan had battle cruisers equipped with six to eight 
heavy guns� These had a top speed between twenty-seven and thirty-one knots� 
Until 1930, the Washington Naval Treaty limited the total tonnage and construc-
tion of battleships and aircraft carriers� For cruisers, the treaty established ceil-
ings only for the displacement and armament of individual vessels� Thus, cruisers 
with a standard displacement of ten thousand tons and light armor were built� 
Their main armament comprised six to ten 20�3 cm guns; they had a top speed of 
thirty-three knots� Although they could evade the slower capital ships, they had 
to avoid contact with battle cruisers, which were capable of similar speed yet far 
superior in armament�
Since the core of the French fleet consisted of nine slow capital ships and five 
fast heavy cruisers, the German naval command deliberately endowed its ten-
thousand-ton vessel with the characteristics of a “small battle-cruiser”: it was 
superior to cruisers in armament and to capital ships in speed� With six 28 cm 
guns in two triple turrets and a speed of twenty-six to twenty-eight knots, the 
Panzerschiff (armored ship, also known as a “pocket battleship”) came very close 
to the concept of the battle cruiser� Moreover, diesel engines would give the ship a 
Over the course of the twentieth century, Ger-
many twice tried to force a strategic decision, 
in direct confrontation with the Anglo-Saxon 
naval powers, by cutting the Atlantic shipping 
routes. Both attempts ended in failure.
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maximum range of twenty thousand miles, vastly exceeding that of any cruiser or 
capital ship� Owing to its combat effectiveness and endurance, the pocket battle-
ship was suitable for both warfare in the North Sea and offensive operations in 
the Atlantic�
The construction of the ship immediately attracted the attention of foreign na-
val experts� In April 1929, the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Horace Rumbold 
(1869–1941), reported to his government as follows:
From a naval technical point of view, the building of this vessel is to be welcomed, as 
its design promises to include a number of new features in warship construction� The 
principal of these are reported to be a comparatively heavy armament of six 11-inch 
guns, eight 5�8-inch and twenty antiaircraft guns, six torpedo tubes, adequate armour 
protection, special Diesel engines giving a cruising speed of 26 knots, the extensive 
employment of light metals and electric welding in place of riveting, and the highest 
degree of unsinkability�68
However, Germany’s naval command regarded the construction of pocket 
battleships not just as a military necessity but as a political-military lever with 
which to upset the entire system of international naval armament controls that 
had been established—without German participation—at Washington in 1922� 
The naval command hoped this step would give Germany the chance to be 
readmitted to the community of major naval powers�69 Of course, if Germany 
had been included in the Washington Naval Agreement, this would have been 
tantamount to a wholesale abrogation of the naval arms limitations laid down in 
the Treaty of Versailles�
Change of Strategy and Operational Planning
The naval command was cognizant that Germany was highly dependent on 
seaborne imports� It tried to impress this overall strategic reality on the army so 
the latter would take that factor into account when drawing up its operational 
plans� From 1928 onward, the new minister of the Reichswehr (German Impe-
rial Defense), Lieutenant General Wilhelm Groener (Ret�) (1867–1939), set new 
standards for all operational planning by the army and navy� He stressed that the 
idea of a large-scale war had to be ruled out from the start� Military operations 
against foreign powers should be limited to two possible types of conflict: (1) 
repelling raids from neighboring states onto German territory; (2) maintaining 
armed neutrality during a conflict between foreign powers�
Groener demanded that the Reichswehr be combat ready to oppose immedi-
ately any sudden Polish invasion� For the navy, this new concept meant it had to 
be able, on seventy-two hours’ notice, to begin operations to destroy the Polish 
navy and neutralize the port of Gdynia as a naval base�70 Such a demonstrative 
strike clearly was intended to be part of a strategy of deterrence� Under this 
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concept of calculated escalation, the German government could react quickly 
to a possible invasion, then refer the conflict to the League of Nations without 
delay� Thus, the government gave the navy, for the first time, a role as an effective 
instrument of crisis management�
In the spring of 1929, Groener requested that the naval command review 
whether Germany, to conduct its maritime defense, would need any surface 
units that went beyond the ceiling of the peace treaty� By so inquiring, Groener 
got at the heart of the self-perception of the navy’s leadership, which saw its 
service not merely as an instrument of national defense but, in the long run, as 
an indispensable prerequisite for a future German maritime position of power� 
Under no circumstances would a return to brown-water-navy status be accept-
able; the German navy instead intended to build oceangoing units, in accordance 
with the traditional concept of naval prestige, and thereby to express hope for a 
better future� Naturally, it was not possible, nor was it intended, to explain this to 
a minister who, although he had pushed the Panzerschiff through the Reichstag 
(national legislature), otherwise had expressed often his critical attitude toward 
the buildup of the German High Seas Fleet before 1914�
In his reply to Groener’s question, “Does Germany need large warships?,” 
the chief of naval command, Admiral Erich Raeder (1876–1960), championed 
the earlier naval concept, which focused on a potential conflict with France and 
Poland�71 He argued that the attitude of the navy must not be determined by 
wishful thinking to reestablish itself as a major naval power� Its most important 
task in war was to prevent—at all costs—enemy forces from interdicting German 
SLOCs� World War I had proved the connection between German resistance at 
the home front and naval blockade: “Cutting off our sea lanes is the simplest and 
safest way, without any bloodshed, of defeating us� Our enemies know this as 
well� England has the most powerful fleet world-wide and its geographical posi-
tion is disastrous for Germany� Therefore, any armed conflict has to be avoided 
that would turn England into one of our enemies� We would be doomed to failure 
right from the start�”72
Raeder’s memorandum concluded that the navy—without even considering 
the limits the peace treaty set—could fight the fleet only of a second-class sea 
power, such as France�
Naval Rearmament under Hitler, 1933–37
A few days after seizing power in January 1933, Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) made 
it clear to naval and other military commanders that he intended to develop the 
armed forces into an instrument of his power politics� As far as the translation of 
this objective into armament was concerned, Hitler was initially cautious� As he 
explained in a speech on February 3, 1933: “The most dangerous period is that 
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of rearmament� Then we shall see whether France has statesmen� If she does, she 
will not grant us time but will jump on us (presumably with eastern satellites)�”73
The Reichsmarine (German Navy) had to make do with compromises regard-
ing the displacement and armament of its future capital ships� However, in view 
of the anticipated long-term buildup of the fleet, these compromises seemed 
acceptable� The last of three Panzerschiffe was launched in June 1934� The next 
two units were upgraded to battle cruisers (31,000 tons, thirty-one knots, nine 
28 cm guns) in answer to the French battle cruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg�74
The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935, allowed Germany to 
have a surface fleet with a tonnage up to 35 percent of that of the British Em-
pire� German naval leaders now believed they had attained their goal of “equal” 
rights� The 35 percent ceiling applied not just to total tonnage but to individual 
categories of warships� In the case of U-boats, Germany was allowed to achieve 
45 percent at first, later 100 percent, of British submarine strength� In this con-
text, Germany gave assurances that its navy would adhere to what were known 
as the “cruiser rules” regarding submarine warfare conducted against merchant 
shipping�75
The navy’s planning thus was based wholly on the structure of that of the other 
naval powers� Its motto was: What the other navies, with their rich traditions, 
consider proper, and what Germany now is permitted within the 35 percent 
ceiling, is what Germany will build� The navy started to build a so-called nor-
mal fleet: fast capital ships, heavy and light cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers, 
and—for the first time after seventeen years—submarines� One week after the 
Anglo-German Naval Agreement was announced, the navy commissioned its 
first, small (250-ton) U-boat—thereby revealing its long-term secret preparatory 
activity in this area�76
Even if the U-boat had not been improved in basic ways since 1918, it had 
developed considerably in every direction (e�g�, in its improved torpedoes, its 
minelaying ability, and its capacity to transmit and receive signals both while sur-
faced and while submerged)� Nevertheless, opinion was widespread in all navies 
that the U-boat had lost the eminence it had achieved in World War I as one of 
the most effective naval weapons� The British Admiralty was convinced that asdic 
(a submarine location device named after its progenitor, the Anti-Submarine 
Detection Investigation Committee) had reduced the submarine threat almost to 
extinction� In contrast to this opinion, the small German U-boat staff, centered 
on Captain Karl Dönitz (1891–1980), was convinced that antisubmarine warfare 
(ASW) weapons were greatly overrated and had not made decisive progress since 
1918�77
From 1928 onward, Admiral Raeder determined the navy’s thinking� In study-
ing Germany’s World War I cruiser campaign, he had come to the conclusion 
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that during the autumn of 1914 there had been a strategic correlation between 
the North Sea campaign and the operations of the cruiser squadrons in the Pa-
cific and South Atlantic� Raeder realized that all naval theaters of war formed an 
interconnected whole, so any operation had to be viewed in relation to those in 
other areas� Accordingly, he made overseas cruiser warfare and battle-fleet opera-
tions in home waters integral components of a single naval strategy that sought to 
exploit diversionary effects, thereby exhausting the enemy’s forces and disrupting 
his supplies�78
Raeder formulated his strategic thinking most clearly in a briefing to Hitler 
on February 3, 1937� Analyzing Germany’s Great War experiences, he pointed 
out the correlation between strategy and a country’s military-geographical situ-
ation� Raeder was aware of the likely “totality” of a future war—that it would be 
a struggle not just between forces but of “nation versus nation�” He emphasized 
the negative consequences for Germany if it were unable to procure continually 
the raw materials it lacked� In so doing, Raeder pointed out the glaring weak-
nesses in Germany’s war potential—but was unable to influence Hitler’s policy 
of confrontation�79
Buildup of the Navy against Britain, 1938–39
A fundamental change in strategic planning by the Kriegsmarine (as the German 
navy was known after 1935) commenced in spring 1938� As it became apparent 
that the Western powers opposed German expansion, Hitler issued a directive 
that all German war preparations should consider not only France and Russia but 
also Britain as potential enemies� A second confrontation with Britain now influ-
enced all further planning for the next naval war� Raeder followed Hitler’s hazard-
ous course of confrontation willingly, or at least without protest, in contravention 
of his strong statement on this matter to Groener in 1929� Raeder assumed— 
erroneously—that the navy would have several years of peace to continue its 
buildup�
In the summer of 1938, the naval staff produced a strategic study that con-
cluded that, given a geographical starting position similar to that of 1914, only 
oceanic cruiser warfare, employing improved Panzerschiffe and U-boats, held 
any prospect of success�80 Despite this realization, a planning committee of senior 
officers busied itself with the question of what tasks battleships could perform 
in a cruiser war in the Atlantic� The result was paradoxical and revealing: “The 
chief of staff of the naval staff concluded at the end of the discussion that all par-
ticipants agreed that battleships were necessary, but that no consensus regarding 
their use could be achieved for the time being�”81
Traditionalists considered the most important arm of naval power to be 
capital ships� Focusing on them meant that the concept of sea control pushed 
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the concept of sea denial into the background� Unlike the big-ship traditionalist 
Tirpitz, the naval staff during the 1930s had proposed a sea-denial strategy re-
peatedly� In contrast, the suggestion to develop a German strategy of sea control 
constituted a new, alternative approach to sea and world power in the twentieth 
century� In September 1938, the commander in chief of the fleet, Admiral Rolf 
Carls (1885–1945), noted as follows: “If, in accordance with the will of the Führer, 
Germany is to achieve a firm world-power position, it will need, in addition to 
sufficient colonies, secure sea 
routes and access to the high 
seas� � � � A war against Brit-
ain means a war against the 
Empire, against France, prob-
ably also against Russia and a 
number of countries overseas, 
in other words against one-
half or two-thirds of the whole 
world�”82
Nevertheless, Raeder was 
more inclined toward a sea-
denial strategy via an oceanic 
cruiser campaign with Pan-
zerschiffe, and he intended to 
give this strategy priority in the future armament program� However, by Novem-
ber 1938 he had been unable to gain Hitler’s support for his program� Hitler did 
not accept the cruiser warfare strategy, insisting instead that the navy step up the 
pace of its battleship construction so that as soon as possible he would have at his 
disposal an instrument of power he could employ globally�
The navy had to accept this decisive change� It formulated a new concept, the 
so-called Z-Plan, which centered on the construction of six capital ships by 1944� 
Additionally, battle cruisers, Panzerschiffe, aircraft carriers, fast light cruisers, 
and 247 U-boats were to form the backbone of German naval forces for the future 
Battle of the Atlantic� On January 27, 1939, when Hitler ordered that the buildup 
of the navy was to take precedence over all other tasks, including the rearma-
ment of the army and the Luftwaffe (air force), he heralded a gigantic buildup 
of naval forces� Within a few months, the planning of a series of six new-design, 
diesel-driven battleships was complete; the construction of two units began in 
the summer of 1939� In the meantime, on April 27, 1939, Hitler denounced the 
Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935�83
The experiences of World War I acted as the starting point for developing the 
so-called pack tactics that German U-boats employed against enemy sea routes 
The allied forces—especially . . . Admiral 
Arleigh Burke . . . —supported . . . creation 
[of the Federal German Navy]. . . . [A] close 
cooperation and friendship developed between 
Admiral Burke and Vice Admiral Friedrich  
Ruge . . . , the first head of the [FGN]. Burke 
created a basis of confidence with his firm 
conviction that allied forces could fulfill their 
common tasks only if their cooperation were 
based on openness and mutual trust. Vice 
Admiral Ruge succeeded in establishing this 
basis of confidence, which today is accepted as 
a matter of course.
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during World War II�84 Dönitz recognized that the concentration of merchant 
shipping in convoys would require a similar concentration of U-boats to counter� 
And before the U-boats could attack a convoy, they needed to locate it—in other 
words, the problem of reconnaissance would have to be solved� In 1917–18, a 
number of U-boats had attacked successfully on the surface, under cover of dark-
ness� During the evaluation of wartime experiences, former U-boat command-
ers recommended adoption and further development of this method of attack� 
Dönitz also had drawn attention to the advantages of night attacks in his book 
Die U-Bootswaffe, published in 1939� Nonetheless, later in World War II, this type 
of attack took British ASW defenses by surprise—they had relied too much on 
the supposed superiority of asdic� The escort forces were unable to cope with the 
German tactic, particularly as asdic had an effective range of no more than about 
1,400 meters, which left it ineffective against U-boats operating on the surface�85
WORLD WAR II
Disillusionment came on September 3, 1939� Totally unexpectedly, Hitler or-
dered the navy to launch a naval war against Britain�86 The German navy was in 
no way prepared� Raeder’s initial estimate of the situation was very pessimistic, 
and he resigned himself to the realization that neither the few U-boats nor the 
surface forces would have any decisive effect on the outcome of the war: “They 
can do no more than show that they know how to die gallantly and thus are will-
ing to create the foundations for later reconstruction�”87
However, the progress of the war soon demanded a new estimate of the situ-
ation� Nine months on, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands had been occupied; by June 22, 1940, France had suffered a total 
defeat� German naval control extended from Norway to the Pyrenees� Therefore, 
the German naval staff switched to an offensive concept of naval warfare, aimed 
solely at destroying Britain’s maritime transport capacity� The Kriegsmarine’s 
surface forces were insufficient for such a task; to supplement them, the navy 
concentrated on constructing and employing the means of naval warfare that had 
proved its worth during World War I—the U-boat�
The naval staff knew from its experience during the previous war that employ-
ment of the U-boat against the enemy’s merchant marine could be successful only 
if U-boats were deployed continuously along the enemy’s SLOCs, employing as 
many vessels as possible� The navy calculated that the number of U-boats perma-
nently at sea should range from 100 to 150 boats� Taking into consideration time 
for maintenance and resupply, this meant the navy needed approximately three 
hundred operational boats at its disposal�88 In the quest to achieve this, time was 
an important factor:
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1� In an economic war waged against a country that depended on supplies 
by sea, success could only be achieved in the long run� It was therefore 
a question of continuously weakening the enemy’s maritime transport 
capacity to an extent that exceeded the rate at which the enemy could 
construct new merchantmen�
2� From the summer of 1940 onward, it became apparent that the British 
war effort increasingly was being supported by the resources of the United 
States� This made the naval staff intent on “putting Britain out of action 
soon, before the effects of even greater American aid made themselves 
felt�”89
3� Since it took around two years to construct a U-boat and bring it to 
operational status, amassing the numbers the navy envisaged so as to 
achieve the necessary concentration of forces required plans to be made at 
a very early stage�90
While a numerically increasing U-boat fleet held out the prospect of German 
success, the naval staff had to take into account that the enemy, in view of the 
looming threat, would do everything he could to strengthen his ASW effort�
In October 1939, the naval command presented a U-boat buildup plan that 
set a monthly rate of twenty-nine boats� Hitler approved the plan; however, he 
refused to sanction priority, since he was at that time more concerned with the 
demands of the imminent land campaign against France�91 One year later, in 
November 1940, the navy had to realize that U-boat construction was being held 
up by shortages, and that the current building rate barely covered the current 
loss rate� The naval staff foresaw that there would be limits to the Reich’s mate-
rial resources and production capacities� In December 1940, it viewed America’s 
growing support of Britain as a dangerous development “towards a marked pro-
longation of the war�” To the naval staff, this portended a “very negative effect on 
the overall German war strategy�”92 This statement expressed the simple, obvious 
fact that Germany could not win a prolonged war of attrition against the two 
Atlantic naval powers�
For this reason, in December 1940, Grand Admiral Raeder requested that Hit-
ler “recognize that the greatest task of the hour is concentration of all our power 
against Britain�” To Raeder, this meant focusing air and naval forces against Brit-
ish supplies� The admiral was firmly convinced that U-boats were the decisive 
weapon to be used against Britain� Although Hitler did not reject Raeder’s view, 
he referred to the allegedly new political situation: the necessity “to eliminate at 
all cost the last enemy remaining [i�e�, Soviet Russia] on the continent, before he 
can collaborate with Britain� � � � After that, everything can be concentrated on the 
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needs of the Air Force and the Navy�”93 In Hitler’s eyes, Britain was not the enemy 
on which all weapons had to be concentrated, but a potential partner who might 
be made to “see reason” if an appropriate amount of military pressure were ap-
plied� Hitler also knew that a forced economic war could not lead to any marked 
success in one year� Furthermore, this kind of effort could increase the danger of 
the United States entering the war, something he sought to avoid at that point�94
In July 1941, after the first successes in the war against Russia, the naval staff 
tried to convince both the Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) Command and Hitler of 
the immediate strategic necessity to concentrate on fighting the Anglo-Saxon 
naval powers� Analyzing the threat to which Germany was exposed, the naval 
staff portrayed the dilemma of a European continental state that lacked the vital 
elements of a naval power but was forced to fight against the greatest naval pow-
ers: “While in World War I we had the second strongest battle fleet in the world 
but no appropriate operational base, we now dispose of a strategically favorable 
operational base, however, we do not have the required battle fleet to operate 
within the Atlantic�”95
The naval staff predicted that the two Allied naval powers would continue to 
fight, even if the Soviet Union collapsed, so they could reach their “final goal”: 
destroying Germany on the continent� The naval staff came to the conclusion that 
“the enemies’ prospect for the battle in the Atlantic for the year 1942 must be as-
sessed as favorable�” For this reason, the naval staff advocated that Germany bring 
about a decision in the Atlantic by taking advantage of both political assets (the 
cooperation of Vichy-France and Japan) and military assets (the concentrated 
employment of all available forces, in particular the U-boats and air forces)�96
From 1940 onward, Germany possessed a good geographical position for 
naval warfare in the Atlantic, but this basis could not be exploited fully, owing 
to insufficient weaponry� The U-boat provided an effective weapon in the fight 
against enemy shipping up to 1942, but thereafter wider war demands, especially 
the critical situations in the Mediterranean and on the eastern front, forced the 
naval command to employ its last remaining offensive capability like an “opera-
tional fire brigade�”97 This led to enormous attrition, which was counterproduc-
tive to the strategic concept of mass concentration in the Atlantic� As the Allies 
developed better ASW weapons, the concept of a “U-boat war” failed in 1943 
because the submarine had lost its ability to escape from enemy surveillance�
In fact, the concept of attrition warfare began to fail by the fall of 1942 in the 
face of the mobilization of Allied resources and industrial capacities, especially 
those of the United States� The German naval staff analysis at that time of the 
accelerating buildup of Allied maritime transport capacity already revealed that 
the U-boats could not increase the monthly rate of sinkings to a level necessary 
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to win the “tonnage race�” The naval staff delivered a pessimistic prognosis: “If, 
� � � considering the enemy’s rising production output, Germany wishes to dimin-
ish the enemy’s tonnage from the end of 1942 onwards to the same extent as is 
currently being achieved, ship sinkings per month will have to be increased to 
approximately 1,300,000 GRT� Given the current situation, it is doubtful whether 
such a high rate of ship sinkings will be feasible for a sustained period of time�”98 
Recalling the historical argument that “no war in history � � � has yet been won by 
the use of one method of warfare,” the naval staff came around to an understand-
ing that reflected actual conditions�99 By the end of 1942, German U-boats, as a 
realistic threat, had succumbed to the immense industrial capacity of the United 
States�
From 1943 onward, the navy had an officer at the helm, Grand Admiral 
Dönitz, who both was a charismatic leader and had close links to Hitler and Nazi 
ideology� Not until after Hitler’s death did he change “from the almost-blind tool 
of a criminal to the responsible soldier of the traditional Prussian school�”100 At 
that point he did everything in his power to end the already-lost war in a proper 
fashion and, at the same time, to evacuate as many people as possible across the 
Baltic to the West� The latter effort—the navy’s last wartime act—brought the 
service much positive postwar public recognition�101
Over the course of the twentieth century, Germany twice tried to force a stra-
tegic decision, in direct confrontation with the Anglo-Saxon naval powers, by 
cutting the Atlantic shipping routes� Both attempts ended in failure� The second 
defeat brought with it the end of the German Reich and the dissolution of all 
German armed forces�
BUILDING A NEW NAVY AFTER 1955
The Western orientation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) led to close 
integration of the new German armed forces into the Atlantic Alliance�102 Ten 
years after the surrender of Germany’s World War II forces, a new German naval 
force came into existence� The allied forces—especially the U�S� Navy, including 
its CNO, Admiral Arleigh Burke (1901–96)—supported its creation� During the 
first years of the buildup, a close cooperation and friendship developed between 
Admiral Burke and Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge (1894–1985), the first head of 
the Federal German Navy (FGN)�103
Burke created a basis of confidence with his firm conviction that allied forces 
could fulfill their common tasks only if their cooperation were based on open-
ness and mutual trust� Vice Admiral Ruge succeeded in establishing this basis of 
confidence, which today is accepted as a matter of course�
This meant for the FGN, the smallest of the armed services within the FRG 
armed forces, that, for the first time in its history, the naval service was obliged 
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merely to perform that function “which a German Navy can actually perform,” 
in close cooperation with the great maritime powers�104
At the same time the FRG joined NATO in May 1955, the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) was integrated into the Warsaw Pact� The formation of light 
naval forces ensued, out of the Volkspolizei See (i�e�, the national sea police force 
of the GDR) that had been in existence since 1950� In 1960, the GDR’s newly es-
tablished forces were termed Volksmarine (People’s Navy), in commemoration of 
the 1918 revolutionary tradition� This navy, which was strictly integrated within 
the ideological leadership claimed by the Communist Party, demonstrated little 
continuity with former German naval forces, whether in formation, structure, or 
mandate� Within the Warsaw Pact it evolved into an offensive naval force for use 
in confined and littoral waters� 
The two German naval forces exhibited great disparity until 1990� Each navy 
regarded the other as a potential military adversary in the context of the system 
of alliances� However, both were spared the necessity to prove their combat 
strength� With the reunification of the German republics in the fall of 1990, parts 
of each were incorporated into the German navy�105
Today, the German navy has not only a lively interest in its history but a special re-
lationship to it� A clear link can be seen between the historical self-understanding 
of its officers and the history of their service� In the past, this link often served 
only as an attempt to legitimize and secure the service’s position� The navy, which 
came into being in the mid-nineteenth century, often had to fight for recognition 
and even for its existence during a relatively short history� However, when histori-
cal interest is limited only to the navy and naval warfare, there is a danger that too 
little attention will be paid to the overlapping political correlations�
Nowadays the situation is different� Germany is one of the leading export 
nations in the world, and therefore extremely dependent on trade and the un-
hampered use of the high seas� This situation requires an understanding and an 
acceptance of the maritime domain as a vital Achilles’ heel for the prosperity of 
the German economy and society� This situation underlines the necessity for a 
well-balanced navy that is able to conduct demonstrations and to protect German 
maritime interests, in cooperation with alliances and partners� The situation for 
the German navy is much more comfortable at present than in previous eras, 
reinforcing its self-confidence; but a wider understanding of its roles is needed, 
now more than ever�
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Dimensions of a Maritime Defense Strategy
Tomohisa Takei
Your Majesty, King of Zhao, if you serve the King of Qin, he will ask to 
be given the castles of Yiyand and Cheng Gao. If you provide the castles 
this year, the King of Qin will then tell you to give him some land the 
next year. If you give away parcels of land, eventually the amount of 
land suitable for release will be reduced, and, if you do not provide land, 
then everything that you have done up until now will become useless, 
and eventually you will run into big trouble. . . . [W]ithout doing any 
battle, your land will be sliced away, continuously.
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THE NEW TIME AND SPACE
 Compared with previous years, the Japanese defense white paper for fiscal year 2016 devoted more pages to discussing territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea—where China has been behaving with disrespect to international 
norms. The Chinese are overriding international law with Chinese civil law. 
China’s activities, such as reclamation activities on submerged features, reefs, 
and rocks, have exacerbated longstanding territorial disputes among Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members. International and regional at-
tention has been drawn to the decision in favor of the Philippines versus China 
by a tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and held in the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague.
In the Spratly Islands, China purports to build 
seven “islands” from reclaimed coral and sand.1 It 
takes significant effort, time, and expense to build 
dry land from scratch by “reclaiming” it onto a 
reef. Even Subi Reef, the closest of these features to 
China, is located 510 nautical miles (approximately 
950 kilometers) from Hainan Island. In disregard 
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THE NEW TIME AND SPACE
of generally accepted land-reclamation practices, the Chinese allow no time for 
the foundation to stabilize; instead they build multiple facilities right away and 
militarize the area� Just two years after starting reclamation activities at Fiery 
Cross Reef, for example, China announced the completion of a three-thousand- 
meter runway and peripheral facilities� China also conducted a test flight of a 
civilian airplane on January 2, 2016� By early 2017, facilities had been completed 
for twenty-four military aircraft on three reclaimed “islands”: Fiery Cross Reef, 
Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef� The Vietnamese government condemned this act as 
an infringement of sovereignty�2 According to estimates based on similar projects 
in Japan, the costs to build an artificial island as big as the one on Fiery Cross Reef 
(2�74 square kilometers in area, five meters in height), pave a three-thousand-
meter runway, and build an airport with all the necessary ancillary facilities (e�g�, 
aircraft warning lights and guide lights) could be as high as U�S�$2�4 billion (¥240 
billion)�3
China is executing six construction projects similar to the Fiery Cross Reef 
reclamation simultaneously, bringing several dredging boats and pump dredgers 
to expedite the effort� Many view this activity as an effort to gain territorial con-
trol of the South China Sea� Neighboring countries and the international com-
munity at large, including Japan and the United States, have pursued peaceful, 
legal resolutions of this issue, so far to no avail�4
From August 5 through August 9, 2016, while two to three hundred Chinese 
fishing boats were operating around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, 
up to fifteen China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels entered and exited the contiguous 
zone repeatedly, and fifteen CCG vessels entered Japanese territorial waters (i�e�, 
within twelve nautical miles of shore) during this short period�5 Considering the 
abnormal number of CCG vessels (three to four have been more common for 
such incursions) and their intrusion into territorial waters, the Japanese govern-
ment made a diplomatic protest to the Chinese government� Suspicions arose 
that the activities of the many fishing boats and CCG vessels operating in the area 
surrounding the Senkaku Islands actually constituted an invasion being directed 
by the Chinese government, especially because after the most intrusive entry to 
date occurred on August 9 the invasion of territorial waters suddenly paused—
abnormal behavior for ordinary fishermen�
Two issues emerged from these events in the South and East China Seas�
The first is that China has demonstrated that it has the resources to carry 
out multiple massive, expensive marine-construction projects simultaneously 
and quickly, and it seemingly disregards limitations imposed by UNCLOS and 
complaints from the international community� China’s one-party-rule political 
system makes it easy for the Chinese Communist Party to control and direct 
numerous fishing boats and deploy a large force of CCG vessels�
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The second issue is that the land-reclamation activities in the Spratly Islands 
and the dispute over the Senkaku Islands both can be considered part of China’s 
strategy to expand its maritime claims in the region� The nature of the country’s 
political system, combined with the massive economic resources available to it, 
provides China with the flexibility needed to adjust the speed and scale with 
regard to time and space considerations for its territorial-expansionist maritime 
strategy� No other country in the Asia-Pacific region can match China in this re-
gard� Consequently, every effort must be made to avoid “mirror imaging” China 
when analyzing the current security environment�
This article examines the concepts of time and space from the perspective of a 
status quo nation that seeks to deter the designs of a revisionist power, and helps 
formulate a new maritime self-defense strategy for Japan that serves as a useful 
reference for small and medium-sized countries that seek to preserve stability in 
their regions�
THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: THE TIME DIMENSION
During the height of America’s military intervention in Vietnam, from 1965 to 
1968, the quantity and quality of the American military was so overpowering vis-
à-vis the Vietcong, along with their North Vietnamese allies, that it seemed the 
United States could not lose the war� But, as Yōnosuke Nagai observed in his Jikan 
no Seijigaku (Politics and Time), one must understand America’s loss in terms of 
who lost to whom�
Conclusively speaking, it is a cruel historical fact that the metropolitan power, em-
powered through an urban industrial/technological society, lost to [the Vietcong], 
empowered through a primitive, agricultural society� This battle was not a simplistic 
battle of military “ability” but a battle of “will�” While the battle of “ability” is basi-
cally a spatial and quantitative battle, the battle of “will” is determined by the system’s 
stamina size, or the size of the sacrifice (cost) measured by time�6
In other words, as the struggle became protracted, an increasingly war-weary 
American citizenry lost its will to fight� In contrast, the North Vietnamese, de-
spite dramatic battlefield losses and the defeat of the Vietcong following the Tet 
Offensive, eventually prevailed because they never lost their will to fight, despite 
the passage of time�
Nagai also notes two asymmetries that generally (including in the Vietnam 
War) work to the advantage of a liberation army fighting against a government 
army: (1) The existence of sanctuaries helps the liberation army avoid defeat� 
(2) The liberation army—the revisionist force—takes the initiative against the 
government army—the status quo defenders�7 The Vietnam War was an asym-
metrical battle between a metropolitan power, the United States, and a libera-
tion army� The liberation army based itself in its sanctuary of North Vietnam, 
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supported by China and the Soviet Union, and used this advantage to carry out 
guerrilla war freely against South Vietnam� Over time, the liberation army took 
advantage of the two asymmetries, patiently continuing to fight in such a way 
as to avoid defeat� The war eventually exhausted the will of the metropolitan 
power to continue to fight� The liberation army skillfully used a “ripening-time” 
strategy—it waited until the time was ripe, then took decisive action�8
National liberation wars that follow such a ripening-time strategy, such as the 
Vietnam War and the Algerian War, continue to be fought today, such as in Af-
ghanistan, Syria, and North Africa� However, in these modern conflicts we see a 
variation in the strategy in the form of indiscriminate terror attacks, such as those 
carried out by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)� Not only does ISIL 
send terrorists disguised as Middle Eastern refugees into Europe; it uses social 
media to promote its version of violent extremism, sending out propaganda and 
encouraging terrorism� Hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the Syrian 
civil war and Libya’s domestic disorder have flooded Europe� This phenomenon, 
accompanied by continuing terrorist acts, has made the member states of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) suspicious about refugees, which led to a fundamental shift 
in EU refugee policy� ISIL’s indiscriminate terror attacks are intended to demon-
strate the organization’s power and to exhaust the national will of those opposed 
to it� In this context, ISIL’s indiscriminate terror attacks can be categorized as part 
of a ripening-time strategy�
Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea using “hybrid warfare” and its promotion 
of conflict in eastern Ukraine, like China’s one-sided land-reclamation activities 
in the South China Sea, exhibit characteristics of the ripening-time strategy�9 
Russia’s military is overwhelmingly more powerful than Ukraine’s, and Russia has 
placed about forty thousand soldiers in the vicinity of the shared border� Ukraine 
cannot recapture Crimea, and because Russian public opinion strongly supports 
President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy, Russia can maintain its efforts—fighting 
to avoid defeat—and wait until Ukraine loses its will to fight and concedes�10
With regard to the South China Sea, China has pursued a strategy similar to 
Russia’s in Crimea and eastern Ukraine� China’s land-reclamation activities, its 
construction of harbor and airport facilities, and its militarization of the entire 
body of water have ensured China’s actual control over the features under dis-
pute� Now China waits for the international community to lose its will to contest 
Chinese actions�
On July 12, 2016, an Annex VII arbitration tribunal denied China’s claim to 
historic title within the area of the “nine-dash line” as being incompatible with 
UNCLOS� It further determined that the Spratly Islands consist only of mere 
rocks and low-tide elevations, rather than islands that can sustain human habi-
tation; only the latter would have been entitled to an exclusive economic zone 
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(EEZ)� Consequently, regardless of which state has lawful title to the features in 
the Spratly Islands, those features are entitled, at most, to a territorial sea; no fea-
ture generates an EEZ� Specifically, the court’s ruling noted that four of the seven 
China-controlled “lands” were constructed on rocks; they accrue twelve nautical 
miles of territorial waters, but not an EEZ or an extended continental shelf� The 
other three features, Subi, Hugh (or Hughes), and Mischief Reefs, are low-tide 
elevations in that they are above water at low tide but submerged at high tide� 
These features are considered to be part of the seabed; no state may claim title 
over them� If they lie in the EEZ of a coastal state, that state does enjoy exclusive 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the living and nonliving resources of the 
features� However, almost half of the seven features in question are located within 
two hundred nautical miles of the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia, which dis-
pute ownership with China, while the remaining features are located on the high 
seas, belonging to no country and falling within no country’s EEZ�11 Because EEZ 
borders in the South China Sea are not finalized, the several countries involved 
are left fighting over the “territory” of the Spratlys and many other small features, 
sometimes trying to seize control by force (even if on a small scale), through land 
reclamation, or both�
The seven features where China is reinforcing its control have been trans-
formed from their original state, and CCG patrol vessels now block foreign ves-
sels from the area� The number of ships in the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
and the CCG continues to expand, now exceeding the totals of their counterparts 
in Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines combined�12 Numerous fishing boats 
assigned to the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia further skew the odds 
against China’s regional neighbors in any maritime dispute�
China prefers to conduct only bilateral negotiations with its regional neigh-
bors� To be most effective, interested nations should resist such lopsided negotia-
tions and act only multilaterally� However, some countries with strong economic 
ties to China oppose adoption of a legally binding code of conduct, and as a result 
have prevented ASEAN member states from acting together�13
Confusion and uncertainty in the South China Sea work to China’s advantage� 
The government of the Philippines appears to be losing its will to fight in its ter-
ritorial dispute with China� President Rodrigo Duterte announced on September 
13, 2016, that the Philippines would end joint maritime patrols with the United 
States—to which both parties had agreed previously—in April 2017; thereafter it 
will allow only aerial patrols, and only within territorial waters�14 On September 
28, 2016, while visiting Vietnam, Duterte stated that the Philippines would hold 
the U�S�-Philippine bilateral war games—military exercises that China opposes� 
However, Duterte stated that following the PHIBLEX 33 amphibious exercise, 
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his government also would reinforce its economic relationships with China and 
Russia�15
On the basis of the foregoing, it appears that China has undertaken a cunning 
strategy designed to wear down its regional neighbors: ignore the PCA ruling 
(calling it “a political farce staged under legal pretext”—Wang Yi, China’s minis-
ter of foreign affairs); reinforce control of the artificial islands and surrounding 
waters via CCG patrols; use economic leverage (involving, e�g�, economic aid and 
export/import restrictions) over neighboring countries to demand compromise; 
and squat in the area until disputant nations eventually give up�16
Compared with Russia, China has executed its ripening-time strategy more 
slowly and flexibly, taking advantage of having the world’s second-biggest econo-
my and a single-party political system that offers its leadership almost complete 
autonomy from domestic interference in its foreign and defense policy making� If 
China had taken actions in the South China Sea as clear and aggressive as those of 
Russia in Crimea, nearby nations would have reacted strongly� Instead, to avoid 
fueling its neighbors’ suspicions, China took its time testing the waters to see how 
the international community would react to its slow but continual transgressions� 
Indeed, China has taken further advantage of the power vacuum in the region 
caused by America’s continued preoccupation in the Middle East� Applying its 
vast resources to marine construction projects, China made such significant ter-
ritorial changes over such a short period that it is now impossible to revert to the 
status quo ante� At this point, China need only wait patiently until the nations 
involved give in and compromise�
THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: THE SPACE DIMENSION
While it waits for a situation to ripen, it is important for a revisionist power 
to restrict the other parties’ ability to seek restitution, and instead to extract 
concessions�
Modern history offers Nazi Germany’s accession of the Sudetenland from 
Czechoslovakia as an example of effectively drawing out concessions from an 
opposing party� As part of its “salami slicing” of eastern Europe, Nazi Germany 
at the 1938 Munich Conference demanded that other countries, principally the 
United Kingdom and France, allow the cession of the Sudetenland, justified by 
the presence of the many ethnic Germans living in that area� The appeasers ac-
ceded to this demand in exchange for a guarantee that Germany would settle 
for these new boundaries and not go to war� The people of western Europe, 
still weary from World War I and remembering how difficult it had been to de-
escalate tensions once mobilization plans were initiated in August of 1914, sought 
to avoid war at all costs�
NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb   6 8/7/17   11:58 AM
59
Naval War College: Autumn 2017 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
 5 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
In other words, there was no temporal or spatial redundancy in either political 
or military affairs� Public opinion influenced and pressured politicians’ decision-
making processes, to the detriment of more-sound military advice�
These days, the development of truly global information-communications 
technologies means the mass media report incidents that happen on the other 
side of the world as if they occurred next door� Economically, the world is much 
more mutually interdependent than during Hitler’s day; in this way, political as 
well as economic relationships among nations are intimate� As a result, should 
war break out, there is much less spatial redundancy than in the past� If an un-
foreseen armed conflict occurs between China and Japan (the countries with the 
world’s second- and third-largest economies, respectively) the effect on the world 
economy and international affairs would be devastating—even if the war zone 
were limited geographically�
In a strategic environment such as this, revisionist powers have taken the 
initiative—China and Russia already have crossed the line� By contrast, status 
quo powers tend to be psychologically suppressed, desiring to avoid retaliating 
with military force or even exercising a police function� Revisionists, by their 
willingness to take the initiative at any time, can manipulate the rate by which 
they increase their governmental presence, encouraging status quo states to con-
clude that a forceful response is not necessary� Then revisionists can expand their 
military operations in the area slowly, increasing the tempo gradually, such as by 
adding air operations to sea operations, or vice versa�
Human senses have thresholds� For example, when exposed to loud noise, 
your hearing gradually becomes immune; and if continuously pricked with a 
needle, eventually you feel no pain� The threshold for enduring pain rises as time 
goes by� Similarly, if revisionist actions are repeated and expanded with some 
subtlety, the mass media and the international community will accept such ac-
tions as the new norm, unless the status quo powers take some kind of sudden, 
unexpectedly aggressive action�
When revisionist powers practice salami tactics skillfully in peacetime, it 
imperceptibly raises the pain threshold� If defenders of the status quo take no 
action in the face of graduated, repetitive aggression, it suggests acceptance 
of a new stasis� One act of appeasement will lead to another� For defenders 
of the status quo, how to put a stop to the cycle of appeasement is a crucial 
challenge�
SOLUTIONS TO THE NEW SPACE AND TIME
As a useful example for understanding space and time in the new security envi-
ronment, consider NATO’s response to Russia�
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Altering the Space Dimension
To increase their security in the face of salami tactics, small and medium-sized 
powers have only two choices: appeasement or collective security through bilat-
eral or multilateral alliances� Alliances bolster deterrence by creating closer rela-
tionships among the threatened states, thereby making the space “denser�” During 
the Cold War, NATO and the neutral states of northern Europe recognized this 
reality and reacted effectively to Russian aggression in the region�
In 1994, the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine signed 
the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, under which Ukraine 
gave up its nuclear weapons� In exchange, the signatories promised that they 
would not use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
Ukraine�17 However, twenty years later, Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed the 
Crimean Peninsula, then muscled in on the Donets region of eastern Ukraine, 
both enclaves of Russian speakers with historic and cultural links to Moscow� 
Fighting continues today between the forces of the Ukrainian government and 
the rebel armed forces—another revisionist effort initiated by a power out to 
challenge the status quo in defiance of international law�18
NATO condemned Russia’s activities as an attempt to destabilize eastern 
Ukraine and a violation of international law� NATO and its member states repeat-
edly called on Russia to withdraw from Crimea and fulfill its obligations under 
international law�19 NATO held a summit in Warsaw in July 2016 and issued a 
communiqué that branded a wide variety of Russian activities destabilizing to 
the European security environment� The cited actions included the ongoing il-
legal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea; the violation of sovereign borders by 
force; the deliberate destabilization of eastern Ukraine; and large-scale exercises 
and other provocative military activities near NATO borders, including in the 
Baltic and Black Sea regions and the eastern Mediterranean�20
Although historically Sweden’s foreign policy has opposed participation in 
military alliances in general, the Swedish government made clear in 2009 that it 
supported multinational security and cooperation� It enthusiastically promoted 
security cooperation and interactions with other countries through international 
institutions, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe� 
After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Sweden, although not a member of NATO, 
reinforced its relations with the organization by signing the memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) regarding host-nation support� Sweden also is building 
bilateral, multilayered, cooperative security relationships with other countries�21 
On June 8, 2016, Sweden’s minister of defense, Peter Hultqvist, signed a letter of 
intent with his American counterpart, Ashton Carter, to enhance defense coop-
eration� This followed an earlier defense-cooperation understanding with the 
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United Kingdom in 2014� While there is no mutual defense obligation between 
Sweden and the United States, their MOU laid out five key aims: enhancing in-
teroperability, strengthening capabilities and posture through training and exer-
cises, deepening armament cooperation, advancing cooperation in research and 
development, and meeting common challenges in multinational operations�22
Finland’s foreign and defense policies are similar to Sweden’s in many ways, 
but there are some differences� After Finland became independent from Russia in 
1917, it attempted to maintain a good relationship with the Soviet Union, a coun-
try with which it shares a long, troubled border� Finland remained more neutral 
militarily than Sweden (i�e�, less Westward tilting)� For example, the Agreement 
of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, signed in 1948, was canceled 
in 1992 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but Finland replaced it with a 
basic treaty with Russia� Then, after Finland joined the EU in 1995, it changed 
its policy to “military non-alignment, backed up by a credible national defense�” 
After Russia annexed Crimea, Finland, also a nonmember of NATO, enhanced 
its relationship with the organization by signing the MOU regarding host-nation 
support in 2014�23 On July 9, 2016, in connection with NATO’s Warsaw summit, 
Finnish defense minister Jussi Niinistö and his British counterpart, Michael 
Fallon, signed a declaratory expression of intent between their countries�24 The 
document does not obligate Finland or Britain to provide mutual assistance in 
the event of a crisis, but rather sets a framework for cooperation�25 A short time 
later, on August 22, Niinistö told Reuters that Finland also was negotiating a 
defense-collaboration agreement with the United States�26
Motivating these changes in the foreign policies of Sweden and Finland, in-
cluding the rapid enhancement of their relationships with NATO, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom, are Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, the 
continuing “hybrid warfare” being practiced in eastern Ukraine, and the growing 
military competition between NATO and Russia in and around the Baltic Sea�
Altering the Time Dimension
Deterrence also can be reinforced by improving military readiness with regard 
to time� The following discussion continues to consider the example of northern 
Europe, where NATO has placed combat troops in the Baltic countries and Po-
land, each of which shares a border with Russia�
The histories of all four of these countries provided grounds for profound sus-
picion of Russia; in particular, Poland has been partitioned many times over the 
centuries� After the Cold War, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania did try to 
maintain good relationships with their large eastern neighbor, but for reasons of 
national security they also took steps to enhance their relationships with NATO 
and the EU� They joined NATO to avail themselves of the principle of collective 
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self-defense�27 After the Russian annexation of Crimea in the name of protecting 
Russians, it is not surprising that these countries requested that NATO station 
troops on their territories� Latvia is particularly vulnerable, as 40 percent of its 
population is Russian speaking; Estonia’s equivalent proportion is 30 percent� 
Poland shares a border with Ukraine� It is easy to understand why these countries 
are particularly fearful of what Russia might do�
At the same July 2016 Warsaw summit, NATO welcomed the offers of Canada, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States to serve as framework 
nations for a robust, multinational forward presence� Beginning in early 2017, 
that enhanced forward presence was to rest on four battalion-sized battle groups 
introduced into Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, provided by framework nations 
and other contributing allies�28 To enhance its presence in its southern area, such 
as Romania, NATO further decided to improve integrated training�29 However, 
establishing a forward allied military presence is not a sufficient deterrent�
In a discussion focused on China’s antiaccess/area-denial strategy, Aaron L� 
Friedberg invokes a more general principle: that the most difficult question con-
fronting U�S� military planners is not what kind of military power they should 
use, but how aggressively American military power should be used in an oppo-
nent’s land� At a critical moment, if the opponent discerns that the United States 
has neither the intention nor the ability to employ its military power on the op-
ponent’s territory, the leader of that opposing country will not fear retaliation and 
will underestimate the risk of war that an attack will cause; he will devote more 
resources toward mounting an offense than to maintaining a defense�30
Applying Friedberg’s logic to the future of eastern Europe, if Russia believes 
NATO has no specific response plan and is not ready to retaliate out of concern 
for Russian escalation, there is little to deter Russia from continuing its salami 
tactics� The main purpose of positioning NATO troops in the Baltic countries is 
to deter Russia’s next action�31 Will NATO’s forces counterattack against Russia, 
despite the risk of escalation? The answer to this question is at the core of NATO’s 
existence�
Space and Time
These two responses to the new security environment—making space more 
dense and speeding up the readiness timetable—are intended to prevent ad-
ditional applications of salami tactics by China and Russia� Where a situation 
seems to have reached the last stage of a ripening-time strategy (i�e�, the revision 
is almost completed), is there any way to recover?
Russia’s action in Crimea is clearly illegal, but as a permanent member of the 
UN Security Council (UNSC) Russia can veto any UNSC resolution� Russia also 
has more military power than Ukraine, including nuclear weapons� It would 
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be difficult for Ukraine to recover its illegally occupied territory anytime soon� 
Ukraine’s only viable strategy is to maintain its citizens’ will, thereby preventing 
the situation from “ripening” any further� It must continue patiently to negotiate 
within a multinational environment, understanding that any favorable resolution 
will take significant time�
The best global strategy to prevent larger powers from intimidating weaker 
ones into making concessions is to never accept any change to the status quo 
and never confer legitimacy on the illegal use of force� The status quo ante must 
be maintained� To avoid giving revisionist powers even the smallest opportunity 
to undermine stability, small and medium-sized nations also should take proac-
tive measures, such as reinforcing alliances and creating favorable international 
public opinion� Deterrence also can be improved by enhancing collaborative 
relationships with other nations in areas for which no collective-defense system 
like NATO exists�
Whether applied reactively or proactively, the basic concepts discussed in this 
article should be understood and employed dynamically� Static military measures 
meant to maintain a status quo are meaningless� States need the capability to 
respond to peacetime salami tactics by revisionist powers to a degree calibrated 
not to cross the threshold of excessive force� To do so, it is important to have 
available and to deploy, at the right time and in the right way, both a dynamic 
police force and such military power as will enable a country to deter or respond 
to the situation�
Globally, military conflict is expanding� Small and medium-sized states facing 
intimidation from revisionist powers naturally hesitate to employ military force, 
even in their own defense� But in the new security environment, in which revi-
sionist powers ingeniously adjust and rebalance the status quo, states must plan 
for an opponent’s initiatives, maintain the ability to act, and be sure of the politi-
cal will to use force in a crisis, despite the risks of escalation� Above all, the key to 
calming a crisis before it escalates is to return to the original state of affairs before 
the revisionist power enters the waiting-game phase of a ripening-time strategy�
The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) has dispatched its patrol ships and aircraft into 
the sea and air areas around the Senkaku Islands� This helps to maintain security 
and reinforces the effectiveness of JMSDF surveillance activities in the sea and air 
domains� Even now, four years after property rights to the Senkaku Islands were 
transferred from private parties to the Japanese government, the mass media’s 
interest in East China Sea affairs remains high, and they continue to broadcast 
JCG reports on the activities of Chinese vessels in the waters near the Senkakus� 
Japanese citizens maintain high awareness of the current situation, and their in-
terest in the Senkaku Islands ensures the government will protect the islands and 
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Japanese citizens� Japan’s response stance is at the threshold level� Mass-media 
contributions such as these undoubtedly play a significant role in shaping public 
attitudes, which helps prevent China from unilaterally altering current condi-
tions as part of a ripening-time strategy�
This article has analyzed the security-environment dimensions of time and 
space, from the perspective of status quo–maintaining nations� The discussion 
should provide readers with some ideas bearing on Japan’s maritime self-defense 
strategy and its future national security with regard to China� More generally, 
the article illustrates that the current security challenges vis-à-vis revisionist 
states such as Russia and China are complex; any attempt to address changes in 
the status quo is complicated by the many actions and calculations of different 
parties� Such a situation cannot be explained using military rationales alone, and 
must be addressed using a multilateral approach that employs all the instruments 
of power�
N O T E S
  The original Japanese version of this article 
appeared in Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force 
Command and Staff College Review 12, special 
issue (November 2016)� The epigraph comes 
from 司馬遷 [Sima Qian], trans� Tamaki  
Ogawa, Makoto Imataka, and Yoshihiko 
Fukushima, 蘇秦列伝」『史記列伝(一)』
[Records of the Grand Historian, Biography 
of Su Qin] (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 1993), p� 
12� Su Qin was an influential strategist during 
the Warring States period of ancient Chinese 
history� He advocated a “vertical alliance” to 
deter the strong 秦 (Qin) kingdom’s expan-
sion toward and invasion of the Six Kingdoms 
on its eastern border� To weaken the Vertical 
Alliance, the Qin created some bilateral alli-
ances, constituting the so-called Horizontal 
Alliance�
 1� They are Johnson South Reef, Cuarteron 
Reef, Gaven Reefs, Hugh/Hughes Reef, Fiery 
Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef� 
Airports have been constructed or are under 
construction on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, 
and Mischief Reef� Japan Ministry of Defense, 
Defense of Japan 2016 (Tokyo: 2016), p� 57�
 2� 中国,「人工島」の滑走路で試験飛行ベト
ナムが抗議 [“China Conducted Test Flight 
at ‘Artificial Island,’ Vietnam Protested”], 
Asahi Shimbun, January 4, 2016�
 3� Offshore civil engineering work (e�g�, dredg-
ing, bank protection): about ¥99�2 billion; 
onshore construction (e�g�, site preparation, 
building power plants): about ¥5�3 billion; 
airport-related construction (e�g�, concrete 
pavement, lights installation, power plant 
installation): about ¥3�8 billion; total: about 
¥108�3 billion� ¥108�3 billion × 220 percent 
(applying a remote island–construction index 
to the 1,200 km from Hainan Island) = about 
¥238�3 billion� The calculation excludes on-
shore facilities (e�g�, office buildings, barracks, 
tower, hangars, fuel tanks)�
 4� For an example, see Group of Seven Foreign 
Ministers’ Meeting, “G7 Foreign Ministers’ 
Statement on Maritime Security, April 11, 
2016, Hiroshima, Japan,” available at www 
�mofa�go�jp/�
 5� Japan Coast Guard, 平成 28 年 8 月上旬の
中国公船及び中国漁船の活動状況につ
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REBUILDING THE UKRAINIAN NAVY
 The Russian Federation’s rapid and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 has had a profoundly negative effect on the Ukrainian navy� The service lost ac-
cess to a third of its Black Sea coastline, control of the Kerch Strait, and access 
to the defense industries located in Crimea�1 It lost the majority of its service 
personnel and access to its military and maritime infrastructure and ports in 
Crimea� The Ukrainian navy also lost two-thirds of its warships, including its 
most modern platforms� Despite Russia’s slow return of some of Ukraine’s mari-
time platforms, the Russian seizure of many of Ukraine’s major warships and na-
val aviation and air assets has dealt a serious blow to the already small Ukrainian 
navy� Andri Ryzenko, a former deputy head of the Ukrainian navy, has described 
the fleet as an “operational shadow of its former self ” in urgent need of modern-
ization and rebuilding�2
In light of these severe losses and the realization 
of the important role maritime forces can play in 
the war in the east and in protecting Ukraine’s in-
terests in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), there 
is a growing recognition within the Ukrainian 
government of the need to rebuild the Ukrainian 
navy� Ukraine’s president, Petro Poroshenko, has 
announced ambitious plans to “revive” the Ukrai-
nian navy, stating that in the future it would be 
equipped with state-of-the-art precision weapons�
This article examines the Ukrainian govern-
ment’s attempts to rebuild the Ukrainian navy 
and argues that, while Ukraine faces political, 
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conceptual, and financial challenges in reviving its maritime power, it has made 
some modest progress toward building a “mosquito fleet�” This fleet has been 
bolstered by the addition of some small, new ships and the increasing profession-
alization of Ukraine’s naval personnel, in particular its marines� This progress 
suggests that Ukraine can go in a radically different direction as it redevelops its 
navy: toward coastal defense�
To make this argument, this article proceeds in three sections� The first exam-
ines why maritime power is important to Ukraine� It argues that Ukraine’s com-
mercial and economic interests already have been affected adversely by the lack 
of a navy� The war in the east has revealed the vulnerability of Ukraine’s coastline, 
and Russia’s seizure of maritime infrastructure and its attempts to exploit energy 
reserves in Ukraine’s territorial waters have reinforced the urgent requirement 
to rebuild the fleet� The second section explores the range of difficulties Ukraine 
faces in rebuilding its navy� These factors include the impact of the Russian an-
nexation of Crimea, the lack of a coherent and realistic concept for the navy, 
and domestic challenges� The final section evaluates the progress made so far in 
building a small, coastal-defense navy�
The rebuilding of the Ukrainian navy merits further analysis for several rea-
sons� First, it illustrates the often intrinsic link between land and maritime power: 
for Ukraine’s navy, the loss of Crimea has been equivalent to, or even worse than, 
a defeat in a fleet action� It demonstrates the problems of “rebuilding in contact,” 
in which medium- to long-term maritime interests may have to be mortgaged 
to address short-term military needs in the east� Finally, it demonstrates the 
problems of generating maritime capabilities in a weak-state context in which 
economic challenges and political instability interfere with the ability to establish 
and implement effective maritime policy and strategy�
UKRAINE AS A MARITIME STATE
Long land borders and proximity to Russia have given the Ukrainian state a 
continental focus, but Ukraine also has important maritime interests� President 
Poroshenko has stated unequivocally that Ukraine, was, is, and will remain a 
maritime state� Some of its maritime interests are economic in nature, but oth-
ers are military strategic� In June 2015, the then deputy head of the Ukrainian 
navy, Andri Ryzenko, pointed out that Ukraine’s prosperity, its economy, and the 
potential growth of tax revenues depend on realization of the country’s maritime 
potential� A quarter of Ukraine’s gross domestic product (GDP) is generated by 
the five regions with access to the sea�3 Ukraine’s maritime ports and maritime 
infrastructure in the Black Sea are important national strategic facilities� Before 
the annexation, Ukraine had twenty commercial seaports; eighteen of these were 
state owned, and together they contributed more than 1�55 billion Ukrainian 
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hryvnia (UAH) (approximately U�S�$55 million) to the Ukrainian state budget�4 
While Ukraine has lost access to five of its ports located in Crimea, it retains four 
important commercial ports in Odessa, Chornomorsk, and Yuzhny, located on 
the northwestern coast of the Black Sea, and Mariupol’ in the Sea of Azov�5 Taken 
together, these ports account for almost 70 percent of the total commercial cargo 
into Ukraine� In a sign of their significance to the Ukrainian economy, Ukraine 
increased its container turnover by almost 6 percent in the first quarter of 2016�6 
Further demonstrating the economic importance of these ports, Cargill, an 
American global corporation, announced in early 2016 that one hundred million 
dollars had been invested to build a grain terminal in Yuzhny�7
Ukraine’s ports also matter because Ukraine has an export-oriented economy; 
it is a major exporter of machinery, grain, coal, steel, and fertilizers, which are 
shipped out through its ports� Indeed, these are of growing importance, and from 
2015 to 2016 Ukraine increased its export volume by 12 percent�8 Mariupol’, for 
example, is the busiest commercial maritime hub on the Sea of Azov, and before 
the Russian annexation of Crimea it produced almost a third of the Donets 
region’s total industrial output, including over 70 percent of the region’s steel 
production�9 Considering these important maritime economic and commercial 
interests, rebuilding the Ukrainian navy clearly is necessary to protect Ukraine’s 
national interests�
Ukraine’s maritime interests are also military in nature, and the ongoing con-
flict in eastern Ukraine against separatist and Russian forces has only sharpened 
them� This protracted conflict and the vulnerability of the strategically important 
city of Mariupol’ also have created incentives to rebuild the Ukrainian navy� Ma-
riupol’ constitutes a key battleground—the front line and a decisive point in the 
ongoing conflict� For the separatists, Mariupol’ represents an important strategic 
prize: taking it would give them control of the two hundred miles of coastline 
running from Donetsk to Crimea, effectively halving Ukraine’s Sea of Azov and 
Black Sea coastlines� The seizure of Mariupol’ also would represent a symbolic 
coup for the separatists, as President Poroshenko named the city Ukraine’s provi-
sional capital of the Donets region in 2014� Importantly, the capture of Mariupol’ 
also could provide a land corridor from Russia to the Crimean Peninsula�
Although Ukrainian forces have secured control of the city, Mariupol’ remains 
contested, and Ukrainian positions in the surrounding area are under almost-
constant attack� After separatists seized its administrative buildings in the spring 
of 2014, the city was brought back under Ukrainian control in June 2014�10 In Au-
gust 2014, the rebels launched another offensive to take Mariupol’; it was halted 
by the signing of the Minsk Agreement� However, in a sign of the importance of 
this port to the separatists, Mariupol’ was shelled again in January 2015, killing 
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thirty people and injuring eighty-three others�11 This protracted battle for Mari-
upol’ is far from over� In August 2016, one Ukrainian soldier was killed and five 
were wounded after the separatists launched an intense artillery barrage near 
Mariupol’� Shyrokyne, a seaside village just east of Mariupol’, was attacked sixteen 
times by Russian-backed separatists, nine of those times with heavy weaponry�12 
A month later there were reports from Ukraine’s Anti-Terrorist Operations 
Headquarters that rebels again had fired on Ukrainian positions near Mariupol’�13 
The constant attacks around Mariupol’ clearly demonstrate a very real and ongo-
ing threat from the separatists to Ukraine’s maritime interests and security�
More widely, Ukraine faces a growing threat from Russia’s maritime capa-
bilities� Ukraine’s military doctrine identifies the Russian Federation as a direct 
threat to Ukraine�14 This threat encompasses not just support to Ukrainian sepa-
ratists but a more general military buildup� For example, since the annexation, 
estimates suggest that Moscow has spent almost $750 million upgrading its forces 
in Crimea, and essentially has “turned the peninsula into an iron fortress capable 
not just of defending itself, but also of delivering missile strikes on ground targets 
in central and southern Ukraine�”15 In the early months after the annexation, Rus-
sia moved quickly to develop a fully capable air-defense system and deployed mo-
bile, long-range, antiship systems� These, together with similar systems installed 
on the coast of Krasnodar, give Russia the ability to strike surface targets from 
its ground-based locations across about a third of the Black Sea�16 As part of the 
more recent military buildup, the Russian navy will deploy batteries of Buk mis-
siles in Crimea, which, along with the S-300 and S-400 missile systems already 
stationed in Crimea, effectively will secure (Russian) airspace over the peninsula 
and the Black Sea�17
Russia almost has doubled the number of service personnel in Crimea, creat-
ing seven new military formations and eight military units in addition to those 
available to the Black Sea Fleet�18 Russia also has increased the number of tanks 
and combat armored vehicles in Crimea by a factor of almost seven, artillery sys-
tems are 7�2 times more numerous than before the annexation, and the numbers 
of helicopters and submarines also have doubled�19 Russia has replaced the avia-
tion component of the Black Sea Fleet, landing its first fourteen multirole Sukhoi 
Su-27SM and Su-30 fighters at Belbek Airport in Crimea�20 Advanced Russian 
missile systems deployed to Crimea include batteries of Pantsir-S1 combined 
surface-to-air (SAM) antiartillery systems, capable of engaging both airborne 
and land-based lightly armored targets, as well as conducting fire on military and 
industrial targets� Russian Bastion antiship missile systems also have been de-
ployed along the Crimean coast; these can engage both surface ships of different 
classes and land-based targets� Lastly, Russia has deployed the Bal coastal mis-
sile system from the Caspian to control its territorial waters, and the air-defense 
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troops stationed in Crimea also received S-300PMU SAM systems�21 Comment-
ing on the upgrading and renewal of Russian capabilities in Crimea, NATO’s then 
supreme allied commander Europe General Philip M� Breedlove, USAF, stated in 
early 2015 that the new weapons systems have made Crimea “a great platform for 
power projection in this area�”22
Russia has ambitious plans to strengthen the Russian armed forces in Crimea 
further over the period 2020–25, to include increasing service personnel, arma-
ments, air assets, and missile systems, as well as the size, power-projection capa-
bilities, and antiaccess/area-denial ability of the Black Sea Fleet�23 The Black Sea 
Fleet will be augmented with up to six new frigates, two new missile corvettes, 
and six Kilo-class diesel-powered submarines�24
The emergence of a separatist micronavy complicates further the traditional 
Russian naval threat� There is increasing evidence to suggest that the separatists 
are building their own maritime capabilities, including cutters armed with large-
caliber weapons�25 A report by a pro-Russian newspaper in May 2015 claimed 
that the rebels had set up an Azov Flotilla, with a maritime Spetsnaz element, in 
the Donetsk People’s Republic�26 This development by the separatists—of a small, 
highly mobile fleet equipped with antitank guided missiles, automatic grenade 
launchers, and machine guns, able to carry out attacks on Ukrainian shipping 
and ports or to land forces and conduct raids or sabotage missions—is clearly a 
serious threat to Ukraine’s coastline and the country’s ability to protect its mari-
time domain�27 In August 2016, there also were reports that the separatists had 
practiced carrying out and defending against an amphibious landing�28 A video 
of the landing posted online shows soldiers coming ashore in several dozen small 
speedboats and BTR-80 amphibious armored personnel carriers�29 Although the 
reach of this potential amphibious force currently is limited by a lack of landing 
ships, local media reports claimed that the separatists had demonstrated a high 
level of combat readiness in both defensive and offensive coastal operations�30 
In a sign of the seriousness of this threat, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry an-
nounced that Ukrainian marines, coastal artillery, and other naval detachments 
were taking part in antiterrorist operations to prepare to “deter an armed aggres-
sion from the sea�”31
Ukraine clearly faces many challenges to its maritime interests� In meeting 
these threats, Ukraine’s government has attached significant importance—at 
least in theory—to the rebuilding of the Ukrainian navy� In rebuilding its navy, 
Ukraine could be assessed as having a number of advantages over other states 
attempting to develop their maritime capabilities� For example, Ukraine has a 
clear threat against which to frame its maritime policies and capabilities; the 
war in the east has removed some of the domestic barriers to increased defense 
spending; and the loss of so much naval equipment might reduce the physical 
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and intellectual constraints that legacy systems impose� In practice, however, 
Ukrainian naval regeneration has been impeded by a number of key difficulties�
THE CHALLENGES TO UKRAINIAN MARITIME REGENERATION
One clear challenge facing those rebuilding Ukraine’s navy is the losses suffered 
at the hands of Russia� The key losses that impinge on the future development 
of the Ukrainian navy were of the maritime infrastructure and ports in Crimea� 
The loss of these facilities has had a devastating effect on the Ukrainian navy—as 
noted, equivalent to a major defeat at sea� The Ukrainian navy lost its head-
quarters in the Black Sea and much of the service’s signals-intelligence, training, 
administration, maintenance, and logistics infrastructure, including its ammuni-
tion storage facility in Inkerman Valley�32
As a result, the truncated Ukrainian navy has been relocated to Odessa, which, 
as a commercial rather than a military port, lacks the maritime infrastructure 
necessary to support and maintain the fleet effectively� Compared with Sevas-
topol’s waters, the sea near Odessa is shallow, which creates practical challenges 
if Ukraine is to realize its plans to build an underwater capability to deter a 
potential enemy� Considerable investment will be required to turn Odessa into 
an effective maritime base for the fleet, and the Ukrainian government has been 
slow to develop maritime infrastructure there� In April 2016, more than two years 
after the loss of Crimea, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry finally announced plans 
to begin construction of a modern maritime base in Odessa for the Ukrainian 
navy�33 Three months later, the defense minister confirmed that UAH 100 million 
(almost four million dollars) had been allocated to construct the navy headquar-
ters in Odessa�34
Given the challenging security environment in the east, the eventual construc-
tion of a safe and effective naval base in Odessa is likely to remain problematic, 
however� Not only has there been a spate of terrorist attacks, but the situation 
on the ground in Odessa remains difficult� In January 2016, a Ukrainian sailor 
prevented an attack on a naval facility in Odessa, and Ukrainian military patrols 
also recently foiled an attempt to plant a mine near a military checkpoint in the 
city�35 There has been a series of terrorist attacks in Odessa that call into question 
the safety of the fleet and its service personnel�36 A recent Jane’s Sentinel Security 
Country Risk Assessment on threats to Ukraine states that government assets, 
transport infrastructure, and assets associated with progovernment troops and 
businessmen in Odessa are currently at risk of attack�37
The loss of Ukrainian naval platforms also created a serious challenge in terms 
of rebuilding the fleet, because those lost included a majority of the navy’s most 
modern ships�38 In total, the service lost eleven ships and boats, eight auxiliary 
vessels, and its only submarine� These vessels included three of the navy’s most 
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modern: two corvettes, Ternopil and Lutsk, and the command ship Slavutich.39 
Other key losses included the landing vessel Olshansk; two of Ukraine’s mine-
sweepers, Cherkasy and Chernihiv; the antitorpedo boat Kherson; and the anti-
sabotage boat Feodosiya�40 As a result, the fleet currently operates only ten ships, 
with thirty-three support vessels� Reports suggest that half of these platforms 
need to be repaired and all are outdated, due to end their operational lives in 
2018�41 Highlighting the poor state of the current fleet, Vice Admiral Serhiy Hay-
duk, a former commander of the Ukrainian navy, stated in January 2016 that the 
fleet had “lost its fighting capacity�”42
Personnel losses also posed a significant problem� When Russia annexed 
Crimea, about twelve thousand of the Ukrainian navy’s almost sixteen thousand 
service personnel were based in the region, and almost 75 percent of Ukraine’s 
maritime personnel remained in Crimea�43 The loss of so many of the navy’s 
experienced personnel had a damaging effect on its operational effectiveness, at 
least in the short term�
Another set of difficulties in regenerating the Ukrainian navy is conceptual 
and policy related: it has proved easier to define the threats to Ukraine’s maritime 
interests than to determine clearly what sort of navy is needed to meet those 
threats� While there has been some discussion of what a revived navy actually 
would or should look like, many of the suggestions have been conservative in out-
look, focusing on a balanced fleet and traditional roles—ignoring the high cost 
of and other challenges to building such capabilities� Admiral Ihor Kabanenko, a 
former Ukrainian deputy defense minister, has suggested that the Ukrainian navy 
should be a small, modern, and balanced fleet that consists of surface ships and 
submarines, naval aviation, naval infantry, special operations forces, and other 
components that can react adequately to threats from the sea� Vice Admiral Ser-
hiy Hayduk has stated that Ukraine should revive its submarine force, purchasing 
between two and four subs, probably secondhand from Turkey� The naval staff 
also recognizes the need to purchase new minesweepers�44
A paper written by former deputy navy chief Ryzenko provides the most 
comprehensive outline of the naval staff ’s vision of what a future Ukrainian navy 
should look like� In this paper, Ryzenko examines what assets and capabilities, 
investment, and organizational changes the Ukrainian navy will need in the 
future to perform its core mission of protecting Ukraine’s maritime sovereignty 
and national interests at sea� According to Ryzenko, the fleet’s core mission will 
be divided into three tasks� The first of these is defending Ukraine’s coastal area, 
including its harbors and ports; securing critical infrastructure; and countering 
landing operations� The second task is performing general maritime operations 
and wider sovereignty protection; this includes securing sea lines of commu-
nication, performing antisurface and antisubmarine warfare, and carrying out 
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defense diplomacy missions� The third task is conducting what Ryzenko terms 
offensive maritime operations; these would include destroying enemy ships at 
sea, controlling the air where needed, and conducting amphibious landings�45
Some have argued that Ukraine should implement a much more modest “mos-
quito fleet,” or coastal-defense, navy concept� A mosquito fleet–type force aims to 
deny command of the sea to adversaries with larger and more powerful navies�46 
Such a fleet consists of small, fast, and relatively cheap platforms, backed up by 
gunboats, mines, and coastal-defense ships� The goal is to make it impossible for 
an enemy to approach the country’s coastline�47 Under such a plan, the Ukrai-
nian navy would have a much smaller force, with no submarines, more-limited 
coastal-defense and combat-support units, and very limited air-control ability 
over the fleet� In effect, it would focus on performing just one of the three tasks 
Ryzenko laid out: the defense of Ukraine’s coastal area, including its harbors and 
ports, securing critical infrastructure and countering landing operations� As will 
be discussed later, Ukraine has made some modest progress toward building both 
the quantitative and qualitative elements of a coastal-defense force�
A third key challenge in rebuilding the Ukrainian navy is the gap between 
the Ukrainian government’s rhetorical commitment to such a reconstitution and 
its actual funding priorities� In light of the ongoing conflict in the east, the gov-
ernment made the decision in its defense spending to prioritize increasing the 
combat effectiveness of its land and air, rather than its naval, forces�48 As a result, 
while Ukraine’s defense budget has increased significantly, the navy’s share of the 
overall budget has remained small�49 Ukraine’s 2016 defense budget is four times 
higher than 2014’s, and 2017’s will increase further�50 The Ukrainian navy’s bud-
get, however, amounts to just 2 percent of the defense ministry’s total budget, and 
only 0�5 percent of the total budget is spent on procuring weapons and military 
equipment for the fleet�51 The lack of investment in the fleet, in comparison with 
the other two services, can be seen clearly in the so-called White Book, the Ukrai-
nian Ministry of Defense’s annual publication on the current state of the armed 
forces� For example, in 2015 the army acquired nine new weapon systems; the air 
force had twelve new acquisitions, including four helicopters and ten unmanned 
aerial vehicles; but the navy added no new weapon system or capabilities to its 
arsenal�52
At the root of all these difficulties is the parlous state of the economy, which 
has necessitated hard choices� The Ukrainian government still is fighting a costly 
war in the east, and the Ukrainian economy has been slow to recover from the 
crisis� In a speech at the UN summit in New York in September 2015, President 
Poroshenko spelled out the high economic costs of the conflict in the east: he 
claimed it was costing Ukraine five million dollars a day� He went on to point 
out that Ukraine had lost about a fifth of its economic potential with its eastern 
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territories�53 Production within the Donets region has plummeted 70 percent, 
and estimates suggest this has cost Ukraine 7 percent of its GDP� Russia’s an-
nexation of Crimea has contributed to the loss of another 4 percent of Ukraine’s 
GDP�54 In addition, the flow of refugees from the region either to Russia or 
to other parts of Ukraine not only represents an important loss of manpower 
but puts additional strain on the Ukrainian economy�55 Although there have 
been some positive signs that Ukraine’s economy will begin to recover in 2017, 
structural shortcomings and domestic impediments to economic growth—such 
as unsustainable fiscal policies and the difficulty of attracting foreign capital— 
suggest that this recovery will be slow at best�56
Thus, even if the Ukrainian government were able to allocate a larger share of 
the defense budget to the navy, the capital-intensive nature of naval investment 
and the poor state of the Ukrainian shipbuilding industry would make it difficult 
to effect any quick transformation in naval capabilities� Estimates suggest that re-
building a navy capable of performing all three of the core tasks discussed earlier 
—defending Ukraine’s coastal and maritime area, conducting wider maritime 
operations, and carrying out offensive maritime operations—would require the 
navy’s budget to increase by a factor of about twenty� To procure the necessary 
platforms (artillery boats, landing craft, corvettes, submarines, and auxiliary sup-
port vessels) and coastal-defense and combat-support units, as well as to invest 
in maritime aviation and personnel, Ukraine would need to spend about $3�6 
billion over the next five years, according to Ryzenko�57 Indicating the scale of the 
challenge facing the Ukrainian government, this amount constitutes significantly 
more than Ukraine’s whole defense budget for 2016� In contrast, development of 
a mosquito fleet that would enable the navy to perform one core task effectively 
would require a more modest fourfold increase in the current naval budget�58
The long-term decline of the Ukrainian shipbuilding industry also has had an 
impact on the rebuilding of the Ukrainian navy� After the collapse of the USSR, 
Ukraine inherited a significant shipbuilding capacity, with plants in Kiev, Myko-
layiv, Kherson, Sevastopol, Kerch, and Feodosiya� They were capable of building 
missile and aircraft carriers, large antisubmarine ships, heavy transport ships, 
boats, lighter carriers, and multipurpose icebreaking supply vessels�59 During the 
last three decades, however, Ukraine’s shipbuilding industry has become increas-
ingly unprofitable and has lost much of its competitive edge in both international 
and domestic markets�60 Several large enterprises are close to bankruptcy, and 
many of the shipyards have been operating at 15–30 percent of their production 
capacity�61 As a result of these challenges, the shipbuilding industry’s contribution 
to Ukraine’s overall industrial output has dropped from 5 percent to less than 1 
percent�62 This decline in the shipbuilding industry has been caused by a number 
of factors, including increasing steel prices, limited credit resources, a lack of 
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government support, and the investor-deterrent effect of the conflict in Ukraine’s 
east�63 As a result of these challenges, many of Ukraine’s shipbuilding enterprises 
have had no new orders over the last few years, have large wage arrears, and suffer 
an acute shortage of experts�64
Because of weak domestic demand for shipbuilding and a lack of government 
investment in the country’s shipbuilding industry, Ukraine is unlikely to receive 
any new major warships in the imminent future� 65 Ukraine’s Project 58350 cor-
vette program not only has failed to produce a single ship but appears to have 
been shelved� Under plans announced in 2011, ten corvettes were to be built for 
the Ukrainian navy by 2026� However, construction of the Project 58350 flagship, 
Volodymyr Velykyy, had been progressing extremely slowly, and a decision was 
made in October 2015 to allocate funds toward upgrading the existing fleet rather 
than developing new platforms�66 While the manufacturers claim that 80 percent 
of the hull is ready, the ship’s technical readiness stands at closer to 17 percent, 
suggesting that even if the platform secures sufficient funding it is unlikely to be 
brought on line until at least 2018�67
Ukraine’s tumultuous domestic politics further complicates all the previously 
discussed difficulties in building an effective navy� Despite the president’s com-
mitment to implementing wide-ranging economic reforms, they will be difficult 
to achieve, given the fragility of the new government coalition and endemic 
corruption�
In April 2016, the former prime minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk was replaced 
by the former speaker of the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament) 
Volodymyr Groysman� The new coalition, made up of the political parties of the 
president and the former prime minister, has only a very small parliamentary 
majority, so it relies on support from other parliamentary factions and groups� 
This weakening of the government majority will complicate all policy making 
further�68
Endemic corruption in Ukraine compounds all these problems� Highlighting 
the extent of the problem, Transparency International ranked Ukraine 143rd out 
of the 173 countries on its Corruption Perceptions Index, and estimates have 
suggested that over twelve billion dollars per year disappear from the Ukrainian 
budget�69 Thomas de Waal, a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, has argued that 
corruption is an inadequate word to describe the conditions in Ukraine; the 
problem is not that a well-functioning state has been corrupted, but that the 
“corrupt” practices themselves now constitute the “rules” by which the state is 
run�70 Calling into question the ability of the government to engage in reform in 
the future, the worst corruption “occurs at the nexus between business oligarchs 
and governmental officials,” where a few oligarchs control over 70 percent of 
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Ukraine’s economy and have captured and corrupted Ukraine’s political and 
judicial systems�71
BUILDING A MOSQUITO FORCE
Faced with problems in funding and procuring maritime capabilities, Ukraine 
has prioritized, at least in the short term, the acquisition of smaller, faster plat-
forms, in effect building the elements of a small coastal-defense force� In Novem-
ber 2015, the Ukrainian navy began acquiring the fast-attack elements of a mos-
quito fleet when it received two Gurza-M (Project 51855)–class small armored 
artillery boats designed for patrolling coastal areas� Currently undergoing sea 
trials, each boat carries a combat module fitted with automatic cannon, a grenade 
launcher, a machine gun, and two antitank missile systems with laser guidance�72 
In March 2016, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry signed a contract with the state-
owned Ukroboronprom Company in Kiev to provide four more of these small 
armored gunboats for the Ukrainian navy�73 Two of these gunboats are likely to 
be Centaur armored amphibious assault ships based on the Gurza-M, but with 
extended functionality� They would be designed to deliver marines or special 
forces, and to deliver fire support to land forces under engagement in littoral and 
inland waters (estuaries, rivers, and water-storage basins) at distances up to one 
hundred miles�74 In addition, these boats will be highly deployable and could be 
sent by land to Mariupol’ to operate in the Sea of Azov� Each boat can fit into 
two trailer trucks: one truck for the hull with the weapons removed; the other 
for the tower, plus a container with the dismantled weapons�75 Further augment-
ing Ukraine’s mosquito fleet, a U�S� contractor, Willard Marine, also will supply 
four high-speed patrol boats to the Ukrainian navy, accompanied by on-site 
crew training in the design, operation, maintenance, and repair of the boats�76
It is interesting that the combination of a lack of government funds, conse-
quent equipment shortages, popular engagement in the war, and the leveraging 
of the opportunities that new technology affords actually has facilitated the de-
velopment of the fleet, in particular via some very innovative forms of equipment 
procurement� For example, in December 2015 the navy’s flagship, the frigate 
Hetman Sagaidachny, was fitted with a modern navigation radar system financed 
by a charitable organization, a part of the Come Back Alive volunteer movement� 
The movement raised the funds through Internet crowdfunding�77 This organiza-
tion has funded similar systems for other maritime platforms�78
Beyond the headway it has managed in developing the physical capabilities of 
a mosquito fleet, Ukraine has made much more progress in developing the quali-
tative aspects of its maritime power�79 In this regard, the conflict in the east has 
had a paradoxically positive spillover effect on the building of a coastal-defense 
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navy� Training to fight and actually fighting the separatists have enhanced the 
professionalism of Ukraine’s naval personnel, particularly its marines; this has 
served as a force multiplier, by improving the ability of the fleet and its personnel 
to operate� In a visit to Odessa in September 2015, Vice Admiral James G� Foggo 
III, then commander of the U�S� Sixth Fleet, commented positively on what he 
saw of the professionalism of the officer corps and sailors of the Ukrainian navy� 
In September 2014, the fleet demonstrated its commitment to developing the 
ability to conduct joint operations� Special units of the Ukrainian navy and Inte-
rior Ministry as well as naval aviation units practiced a joint search-and-attack 
training operation involving the detection and destruction of illegal armed 
groups in the Odessa region� In July 2015, another joint tactical training exercise 
took place in the Southern Bug estuary in the Mykolayiv region of Ukraine, in 
which the Ukrainian navy, air force, and ground forces practiced conducting an 
amphibious assault and an airborne landing, further enhancing their joint skills�80
Indeed, Ukraine’s marines in essence have been rebuilt from scratch into one 
of the most combat-ready elements of Ukraine’s naval forces� When Russia an-
nexed Crimea, only one-third of the six-hundred-strong Feodosiya-based marine 
battalion opted to return to Ukraine, depriving the fleet of its most combat-ready 
element�81 The marines subsequently have been reconstituted and have gained 
valuable combat experience fighting in eastern Ukraine� In recognition of their 
enhanced combat abilities, units of the marine corps were deployed to the out-
skirts of Mariupol’ in July 2015 to bolster the city’s defenses� Commenting on 
this deployment, Ukraine’s president stated that the marines “will enhance the 
protection of Mariupol significantly�”82 The marines also have benefited from 
an increase in the number and scope of their training exercises� In 2015, the 
numbers of marine corps battalion and company tactical exercises increased 
seven- and 5�5-fold, respectively, and platoon field-firing exercises also went up 
fivefold over the previous year�83 In July 2015, they also held their first brigade-
level tactical training exercise, and they developed their joint skills further by 
practicing their ability to coordinate with air and maritime platforms to capture 
a shoreline and destroy enemy forces�84 Ukrainian navy commander Hayduk 
claimed that by these exercises the “marine corps have [sic] completely renewed 
its battle readiness�”85 More recently, in August 2016, in response to the Russian 
Federation’s announcement of a large naval exercise in the Black Sea, Ukraine’s 
president announced that the country’s marines and coastal artillery units also 
would hold a large military exercise, which would seek to heighten further the 
combat readiness of all naval forces, especially the marines�86
The fleet’s active participation in multinational maritime operations also has 
played an important role in enhancing the combat effectiveness of its service per-
sonnel� In September 2014, just months after the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine 
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held its annual SEA BREEZE exercise, demonstrating its commitment to develop-
ing the professionalism of its maritime forces� As part of this cohosted multina-
tional exercise, Ukrainian naval personnel practiced setting up and securing a 
maritime safety zone in a crisis area� In October 2015, Ukraine’s frigate Hetman 
Sagaidachny also took part in a joint PASSEX drill with Bulgarian, Romanian, 
U�S�, and Turkish ships in the western part of the Black Sea� Vice Admiral Hay-
duk claimed that this operation was a testament to the high level of cooperation 
between the Ukrainian and NATO navies and that multinational operations 
such as this allow fleet personnel to master NATO standards and enhance their 
interoperability�87
Ukraine’s marines also have benefited from taking part in multinational mari-
time exercises� These exercises have allowed the marines to develop a number of 
important skills, ranging from conducting amphibious landings or tracking down 
an enemy submarine to protecting critical maritime infrastructure� In July 2016, 
over 220 U�S� and Ukrainian marines, along with other naval forces, conducted 
an amphibious landing during another annual SEA BREEZE exercise in Odessa� 
During this exercise the marines practiced establishing a safe beachhead ashore 
and protecting critical infrastructure� Commenting on the progress Ukrainian 
naval forces had made, Captain Richard Dromerhauser, USN, stated that he had 
witnessed the flawless execution of a very difficult and complex operation�88 In 
August 2016, Ukraine’s marines also practiced tracking down an enemy subma-
rine as part of the SEA SHIELD multinational military exercise, which took place 
in the western part of the Black Sea off Odessa� A month later, Ukrainian marines 
participated in the PLATINUM LYNX 2016 exercise held in Romania� Working 
alongside NATO allies, they enhanced their interoperability in a combined train-
ing environment�89 The United States also recently announced the funding of a 
two-week training course in Mykolayiv for noncommissioned marine corps of-
ficers to enhance further their operational and combat effectiveness�90
Despite the many challenges Ukraine faces in rebuilding its fleet, the govern-
ment has made some modest progress in developing a mosquito force� Recent 
additions to the fleet include two small armored artillery boats designed for pa-
trolling coastal areas� In 2017 the navy will be augmented further by additional 
small attack craft�
Ukrainian naval forces, in particular the marines, have enhanced their com-
bat effectiveness significantly, including their ability to operate in a joint envi-
ronment� By increasing their training and their participation in multinational 
exercises, Ukraine’s marines have enhanced significantly their ability to protect 
Ukraine’s maritime interests�
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However, while increasing the operational effectiveness of its naval personnel 
is an important enabler in allowing the Ukrainian navy to protect the country’s 
immediate maritime interests, it cannot substitute for, and could be compro-
mised by, the current lack of maritime platforms� Owing to the low number of 
serviceable maritime platforms, the Ukrainian navy has struggled to increase the 
time spent training its naval personnel at sea�
Nonetheless, it is clear that, while Ukraine will continue to face some tough 
challenges in building a small mosquito force, Kiev is moving, albeit slowly, in 
the right direction� Faced with building a “navy in contact,” Ukraine should be 
encouraged to adopt a more pragmatic—but ultimately a more radical—model 
for its navy of the future� Ukraine can neither afford nor sustain a balanced, blue-
water maritime force� In contrast, developing an effective and efficient mosquito 
fleet would give Ukraine the capability to protect its EEZ and deter threats to 
its maritime infrastructure and coastline� The Ukrainian naval staff ’s ambitious 
plans to build a balanced force able to perform all three roles discussed in this ar-
ticle (protecting the EEZ, engaging in wider operations, and conducting offensive 
maritime operations) need to be discouraged actively� Such plans are unrealistic 
and unrealizable, and pursuing them will delay the construction of a more mod-
est and achievable mosquito fleet� By continuing to invest in the development of 
small, highly mobile attack craft and in the enhancement of the professionalism 
of its naval forces, Ukraine can continue to be a maritime state, at least in the 
short to medium term�
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CONFRONTING UNCERTAINTY WITH  
DECENTRALIZED COMMAND
 On June 18, 1812, the United States declared war on Britain� Although the dec-laration hardly could be described as unexpected, given years of strained re-
lations, the United States did obtain a degree of surprise�1 This was inevitable given 
the distance between the two countries and the nature of period communications 
—it took weeks to transmit information between the United States and Britain� 
The slowness of communications created a window of vulnerability for British 
naval forces in North American waters�
Events in Britain only exacerbated the exposure of its naval forces� On June 8, 
ten days before the American declaration of war, a new government formed in 
London� One of its first acts constituted an attempt to ameliorate a major point 
of conflict with the United States: it suspended the restrictions on American 
commerce delineated in previous orders in council� Through late June and most 
of July, British leaders in London hoped their conciliatory gesture would lead to 
a favorable response� Little did they know that the Americans had declared war 
five days prior to Britain’s repeal of the orders�2
Only in late July did news of the American war reach London� British decision 
makers then had to consider whether the Americans, given the suspension of 
the orders in council, would back away from hos-
tilities� The uncertainty contributed to additional 
delays, and it was not until September 26 that new 
instructions and leadership reached Halifax, Nova 
Scotia�3
Between the June 18 declaration of war and 
the arrival of new instructions and leadership on 
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CONFRONTING UNCERTAINTY WITH
DECENTRALIZED COMMAND
September 26, British naval leaders in North American waters faced tremendous 
uncertainty� Vice Admiral Herbert Sawyer, commander of the North American 
station and the senior officer at Halifax, served as the theater commander for 
an area of operations that spanned southward from the Gulf of Saint Lawrence 
in the north, past Halifax and the Eastern Seaboard of the United States, to the 
northern edge of the Bahamas; Sawyer’s command stretched eastward to include 
Bermuda as well�4
Sawyer had to go to war with the force he had, not necessarily the warships 
he needed� He had to execute operations relying on old instructions and his 
understanding of British strategic priorities and intent� In an uncertain envi-
ronment, he had to lead British naval operations in theater while providing his 
political leaders with assessments of American intentions� Captain Philip Broke, 
commanding the thirty-eight-gun frigate Shannon, was the second key British 
naval decision maker in North American waters�5 He oversaw Sawyer’s principal 
strike force� Broke’s primary mission involved mitigating the threat the U�S� Navy 
posed� This article assesses how Sawyer and Broke made decisions, executed 
operations, managed risk, and dealt with uncertainty at the outbreak of the War 
of 1812�6
Royal Navy (RN) operations during the opening months of the War of 1812 
underscore the complexity of naval decision making at the campaign level� This is 
a subject that all too often is lost between descriptions of naval battles and general 
narratives of naval war� Yet a study in naval decision making aids in understand-
ing the relationship among governmental leaders, their theater commanders, and 
operational elements at sea�
THE WORLD SITUATION
Much of what Sawyer and Broke encountered at the outbreak of the War of 1812 
was expected� Naval leaders in the age of sail operated in an environment in 
which communications were slow, so officers had to be agile enough to deal with 
evolving circumstances, from minor incidents to acts of war� Naval officers had 
to be aware of government intent so their actions could fulfill broader objectives�
Yet the specific circumstances that Sawyer and Broke encountered were 
unique� Britain already was engaged in a protracted, multitheater war against 
Napoleonic France, with the Royal Navy operating in the role of the dominant 
naval power� The War of 1812 originated on the periphery of the larger conflict, 
meaning the isolation Sawyer and Broke faced was more extreme than their peers 
faced in European waters� This was not a new theater in an existing war against a 
familiar naval foe, but a new opponent in a geographically distant region fought 
in parallel with the ongoing Napoleonic struggle� For Britain, the existential 
threat was France, not the United States�
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THE SITUATION IN AMERICA
Even so, leaders in London recognized that something needed to be done� “As 
soon as the discussions in America began to take a serious turn,” the secretary 
of the British Admiralty explained, “the British government sent orders to their 
naval officers, not couched in doubtful terms, but in the plain good old English 
style�”7 Leaders in London understood that if the United States initiated hostili-
ties, their theater commander in American waters required guidance�
Sawyer received the following three directives, dated May 1812: 
 1� To repel any hostile aggression, but also take care not to commit one�
 2� In the event of a declaration of war by America, or the issue of letters of marque, 
or any invasion of the provinces and islands [of Canada], to commence and direct 
hostilities, and to sink, burn, or destroy American ships, and to pursue all other 
measures, offensive and defensive, for the annoyance of the enemy and the protec-
tion of his Majesty’s subjects�
 3� To exercise, except in the specified cases, all possible forbearance towards citizens 
of the United States�8
These three instructions sought to meet wider policy aims� Governmental lead-
ers in London attempted to minimize tensions by directing the Royal Navy to 
employ “all possible forbearance towards citizens of the United States�”9 They 
wanted to avoid a war that necessarily would drain assets from the primary war 
against France� If hostilities did occur, destroying American ships would deprive 
America of commerce while driving commerce into British protection� More-
over, the elimination of American warships and privateers that could threaten 
British merchant shipping forwarded “the protection of his Majesty’s subjects�”10 
Avoiding war was the best-case scenario, but if war did occur the initial naval 
object sought to limit America’s ability to use and disrupt the maritime commons�
Sawyer’s order “to sink, burn, or destroy American ships” highlighted the 
way to protect a critical vulnerability—Britain’s sea lines of communication 
(SLOCs)� The commerce that passed along these maritime arteries ensured 
Britain’s global economic position�11 In 1812, every major RN deployment had 
for its fundamental object the protection of British commercial interests, with 
naval stations arranged at terminal, choke, and transit points along the SLOCs�12 
Major trade routes included the link between the British Isles and their posses-
sions in the West Indies� These trade routes were largely dependent on prevailing 
currents and winds� The latter circled the Atlantic in a clockwise pattern� Ship-
ping outward bound from Britain plunged south until it reached the latitude 
of Barbados, where it caught trade winds that propelled it westward across the 
Atlantic� The return voyage to Britain followed the predictable current of the Gulf 
Stream� This brought such shipping close to the Eastern Seaboard of the United 
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States� Sawyer’s North American command mitigated threats to commerce on 
this part of the return voyage� At approximately the latitude of Boston, shipping 
pressed eastward into the Atlantic, using the Azores as a waypoint on its voyage 
to the British Isles�13 Moreover, Sawyer’s command was positioned to protect the 
terminal point of the sea-lanes between the British Isles and its possessions in 
Canada� The U�S� declaration of war put these sea-lanes at immediate risk� The 
instructions to Sawyer attempted to mitigate this vulnerability by directing him 
to destroy American warships, privateers, and merchant commerce� The object of 
ensuring the security of the SLOCs dominated the design and execution of Brit-
ish naval operations during the opening months of the War of 1812�
OPENING ENGAGEMENTS—AND CONFUSION
On June 23, 1812, about a hundred miles east of New York, lookouts aboard the 
thirty-six-gun British frigate Belvidera sighted a small squadron� Captain Richard 
Byron identified the strangers as American warships� Given his orders and the 
tension between the United States and Britain, he beat a hasty retreat, but the 
squadron gave chase� During the afternoon, the lead ship, the American frigate 
President under Commodore John Rodgers, opened fire� Only then did Byron 
allow his crew to engage� Three hours into the chase, Byron had his crew start 
the water over the side and cast nonessential items into the sea� Now lighter, Bel-
videra drew away from its pursuers� It had been a close-run affair�14 These were 
the opening shots of the War of 1812 at sea�
Four days later, Byron brought Belvidera into the harbor at Halifax, where he 
found Admiral Sawyer�15 Sawyer must have been unsure how to proceed� His 
most recent instructions directed him “[t]o repel any hostile aggression, but also 
take care not to commit one�”16 With regard to the latter, he had only to remember 
several previous shooting incidents between British and American warships� In 
1807, HMS Leopard had fired on the American frigate Chesapeake owing to a sus-
picion of British deserters aboard the American warship� Outrage in the United 
States nearly resulted in war� Four years later, in 1811, Rodgers, commanding 
President, almost destroyed the British warship Little Belt� This shooting incident 
occurred in the dark; both the British and the Americans thought the other at 
fault�17 Indicative of the early confusion over Belvidera’s encounter, one British 
periodical posited, “Our Government has expressed an opinion, that the attack 
made upon the Belvidera had neither resulted from any new orders of the Ameri-
can Government, nor was any proof that war had been decided on�”18
Was Belvidera’s engagement merely another incident, or was it war? Sawyer 
needed confirmation� If it had been a mere incident, an overzealous and aggres-
sive reaction could precipitate actual war; whereas if hostilities already existed, 
hesitation could result in the loss of British warships, commerce, or worse� 
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Sawyer’s instructions were clear: if he could confirm that a state of war existed, 
he was “to commence and direct hostilities�”19
Given the high level of uncertainty about American intentions, Sawyer’s first 
move involved the collection, assessment, and dissemination of intelligence� Less 
than a day after the battle-scarred Belvidera made Halifax, Sawyer dispatched 
the naval sloop Colibri to New York under a flag of truce to determine whether 
a state of war existed� He also sent vessels to London and Jamaica with details of 
the attack� Just in case it had not been an accident, he dispatched another warship 
to warn the commanding officer at Newfoundland and ask for reinforcements�20
All these reports were incomplete� Sawyer could only speculate about why the 
Americans had attacked Belvidera� Doing the best he could, Sawyer pieced to-
gether the disparate accounts he could glean from American newspapers and the 
dated reports of British diplomats�21 It took over a week after Belvidera reached 
Halifax to confirm the declaration of war� When Sawyer did receive indisputable 
proof of hostilities on July 5, it cost him another warship to carry this news to 
England�22
THE SITUATION IN HALIFAX
Sawyer’s response also had to take into account the means at his disposal� He had 
but twenty-three operational warships�23 On paper, this might appear impressive, 
but his area of operations required extensive deployments� Moreover, he had to 
provide escorts to convoys� Few warships were then at Halifax, or at least nothing 
approaching the combat power of the American squadron that nearly had over-
whelmed Belvidera� That the Admiralty in London had provided Sawyer with less 
than an optimal force might lead to accusations of mismanagement, considering 
that Britain was the dominant naval power, possessing approximately half the 
world’s warship tonnage�24 However, the navy as a whole was stretched thin, given 
global naval commitments and ongoing operations against Napoleonic France�25
On June 30, three days after the battle-damaged Belvidera had anchored at 
Halifax, the thirty-eight-gun frigate Shannon and the thirty-two-gun frigate 
Aeolus arrived� Captain Broke of Shannon related, “We came in five days from 
Bermuda—thinking all tranquil & pacific with America—& counting only on 
a dull tiresome refit at this port, before we could resume our cruize, � � � but on 
arriving here � � � we met rumours of war” (emphasis original)�26 Chance favored 
the British� Not only had Belvidera escaped, but a planned refit had brought two 
additional frigates to Halifax� Sawyer saw an opportunity� Belvidera completed 
hasty repairs and Sawyer’s flagship, the sixty-four-gun Africa, stood ready� With 
Shannon and Aeolus, the British had three frigates and a sixty-four-gun ship 
concentrated for operations� Sawyer thought this force sufficient to deal with the 
American squadron� Shannon, Africa, Belvidera, and Aeolus sailed from Halifax 
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on July 5 under the overall command of Captain Broke, just hours after receiving 
indisputable proof that the United States in fact had declared war�27
Rather than assigning Broke command of his most powerful naval detach-
ment, Sawyer surely wished to raise his flag in Africa and personally proceed 
in quest of the American squadron, but he remained at Halifax� The uncertain 
political and naval situation meant that Sawyer needed to stay in communica-
tion� At Halifax, Sawyer could coordinate better among the various elements of 
his command� He had no idea when reinforcements would arrive, he had yet to 
receive instructions from London detailing specific objectives or rules of engage-
ment, and he was unclear regarding what kind of war the Americans intended 
to wage� In addition, the location of the American squadron that had attacked 
Belvidera was unknown� Tracking down leads would require significant adapta-
tion, and this could draw the British squadron far from Halifax�
Moreover, Sawyer expected developments in the Gulf of Maine and its off-
shoot, the Bay of Fundy� This constricted area of water contained several im-
portant British Canadian ports, including Saint John, New Brunswick� To com-
plicate matters, the bordering New England states were the center of American 
maritime activity� Sawyer expected cities such as Boston, Salem, Gloucester, and 
Marblehead, Massachusetts, to fit out numerous privateers�28 Such commerce 
raiders possessed government-issued licenses to prey on British shipping but 
were owned, fitted out, and manned by private individuals, resulting in a state-
sanctioned business venture that sought profit from the capture of commerce 
belonging to hostile states�
The threat of American privateers materialized more slowly than expected, 
however� It took eight days after the declaration of war for the U�S� government to 
legalize their use�29 An additional factor delayed the sailing of privateers: in April 
1812, Congress had placed a ninety-day embargo on all American shipping� This 
prevented the sailing of American merchant ships, with the object of keeping the 
Royal Navy from sweeping them from the seas in the first weeks of a war� The 
embargo did not expire until July 4, 1812—and the government made no excep-
tion for privateers�30 As one U�S� newspaper aptly printed, “Is it not very odd that 
privateers would be prevented from sailing sixteen days after war is declared?”31
A narrow window of opportunity existed during which the Americans might 
have benefited from the Royal Navy’s ignorance of hostilities� That window had 
closed by the time American privateers entered the fray because HMS Indian, 
an eighteen-gun sloop, and Plumper, a ten-gun brig, already had reached the 
Bay of Fundy�32 Although this did not prevent American privateers from tak-
ing several quick prizes and even blockading the British Canadian port of Saint 
Andrews, British actions mitigated the damage� Sawyer assessed the threat as 
severe� When Spartan, a thirty-eight-gun frigate, returned to Halifax on July 
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9, Sawyer dispatched it to the Bay of Fundy� The thirty-six-gun Maidstone, the 
first wartime reinforcement to reach Sawyer’s command, joined Spartan� British 
warships alternated among escorting convoys, including a hastily organized one 
of a hundred vessels; patrolling to sweep up privateers; and conducting small 
raids up rivers to neutralize privateers in their nests�33 The British had significant 
success, taking more than twenty privateers between mid-July and mid-August, 
with nearly all the captures occurring in the waters between the Bay of Fundy 
and Halifax�34
Sawyer’s decision to remain at Halifax instead of sailing in quest of Rodgers’s 
squadron also allowed for the more effective employment of eleven reinforc-
ing warships� Quietly dispatched between mid-May and July, they trickled into 
North American waters during the early months of the war� The Admiralty had 
intended these warships to take the place of those cycling home with convoys and 
to provide limited reinforcements to buttress Sawyer’s command in the midst of 
worsening tensions with the United States� But they served a different purpose, 
giving Sawyer additional options and helping to soften the initial blows to British 
commerce�35
TWO SQUADRONS
With Admiral Sawyer remaining at Halifax to manage naval deployments across 
the theater of operations, Captain Broke had a more specific objective: dealing 
with Commodore Rodgers and his squadron of American warships� The British 
decision to seek out the American squadron rested on the assessment that Rod-
gers posed the most dangerous threat to British maritime interests� He had the 
strength to eliminate British warships, put SLOCs at risk, and savage a valuable 
convoy� Whereas American privateers aimed at inflicting cumulative losses on 
British maritime commerce over a protracted period, Rodgers’s squadron in a 
single blow could inflict significant damage, not just to commercial shipping, but 
even to British warships�
Sawyer had two choices when developing instructions for Broke� He could 
provide restrictive orders, in an effort to maintain tighter control, or he could 
provide his intent, trusting his subordinate to execute operations effectively� 
During the period of uncertainty at the outbreak of the conflict, it was unclear 
whether the Americans expected direct aid from France� Sawyer worried that 
such aid would manifest as a combined expedition aimed at Halifax� In hind-
sight, an attack on Halifax was beyond the means of the United States; however, 
the possibility caused Sawyer concern during July 1812, and he had no way to 
recall Broke in the event such an attack transpired�36 Given this factor alone, there 
certainly was much to be said for keeping tight control over Broke’s detachment�
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However, the nature of communications, coupled with the scarcity of warships, 
led Sawyer to choose a decentralized command model� The speed of communi-
cations limited any attempt at control because it would stifle Broke’s initiative� 
This was particularly true given the uncertainty about the Rodgers squadron� 
Restrictive orders would make an encounter with the American squadron less 
likely� Sawyer explained to Broke that his actions “must depend on information 
you may from time to time obtain either of the situation or movements of the 
American Squadron or other circumstances, and it is left to your judgement and 
discretion to act as shall appear to you best for His Majesty’s Service�” Sawyer 
prioritized forward deployments, but this caused Sawyer to explain to Broke, “I 
have no means of keeping up a communication with you, till the arrival of rein-
forcements from England�”37 Without reserves, Sawyer became isolated from the 
operational elements of his command� Sawyer decided to trust Broke to make 
informed decisions�
Four days out, Broke’s squadron linked up with the thirty-eight-gun British 
frigate Guerriere�38 Broke now controlled four frigates and a ship of the line� This 
was a powerful squadron, especially when viewed as a percentage of Sawyer’s 
overall command� At the outbreak of hostilities, Sawyer controlled five true frig-
ates; Broke now had four of them in his squadron, leaving only Spartan for other 
assignments� Also attached to Broke’s squadron was the sixty-four-gun Africa� 
Launched in 1781 and hardly considered a frontline warship by 1812, Admiralty 
documents still described Africa as a third-rate ship of the line—the sole warship 
larger than a frigate in Sawyer’s entire command�39
Thus, Sawyer had depleted the combat power of his entire command to pro-
vide Broke with an effective force� It now fell on Broke to determine the location 
of Rodgers’s squadron� The last positive intelligence was over two weeks old, dat-
ing from Belvidera’s running fight� Broke had to make an educated guess regard-
ing what Rodgers had done in the meantime� He concluded that the Americans 
most likely had returned to either Boston or New York, the principal ports with 
the maritime infrastructure to sustain a powerful American naval squadron� 
Therefore Broke took his squadron toward Nantucket, to place his ships between 
those two cities� He hoped to lure Rodgers out for a fight by attacking trade in the 
area�40 Broke maintained that he would “continue to destroy all such as are not 
worth our sending in � � � and hope thus to make the Enemy feel the Evils of the 
War they have so wantonly began�”41
Then, on July 12, Broke fell in with Colibri, the flag-of-truce vessel Sawyer had 
sent to New York� Several British diplomats had taken passage aboard Colibri there, 
and they provided Broke with intelligence on the strength of Rodgers’s squadron� It 
contained the forty-four-gun President, the forty-four-gun United States, the thirty-
six-gun Congress, the eighteen-gun Hornet, and the sixteen-gun Argus�42
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Sawyer had dispatched Broke’s command with an object of defeating the 
American squadron� How well would the sixty-four-gun Africa, the thirty-eight-
gun Shannon, the thirty-eight-gun Guerriere, the thirty-six-gun Belvidera, and 
the thirty-two-gun Aeolus have done in an engagement with Rodgers’s com-
mand? First, it should be noted that the rated number of guns provides only an 
approximation of combat power; most of the warships mentioned above mount-
ed more than their rated number of guns� The rating system itself was a legacy 
system that did not take into account developments such as the introduction 
of the short-range carronade� Moreover, the Americans had a tendency to rate 
warships smaller than they actually were—this served a propaganda purpose�43 
In this case, it meant that the thirty-six-gun Congress displaced roughly two 
hundred tons more, and had a slightly heavier broadside, than either the thirty-
eight-gun Shannon or the thirty-eight-gun Guerriere�44
How the British warships compared with forty-four-gun American warships 
such as President and United States is a particularly thorny question� William 
James, a contemporary observer and the first British historian of the war, argued 
that warships such as President were built of heavier timbers than seventy-four-
gun British ships of the line�45 In a later study, Theodore Roosevelt countered, 
“The American 44-gun frigate was a true frigate�”46 In reality, President and 
United States displaced about 40 percent more than thirty-eight-gun frigates such 
as Shannon and Guerriere and 50 percent more than thirty-six-gun frigates such 
as Belvidera� In terms of armament, the principal battery of the American war-
ships consisted of twenty-four-pound guns, while British frigates such as Shan-
non, Guerriere, and Belvidera mounted eighteen-pound guns� In comparison 
with a sixty-four-gun ship such as Africa, President and United States displaced 
approximately 150 tons more, had a similar complement, and threw a broadside 
that was one hundred pounds heavier, albeit with a larger percentage of short-
range carronades�47
Considering the above information, the two squadrons were fairly equal in 
aggregate combat power, but several factors gave the British a slight advantage� 
Although each squadron contained five warships, the small sizes of the Ameri-
cans’ Hornet and Argus would make them very fragile instruments of war in any 
engagement� Moreover, two-thirds of Rodgers’s total broadside weight consisted 
of carronades, including almost the entire armament of Hornet and Argus; car-
ronades comprised only 40 percent of the British broadside weight�48 In a long-
range engagement, the Americans would have to rely on two oversized frigates 
and one just a bit more powerful than Shannon to fight a sixty-four-gun ship and 
four smaller frigates�
Although the odds were in Broke’s favor, he worried that Rodgers had linked 
up with other U�S� frigates� Information gleaned from American newspapers 
NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb   9 8/7/17   11:58 AM
92
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 4, Art. 23
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/23
 M C C R A N I E  8 7
indicated that the thirty-two-gun Essex likely had joined the American squadron� 
And Broke believed that Constitution, the third forty-four-gun American frigate, 
also might have joined Rodgers�49 The addition of either of these warships would 
tilt the odds in Rodgers’s favor�
In the worst case, Broke’s command had the combat power to inflict enough 
damage to make the American squadron a nonfactor in the coming months� By 
the time the Americans had repaired any battle damage, British naval reinforce-
ments would have shifted the naval balance in American waters permanently�
OFF NEW YORK
The diplomats aboard Colibri also informed Broke that Rodgers had not returned 
to port after his action with Belvidera� “It was generally believed they were 
gone in search of the homeward bound West Indies Fleet under convoy of the 
Thalia�”50 Although this was accurate information, Broke needed confirmation, 
so he proceeded toward the entrance to Long Island Sound�51 On July 14, he left 
his squadron over the horizon and brought Shannon inshore to gather intelli-
gence about the American squadron� Specifically, Broke sought local fishermen 
or those involved in the coasting trade; such individuals stayed connected with 
events ashore and had access to local newspapers�52
Since it was unlikely that an American would speak with a British naval 
captain knowingly, Broke perpetrated a ruse� He hoisted American colors over 
Shannon and pretended to be the U�S� frigate Congress� It would take an extremely 
educated eye to tell Congress and Shannon apart: their dimensions were nearly 
identical and each mounted eighteen-pounders on its main gun deck�53 (Flying 
false colors was a perfectly legitimate deception that all navies of this period used; 
the deception became dishonorable only if one fired on an opponent while still 
under a false flag�)54
In two separate incidents, Broke lured fishermen aboard Shannon� He even 
told them that he had parted company with Commodore Rodgers after running 
low on water� Broke described the fishermen as “thoroughly deceived,” for they 
provided him with significant information, including accurate details about the 
engagement with Belvidera�55 Since Broke knew the correctness of this news, he 
viewed the remaining information as more reliable, including reports that Rod-
gers had pursued a homeward-bound British West India convoy�56 The informa-
tion gleaned from the fishermen, in combination with the reports received from 
the diplomats aboard Colibri, indicated that Rodgers had pursued a West India 
convoy� But Broke remained skeptical; although the diplomats and fishermen had 
provided similar information, Broke worried that the newspapers on which the 
intelligence was based were inaccurate� Broke announced, “I shall anxiously seek 
for some further accounts of the American Squadron�”57
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Broke was not the only one attempting to locate Rodgers; U�S� Secretary of 
the Navy Paul Hamilton also wanted to find him� At the outbreak of hostilities, 
Hamilton had given Rodgers permission to surprise British warships in the off-
ing before “returning immediately after into port�”58 However, after attacking 
Belvidera Rodgers did not follow Hamilton’s instructions� It took several weeks 
for Hamilton to realize that Rodgers was seeking bigger objectives than isolated 
British warships� The arrival of British warships on the U�S� coast caused Hamil-
ton’s apprehension to grow, so he dispatched the fourteen-gun Nautilus to locate 
Rodgers’s squadron� Nautilus proceeded to sea on July 15 with a difficult task� 
There were two squadrons at sea—one under Rodgers, the other under Broke� 
They were similar in size, and from a distance would look very much alike� Nau-
tilus’s challenge was to find the right squadron; at this it failed� Nautilus fell in 
with Broke’s command on July 16, and after a short chase became Broke’s prize�59
No sooner had Broke gobbled up Nautilus than his frigates chanced on Con-
stitution� The outbreak of hostilities had found the latter in Annapolis, Maryland, 
and in need of additional men� Hamilton ordered Constitution to join Rodgers 
at New York� The ship was off New Jersey when Broke’s squadron found it� After 
an epic chase, Constitution finally outran the British squadron on the morning 
of July 19�60
During the pursuit of Constitution, Broke’s squadron became badly strung out, 
with the frigates drawing well ahead of Africa and Nautilus; Africa, an old sixty-
four-gun ship, could hardly keep up with the more nimble frigates, and Nautilus 
was manned with only a prize crew� Africa’s captain, not waiting for instructions, 
sent Nautilus to Halifax with the information that Broke had obtained� Sawyer 
had not provided Broke the means to stay in contact, but the fortuitous capture 
of Nautilus alleviated this issue� Later, Broke described the captain of Africa as 
acting with “great judgement”: with only a prize crew, Nautilus added little to 
the British squadron but could provide Sawyer with valuable intelligence, and 
Africa’s captain seized the opportunity�61
The news Nautilus carried informed Sawyer of Broke’s movements over the 
previous two weeks� Broke consistently had positioned his squadron where 
Rodgers was most likely to come to him� Initially, Broke had expected Rodgers’s 
squadron to be anchored at either Boston or New York� He tried to draw Rodgers 
out for a fight by putting American commerce at risk� Simultaneously, he sought 
intelligence� What he obtained indicated that Rodgers was still at sea, likely in 
search of a convoy� If true, such intelligence changed Broke’s mission� While 
continuing to seek confirmation, Broke placed his command between Rod gers’s 
squadron at sea and his most likely base of operations at New York� In this loca-
tion, Broke’s squadron was positioned to snap up Nautilus and Constitution� The 
NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb   11 8/7/17   11:58 AM
94
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 4, Art. 23
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/23
 M C C R A N I E  8 9
latter escaped only by superior sailing� Broke accurately concluded that both 
Nautilus and Constitution also were on the lookout for Rodgers’s squadron�62
OF CONVOYS
After chasing Constitution, Broke pondered his next move� He needed to shift his 
squadron from its position off New York� The longer it remained, the more likely 
it became that Rodgers would divine Broke’s position and avoid him by seeking 
another port� Rather than gamble on the port to which Rodgers would return or 
search for the American squadron directly, and “[h]aving received undoubted 
information [that] Commodore Rogers [sic] was gone upon the Grand Bank of 
Newfoundland to lie [in] wait for our West India Convoys and considering the 
vast injury his squadron might do in that point,” Broke later would explain that 
“it appeared to me the more important duty to abandon the plan we had entered 
upon for distressing the Enemy trade, for the protection of our own�”63
Broke understood the centrality of Britain’s maritime trade� No matter how 
much he wanted to engage the American squadron or gain prize money by cap-
turing American merchant commerce, the ulterior objective of protecting British 
commerce remained paramount� So Broke sailed eastward across the Atlantic 
in quest of the West India convoy� Oddly enough, finding the convoy increased 
the likelihood of encountering Rodgers: since convoys sailed along predictable 
routes, this one would act as a magnet for the American commodore� By seeking 
out the convoy, Broke again was attempting to force Rodgers to come to him�
On the morning of July 29, the squadron exchanged signals with the convoy’s 
sole escort, the thirty-eight-gun frigate Thetis, about six hundred miles east of 
New York City�64 Broke explained, “This fleet was talked of confidentially in 
America as the chief object of Commodore Rogers’ [sic] hazardous enterprise;—
we shall at least ensure their safety, and I hope our escorting them may lead to a 
meeting of the Squadron�”65
But Broke’s assessment was flawed: although he had found a West India con-
voy, he had not found the one Rodgers had pursued� The convoy Broke located 
comprised approximately seventy ships and had sailed in early July; Rodgers 
instead had pursued the May convoy, comprising 120 merchant vessels escorted 
by the thirty-six-gun frigate Thalia and the eighteen-gun sloop Reindeer�66 After 
the running fight with Belvidera, Rodgers had approached the May convoy� Rod-
gers nipped at its heels between June 29 and mid-July; he received reports from 
several merchant vessels that the convoy was nearby; his squadron even sailed 
through garbage the convoy had left floating in its wake� But the pursuit was to 
no avail, and on July 13, when Rodgers was nearly into the approaches to the Eng-
lish Channel, he called it off� All this occurred before Broke even had captured 
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Nautilus� After Rodgers gave up his quest for the convoy, he made a large circuit 
of the Atlantic before heading home�67
The convoy Broke found was never in danger—but this assessment is available 
only from the perspective of hindsight� Both the Admiralty in London and Saw-
yer at Halifax approved of Broke’s actions�68 Given the convoy’s value, the weak-
ness of its escort, and the uncertainty of the American threat, the risk had been 
too high to act otherwise� The convoyed merchant vessels had arrived safely; the 
prime difficulty in assessing successful commerce defense involves understand-
ing why it worked� Rather than seeking the enemy and defeating it through a 
sequential series of actions, commerce protection involved the complex interplay 
of convoys, escorts, and patrols—and a high degree of chance� Only by knowing 
Rodgers’s position in relation to that of the convoy can one conclude that Broke 
did nothing either to deter the American squadron or to protect the convoy most 
at risk� Although Broke failed to bring Rodgers to battle, he had assessed the 
available intelligence, understood the centrality of commerce in Britain’s grand 
strategy, and concentrated his squadron at a decisive point—in this case, in rela-
tion to a convoy� Instead of directly seeking battle with Rodgers, Broke prioritized 
Britain’s trading empire, understanding that this course of action was the most 
likely way to bring Rodgers to him�
So Broke’s squadron stayed with the convoy as it lumbered toward England� 
Africa and Thetis provided direct protection, while the frigates chased down 
sightings� One of these turned out to be an American merchant vessel that had 
encountered Rodgers’s squadron on July 10� Broke learned that Rodgers had 
not pursued Thetis’s convoy but instead was ahead of it� Prevailing currents and 
winds would make it difficult for Rodgers to double back and attack the convoy 
that Broke now protected� Thus, it was reasonably safe� Even so, Broke split his 
squadron, leaving Africa and Guerriere to assist Thetis in shepherding the flock 
of merchantmen�69
At longitude 45 degrees W, these two warships followed Broke’s orders and 
parted with the convoy� Over the next week, they slowly clawed their way back to-
ward Halifax� On the afternoon of August 14, Guerriere and Africa intentionally 
went separate ways: Africa steered for Halifax, carrying Broke’s official reports, 
while Guerriere continued on patrol� Only five days after parting with Africa, 
Guerriere encountered Constitution� The ensuing battle resulted in the first sig-
nificant British naval loss of the war�70
GROPING IN THE DARK—TO LITTLE EFFECT
Meanwhile, Broke took Shannon, Belvidera, and Aeolus toward the American 
coast, where he hoped to intercept Rodgers� Broke was now attempting to con-
front the American squadron with only three frigates, since he had gleaned from 
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various sources of intelligence that Rodgers also had three frigates, not four or 
even five as Broke once had believed�71 Another factor in Broke’s decision to con-
front Rodgers with a reduced force stemmed from his assessment of the U�S� Navy� 
When Broke learned of Constitution’s victory over Guerriere, he concluded, “We 
are all eager for an opportunity of convincing the Yankees how much they are in-
debted to chance for their success in this contest� Their force is superior in ship & 
metal & number of men—but not in skill or courage equal” (emphasis original)�72 
Broke did not respect his opponent, and it can be assumed that he thought the 
crews of his three smaller frigates equal to the task of defeating Rodgers’s more 
powerful frigates�
However, by reducing his squadron to three frigates Broke had accepted ad-
ditional risk; there was no margin for any circumstance that would further reduce 
his command� This is exactly what occurred on the night of August 10, when 
Belvidera became separated from Shannon and Aeolus during a chase� Belvidera’s 
Captain Byron then captured Hare, an American merchant brig with a treasure 
trove of intelligence� Some weeks earlier, Hare had encountered Rodgers’s squad-
ron� Thinking the merchantman would beat the American squadron home, a 
number of letters were sent across� These now fell into British hands� Under-
standing their significance, Byron immediately pressed for Halifax�73
When Belvidera arrived on August 24, Byron not only brought Sawyer the cap-
tured letters; he provided the first reports of Broke’s movements over the previous 
month� Problematically, Byron did not have Broke’s actual reports—these were 
aboard Africa, which still was making its way slowly toward Halifax� Without a 
clear description of Broke’s intentions, Sawyer faced considerable uncertainty, but 
he needed to act quickly� The captured letters indicated that the Americans would 
return to the United States at the end of August� Sawyer directed the thirty-eight-
gun Spartan and thirty-six-gun Maidstone to reinforce Broke�74 These reinforce-
ments became even more important when Aeolus had to go in for water—Broke 
was now alone as Rodgers approached�75
At Halifax, Sawyer obtained additional intelligence about Rodgers from 
Statira, a thirty-eight-gun frigate that Sawyer had taken under his command after 
the start of hostilities� The ship encountered Rodgers’s squadron on August 26 
while patrolling along Saint Georges Bank� The distance between the American 
warships and Statira was enough to leave both sides in doubt about the exact 
nature of the encounter, but two days later Statira again fell in with the squadron, 
and this time the Americans spied the British frigate and gave chase� The pursuit 
lasted sixteen grueling hours before the weather came on thick, swallowing up 
the British ship�76 Rodgers again had failed to capture an isolated British warship; 
and, just as Belvidera had done two months earlier, Statira carried news of the 
encounter to Halifax� Sawyer quickly assembled another squadron comprising 
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Statira; the forty-gun Acasta and the thirty-eight-gun Nymphe, two other war-
time frigate reinforcements; and the former U�S� sloop Nautilus, now recom-
missioned as Emulous� This squadron sailed on September 2 with orders to find 
Broke and defeat the American squadron�77
This was all for naught, however� The same day that Statira made Halifax, the 
American squadron anchored at Boston� Sawyer characterized the American 
venture as “a very unsuccessful cruize—having taken and destroyed seven vessels 
of little value�”78 Rodgers certainly achieved less than he had desired� He failed 
to capture a single British warship or locate even a small British convoy� Yet the 
British could consider themselves extremely fortunate� The American squadron 
had chased Statira and had come within the narrowest margin of capturing Bel-
videra� And only a few miles had separated Rodgers from an extremely valuable 
but weakly escorted West India convoy of approximately 120 merchant vessels�
A RETURN TO THE LARGER PICTURE
Sawyer had devoted the best of his command to seeking out Rodgers’s squadron, 
at the expense of other responsibilities� Even as late as September 9, Sawyer wrote 
of “the inferior force I had to meet the various exigencies” on the station�79 Broke 
added, “I am bitterly disappointed at not meeting the squadron we are looking 
for—& who have diverted our attention from every other pursuit�”80 Privateers 
had damaged British commerce, and many American merchant vessels had es-
caped the tentacles of the Royal Navy while Broke sought Rodgers�
Worse still, British deployments had broken down� British actions hinged on 
Broke maintaining concentration at the critical point, but the nature of period 
communications and the lack of smaller vessels to carry reports between Broke 
and Sawyer curtailed effective interaction� Without efficient communications, 
the instructions Sawyer provided Broke in early July became critical� High levels 
of uncertainty caused Sawyer to allow Broke significant discretion in developing 
a course of action� By all evidence, Broke ably assessed available information 
and acted in accordance with the intent of his instructions and Britain’s strategic 
priorities� The result, however, drew Broke deep into the Atlantic to protect a 
vulnerable convoy� There was no way to keep Sawyer informed� After seeing the 
convoy to safety, Broke allowed his command to fragment� This was in part a re-
sponse to intelligence about the strength of Rodgers’s squadron, but other factors 
contributed to the five-ship squadron becoming five widely separated individual 
warships�
In the aftermath, Guerriere was lost in combat� Africa slowly lumbered back 
to Halifax with Broke’s reports� The delay in getting these to Sawyer further 
contributed to the uncertainty gripping British operations in late August and 
early September� Belvidera separated from Broke in a chase, then captured vital 
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intelligence about Rodgers’s movements� Captain Byron took the information to 
Halifax, since this was a fixed point, whereas seeking Broke was akin to finding a 
needle in a haystack� After apprising Sawyer at Halifax, Belvidera failed to rejoin 
Broke before Rodgers reached Boston�81 Aeolus parted with Shannon on August 
28 because of a lack of water� As luck would have it, Aeolus encountered Spartan 
and Maidstone the next day� They provided Aeolus with enough water to remain 
on station, but they failed to locate Shannon�82 Broke found himself alone on the 
American coast—and Rodgers slipped by everyone�
Then, adding insult to injury, Broke encountered the U�S� frigate Essex late 
in the afternoon of September 4� Although Shannon overhauled the American 
frigate, darkness fell before Broke could bring the American to action� It was a 
close-run affair, with the captain of Essex describing his escape as “extraordinary�” 
The result likely would have been quite different if Broke had had another frigate 
or two in company, allowing him to use multiple warships to cut off Essex�83 The 
lack of water, chance, and other priorities had left Broke alone, however�
BRITISH NAVAL LEADERSHIP
Captain Broke’s performance exemplifies naval leadership at the operational level 
of war� His assessment of intelligence, acceptance of risk, and decision making 
despite limited information provide instructive examples� Six weeks into the op-
eration, Broke’s squadron fragmented� This was, at least in part, the result of the 
choices he made; but how long can an isolated squadron commander maintain 
the mental acuity to make the best choices before uncertainty leads to negative 
results?
While Broke dealt with the single problem of Rodgers’s squadron, Sawyer had 
to master theater command� He had twenty-three warships at the outbreak of 
hostilities, and this number grew with the arrival of the thirty-six-gun Maidstone, 
thirty-eight-gun Nymphe, forty-gun Acasta, and thirty-eight-gun Statira� In addi-
tion, seven smaller warships arrived with convoys�84 These reinforcements were 
offset during the first three months of the war by the combat losses of the thirty-
eight-gun Guerriere and the schooner Laura, while the British lost the eighteen-
gun Emulous to the wiles of the ocean�85 Normal operations also diminished 
the command� Sawyer dispatched several warships with convoys, while others 
carried news of hostilities to distant locations� By September, Sawyer’s command 
was only slightly larger than it had been at the outbreak of hostilities; however, it 
did contain a larger percentage of frigates�
Sawyer juggled forces and prioritized commitments, acting most decisively 
when he received news of Rodgers’s squadron, first by dispatching Broke, then 
by sending Spartan and Maidstone, and finally by dispatching Statira, Nymphe, 
and Acasta� Convoys sailed at regular intervals—Sawyer did not interrupt their 
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sailings because of the war; in fact, he provided escorts for the unexpected con-
voy that departed British Canadian ports in the Bay of Fundy in July� Sawyer also 
provided warships to maintain a presence around Halifax and Bermuda, the two 
bases that were essential to sustaining his command�
Finally, Sawyer sought out American privateers� This proved easier than it 
should have been, owing to U�S� government delay in passing enabling legislation 
for commissioning private armed vessels, as well as the decision not to amend 
the 1812 Embargo Act to allow privateers to sail before it expired� For privateers, 
surprise came not from where but when they would strike� Commerce warfare 
could inflict more significant damage if conducted before widespread knowledge 
of the commencement of hostilities� Once Sawyer had learned of the declaration 
of war, he understood that the Gulf of Maine and the Bay of Fundy would be 
prime operating grounds� It would take longer for the Americans to commission 
a meaningful number of large, oceangoing privateers; until then, hastily com-
missioned, smaller private armed vessels could seek easy prizes in nearby waters� 
Overall, however, the British were less vulnerable than they should have been, 
owing to American delays and Sawyer’s foresight�
Sawyer managed naval deployments during the opening months of the war ef-
fectively, but the Admiralty decided he was unfit for independent command� He 
had been appointed to his position in October 1810, when North America was a 
backwater: tensions had calmed after the Leopard-Chesapeake incident, and the 
shooting incident between President and Little Belt was months in the future� But 
once the Admiralty became aware of hostilities in late July 1812, it sought a more 
experienced commander�
Although Sawyer managed naval operations effectively, he lacked an appre-
ciation of broader political considerations� In early July, Sawyer had dispatched 
Julia to England with “certain intelligence of the act of the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States Declaring War against Great Britain having 
been approved by the President�” When Julia’s commander, Valentine Gardner, 
brought Sawyer’s dispatches to the lords commissioners of the Admiralty, they 
censored Sawyer, noting “their regret that on a subject of such extreme impor-
tance as that of a declaration of war by America you should not have given their 
Lordships the particulars of the information which you state yourself to have 
received, and that you did not send the American official documents upon this 
subject which Captain Gardner of the Julia reports to have seen at Halifax�”86
Sawyer’s haste in dispatching this information to London likely led to the 
omissions� Certainly, he had operated in a vague sense of suspended anima-
tion for the week between Belvidera’s arrival at Halifax following the ship’s es-
cape from Rodgers’s squadron and the official confirmation of the war� These 
were tense and uncertain days, and it is understandable that Sawyer failed to 
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provide the Admiralty all the details� Although the omission might have been 
understandable, the Admiralty did not view it as excusable� For one thing, the 
First Lord of the Admiralty had to address other government leaders about the 
declaration of war without critical documentation, which was embarrassing� 
Moreover, Sawyer did not direct Captain Gardner to detain the mail and passen-
gers aboard Julia until the Admiralty had been informed about the declaration 
of war� This failure led the Admiralty to complain that the resultant “spillage” (to 
use a modern term) provided that “the Public was in possession of as early and 
more ample information than His Majesty’s Government” (emphasis original)�87 
This was not just embarrassing; it caused Britain’s political leaders to work at a 
disadvantage as they tried to address the outbreak of hostilities� So, while Sawyer 
may have managed naval operations on a distant station adequately, he lacked 
the political acumen to interface with the British government� There was more 
to command on a distant station than merely being proficient at the operational 
level of war� The Admiralty understood that Sawyer was operationally competent, 
but not politically savvy�
Rather than remove Sawyer, the Admiralty decided to amalgamate the North 
America, Leeward Islands, and Jamaica stations under a senior admiral who 
could provide the oversight necessary to link the political, strategic, and op-
erational aspects of Britain’s naval response to the War of 1812� Sawyer would 
remain the senior officer at Halifax, where he could focus on operational issues, 
while the new commander would manage operations from Halifax to Barbados�88 
The presumed ability of one officer to command such an extensive area of opera-
tions led to the following quip: “Why they have excluded the East Indies and the 
Mediterranean, I know not, for surely they might as rationally have been included 
in this most unprecedented command�”89 Certainly, it was unparalleled—and in 
fact proved unwieldy�
The Admiralty’s choice to fill the new positon was Admiral Sir John Borlase 
Warren� He had commanded in North America in the aftermath of the Leopard-
Chesapeake affair and had extensive experience both operationally and as a 
diplomat�90 Although Warren’s command included the North America, Leeward 
Islands, and Jamaica stations, it is telling that he sailed directly for Halifax� This 
was the decisive point for controlling British naval operations in its war against 
America, and Warren needed to establish communications with Sawyer to obtain 
firsthand information about the progress of the naval war�
When Captain Broke learned of the change, he wrote, “Sir John Warren’s ar-
rival makes a grand revolution in our government, poor Adml Sawyer is much 
hurt at the rude manner in which the Admty have deprived him of his chief 
command�—perhaps he will go home�”91 This was prophetic� Warren reached 
Halifax on September 26, and just days later Warren wrote privately to a member 
NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb   18 8/7/17   11:58 AM
101
Naval War College: Autumn 2017 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
 9 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
of the Admiralty that Sawyer was “unwell & I believe it is so & he is very Grumpy 
also at what he calls being superseded in his command�” Rather than having a 
disgruntled subordinate, Warren gave Sawyer permission to return to England�92
With Warren’s arrival, the first chapter of Britain’s naval War of 1812 came to a 
close� Operationally, British naval leaders had demonstrated considerable skill at 
managing fog and friction while accounting for uncertainty� The British lacked 
a complete picture of American political intentions and an exact understanding 
of how the Americans planned to wage war at sea� This required leaders such as 
Admiral Sawyer and Captain Broke to work with available information and make 
assumptions about the rest�
At the same time, they had to prioritize� Prioritization does not come easily to 
a dominant naval power; after all, its navy should be able to master all threats� But 
in this case the available warships were insufficient, and it took time for reinforce-
ments to arrive� Sawyer and Broke sacrificed everything else to protect British 
commercial shipping� Warships protected convoys and the SLOCs rather than 
directly engaging American warships and privateers or sweeping up American 
commerce� Sawyer and Broke understood the difference between seeking battle 
and ensuring maritime security� In uncertain conditions and with a less-than-
adequate force, security took priority� British naval officers in North American 
waters showed a keen regard for Britain’s commercial position and understood 
the role of warships in supporting Britain’s global maritime trading empire�
Yet Sawyer’s reward was to be superseded as theater commander� The Admi-
ralty did not plan to remove Sawyer—he was an effective operator� Instead, Saw-
yer asked to be removed, since he felt aggrieved when the Admiralty placed War-
ren in a position to be his immediate superior� To demonstrate that the Admiralty 
held little ill will, the same First Lord of the Admiralty by 1814 had appointed 
Sawyer to command the Irish station� This was a command in close communi-
cation with London that oversaw convoys and patrols on the approaches to the 
English Channel—a command that demanded Sawyer’s expertise�93
However, the outbreak of war with the United States required a different 
type of know-how; it demanded an admiral who simultaneously could manage 
deployments and communicate broader strategic and even policy-level consid-
erations� Sawyer did not communicate well enough with his political superiors� 
Distance and the speed of communications certainly made exchanges with 
London more difficult, but these factors were known, and Sawyer could have 
accounted for them by lavishing more care on his reports, to include all available 
documentation� That he did not do so proved embarrassing, which led to friction 
between the civilian leaders and their senior officer at Halifax�
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Understanding intent, identifying objects, and managing risk are not the only 
hallmarks of success in decentralized command; clarity and precision in com-
munications prove just as important, for without these attributes, the tenuous 
links among decentralized nodes of authority become strained� The Americans 
contributed enough to the uncertain environment; ambiguity need not have been 
exacerbated by the failure of naval leaders to provide adequate communications 
with their civilian masters�
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MONEY, MOTIVATION, AND TERRORISM
 Attempting to neutralize terrorists is a vexing problem� Terrorists are elusive: they emerge to commit acts of terror, then blend back into their environment� 
Frequently they are lone individuals who travel freely, do not wear uniforms, and 
assiduously seek to avoid detection� Governments historically have employed 
a hard/soft-power approach to the problem: targeting terrorists through direct 
action (counterterrorism units, drone strikes, etc�), while employing soft-power 
mechanisms either to gain information or to create an environment that is less 
conducive to facilitating, supporting, and encouraging acts of terror�
The most recent significant terrorist attack against the United States—the 
attack on the U�S� mission in Benghazi, Libya—provides a useful illustration of 
the classic hard/soft approach� In the immediate 
wake of the attack, the United States deployed to 
the region agents of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI), the U�S� European Command Fleet 
Antiterrorism Security Team Platoon, two Navy 
warships, drones, and other military capabilities� 
Shortly after that, the United States offered a ten-
million-dollar reward for information leading to 
the capture of those responsible for the attack on 
the mission�1
The U�S� Department of State (DOS) offered the 
reward under the Rewards for Justice (RFJ) pro-
gram, which it has called “one of the most valuable 
assets the U�S� government has in the fight against 
international terrorism�”2 Together, RFJ and the 
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U�S� Department of Defense (DoD) rewards program have paid more than two 
hundred million dollars to informants since 1984�
Despite these programs’ size and scope and our reliance on them, they re-
ceive a surprising lack of scrutiny or attention from the media, academia, and 
the government�3 Indeed, no government or research entity ever has evaluated 
or even questioned the efficacy of these programs� While this fact is surprising 
on its own, it is downright astonishing given that a significant body of psychol-
ogy research demonstrates that extrinsic rewards structures—such as those that 
underlie these rewards programs—can undermine motivation and thus prove 
counterproductive� To structure rewards programs better, the rewarder must 
appreciate the relationship between the award and information: why and when 
people are motivated to provide useful information� With this in mind, rewards 
programs can be restructured to motivate potential informants more effectively, 
achieving far better results at a much reduced cost�
This article then has three goals� The first is to highlight both the importance 
of rewards programs and the lack of critical attention they have received� The 
second is to review the implementation of current rewards programs through 
two heretofore unused lenses: research into the psychology of motivation, and 
the historical case study provided by what the British experienced during what 
they called the “Malayan Emergency�” Finally, this article introduces two sugges-
tions for structuring rewards programs better� These approaches, termed here 
maximizing and minimizing, seek to provide readily implementable improve-
ments that apply historical lessons, together with guidance taken from years of 
academic research on motivation�
THE EXISTING REWARDS PROGRAM
Background
The 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism established the RFJ program�4 
The DOS Bureau of Diplomatic Security manages the program, which permits 
the Secretary of State to authorize “rewards for information that leads to the ar-
rest or conviction of anyone who plans, commits, aids, or attempts international 
terrorist acts against U�S� persons or property, that prevents such acts from oc-
curring in the first place, that leads to the location of a key terrorist leader, or that 
disrupts terrorism financing�”5
Rewards can be up to U�S�$25 million, or more if the Secretary of State “deter-
mines that a greater amount is necessary to combat terrorism or to defend the 
United States against terrorist acts�”6 Since 1984, the program has put up more than 
two hundred million dollars in rewards and has paid out more than $125 million�
The DoD rewards program allows the Secretary of Defense to pay rewards for 
nonlethal assistance that benefits the U�S� armed forces�7 The standard operating 
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procedure referred to as Money as a Weapons System implements the DoD pro-
gram, which provides smaller rewards in greater numbers than RFJ�8 Many other 
countries, including Afghanistan, Argentina, China, Greece, Guinea, Kenya, 
Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen, offer similar 
rewards programs for assistance against those designated as terrorists�
Judging Program Effectiveness
There has never been an evaluation of the effectiveness of either U�S� program� 
DOS long has maintained that RFJ is both successful and effective� On the pro-
gram’s web page, administrators state that the program has “provided informa-
tion that has helped prevent or favorably resolve acts of international terrorism 
against U�S� interests and bring to justice some of the world’s most notorious 
terrorists�”9 This statement is true; then again, twenty-five-million-dollar rewards 
have failed, and in some cases continue to fail, to lead to the capture of Saddam 
Hussein, Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed�10 Further, multimillion-dollar rewards have failed to 
produce information on virtually any major terrorist attack on the United States, 
stretching from the Benghazi attack (2012) back through the attack on USS Cole 
(2000), the bombings of the U�S� embassies in Tanzania and Kenya (1998), the 
bombing of the Khobar Towers (1996), the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 (1986), 
the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 (1985), and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 830 
(1982)�11
So, determining whether RFJ is a “successful” program depends on the met-
ric of success used� Perhaps generating a single piece of information would be 
deemed successful; researchers at the European Organization for Nuclear Re-
search (known as CERN) spent an estimated $13�25 billion to discover a single 
Higgs boson elementary particle—by all accounts, a successful effort�12
In the context of rewards programs, however, a far more important metric is 
the efficiency of the program� Consider the following example: a terrorist bomb 
injures two U�S� citizens� If the U�S� government offered a ten-million-dollar re-
ward and received information leading to capture of the terrorists, the rewards 
would be successful—but not necessarily effective� If a one-million-dollar reward 
generated the same information, it would be both successful and more effective� 
Or consider a rewards program that produces one hundred pieces of information, 
but could produce five hundred pieces of information if its administration were 
changed slightly�
The goal of any rewards program should be increased efficiency: more in-
formation at a lower cost� Increasing efficiency requires first understanding a 
program’s costs�
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Valuing Rewards Programs: The Cost of Information
Conducting an objective, academically rigorous evaluation would be the best 
method for understanding the costs and benefits of the programs� Interestingly, 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has conducted evaluations of re-
wards and incentives for federal employees, tax whistle-blowers, and those who 
report Medicare and Medicaid fraud�13 The GAO report on incentivizing federal 
employees provides useful guidance for evaluating the combined DOS/DoD 
rewards program� The report notes that “[a]gencies that fail to evaluate their in-
centive programs have no basis for determining whether their programs actually 
motivate and reward employee high performance�”14
In any rewards program, the actual reward paid is the largest and most obvi-
ous cost of the program� RFJ has paid out more than $125 million in rewards� In 
exchange, the U�S� government has received information� Was the information 
worth more than $125 million? Would it have been worth a billion dollars? Or 
perhaps “only” one million? Might the information have been provided for free?
When information is received through a rewards program, the government 
often presumes that the program motivated the informant� However, informants 
may act out of a sense of patriotism, personal animus, or some other motivation 
that we falsely attribute to the reward� In such cases, a reward would be “wasted,” 
as the individuals would have come forward for a much smaller reward, or per-
haps none at all� Without understanding what motivates an individual to come 
forward with information, it is impossible to fix an efficient price (the amount of 
the reward) for what the government is purchasing (information)�
Absent objective valuations, officials must resort to subjective valuations; what 
makes Ayman al-Zawahiri “worth” twenty-five million dollars and Mullah Omar 
“worth” ten million dollars remains unclear� Government officials have indicated 
that there is an internal process that establishes these numbers; but given the 
suspiciously round reward figures, the valuation is at least somewhat subjective�
Beyond the actual cost of the reward, ancillary costs must be considered� The 
majority of RFJ targets are thought to be located in predominantly war-torn, 
rural, impoverished areas�15 Injecting large sums of cash into such regions has 
the potential to cause any number of unintended consequences� Most obviously, 
rewardees or others could use the money to perpetuate violence by purchasing 
weapons or funding violent operations that will destabilize the region further� 
Conversely, the rewardee may become a target for revenge or robbery� The DoD 
program guidance expressly discusses this possibility�16 A broader negative im-
plication of a large reward is its destabilizing impact on the local economy� In 
theory, these unintended outcomes are more likely in some regions than others� 
Accordingly, rewards programs should take into account the recipient’s location�
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There also exists the possibility that the offer of a reward could bolster the 
reputations of wanted individuals, inflating their standing among associates and 
possibly in the broader community, and bringing them greater support (money, 
personnel, and equipment)� Thus, the reward may exacerbate the problem it is 
seeking to resolve� Some, for example, believe that offering a reward for the cap-
ture of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi increased his reputation�17 DoD has recognized 
this possibility, noting in its reward program guidance that “lower rewards limit 
notoriety for insurgents (Jesse James effect)�”18
A rewards program also may embolden or anger the target of the reward� For 
instance, in 1975 members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) assassinated Ross 
McWhirter (a cofounder of the Guinness Book of World Records) three weeks after 
he offered a reward for information leading to the arrest of members of the IRA� 
One of the killers, after his release in 1999, noted that McWhirter “put a bounty 
on our heads� He asked for it�”19 Poor rewards program execution can lead to such 
blowback�
Finally, it is instructive to look at the GAO report on incentivizing federal 
employees, which identifies several problems with rewards programs, including 
concerns regarding the possibility of fostering negative internal competition�20 A 
poorly structured or advertised program can even result in program failure� The 
FBI, for instance, pulled an advertising campaign for RFJ in the Seattle area fol-
lowing widespread complaints that the campaign promoted stereotypes�21
The true cost of a rewards program, then, is the cost of the reward plus the 
cost of any follow-on effects of the program such as increasing violence; bolster-
ing enemy reputations; angering enemies, thereby incentivizing their actions; 
and fostering negative competition for information� The very idea that a rewards 
program could have negative implications is anathema to the DOS view of its 
program, which is that as long as information is coming in, the program is work-
ing� Yet such costs are very real and should be considered when structuring re-
wards programs� This was one of the lessons the British learned in their Malayan 
rewards program�22
THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY:  
A REWARDS-FOR-INFORMATION CASE STUDY
Governments long have offered monetary rewards in exchange for beneficial 
information or action� Letters of marque—essentially licenses for private indi-
viduals to capture enemy ships, rewarded from the sale of booty—date from as 
early as 1295�23 Similarly, in the sixteenth century countries began formalizing 
the concept of prize money—at first, money paid to crews for capturing a wanted 
pirate�24 Rewards for information on terrorists are a more recent development� 
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One of the earliest references relating to rewards for information for capturing 
what the British termed terrorists comes from the Malayan Emergency�
The Malayan Emergency traces its origins to the establishment of the South 
Seas (Nanyang) Communist Party in 1925; the organization was renamed the 
Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in 1930�25 The party, comprising primarily 
ethnic Chinese, garnered widespread popular support after Japan’s invasion of 
Malaya in 1942� The MCP established the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army 
(MPAJA), which the United Kingdom and the United States officially recognized 
as the “foremost resistance organization behind the Japanese lines�”26 At the end 
of the war, the MPAJA “had established de facto control of many areas�”27 The 
British sought to control MPAJA forces by placing them under British military 
command—paying, clothing, and otherwise providing for all MPAJA forces� By 
1946, however, relations between the British and the MCP were collapsing rap-
idly�28 In February 1948, the communists—now styling themselves the Malayan 
Races Liberation Army—launched a series of major labor strikes, followed by a 
terror campaign, and eventually an insurgency that became protracted�29
The British initially responded with military force, but shifted to a whole-of-
government approach with the implementation of what was called the Briggs 
Plan, named after British lieutenant general Sir Harold Briggs, the commander 
of British forces� The overall intent of the plan was to cut off the insurgents from 
their support base�30 While the plan was, at its essence, a population-control pro-
gram, a major component of the program was a psychological warfare campaign, 
with an associated rewards program�31 Briggs enlisted the assistance of Hugh 
Carleton Greene, whose mission was “to persuade the terrorists to surrender, 
disrupting their organization and spreading disaffection in the process, and to 
encourage the civilian population to oppose them�”32
Before Greene arrived, the British had attempted—disastrously—an amnesty 
plan and were contemplating a rewards program�33 Greene conducted a cultural 
assessment of the communist fighters and their sympathizers and found that—
ironically—they were motivated by “greed�”34 Greene recognized that properly 
targeting the motivation could incentivize peasants to provide information, and 
those recruits tired of the jungle lifestyle to quit� In December 1950, Greene se-
cured funding for large increases in the size of rewards� In March 1952, Briggs’s 
successor, Sir Gerald Templer—who is thought to have coined the phrase “hearts 
and minds”—further increased the size of the rewards�35
Large reward size was one factor that made the Malaya rewards program suc-
cessful� Rewards ranged from three times the average Malayan worker’s annual 
income to as much as eighty-five times the annual figure� In one example from 
1956, an informant who supplied information that led to the ambush of three 
terrorists received an award equivalent to seventeen years of pay�36 By contrast, in 
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2010 the gross domestic product per capita in Iraq was $6,594, yet the vast major-
ity of rewards under the DoD program are below ten thousand dollars� Granted, 
there are complications with advertising very large rewards (discussed later in 
the article), but both the British in Malaya and the Americans in Iraq recognized 
the problem�
While the size of the reward the British paid was important, so too was the 
structure of the program: it provided rewards for nearly everything and every-
body� The program paid rewards both for surrenders and for information leading 
to captures�37 Personnel who surrendered were rewarded at a rate commensurate 
with their importance; for instance, a surrendering platoon leader might receive 
double the reward provided to a surrendering platoon sergeant� Informants who 
provided information leading to the capture of a wanted person were given a 
reward equal to 75 percent of the “surrender value” of the person� Further, vol-
untarily surrendered insurgents who provided information still were provided 
rewards, but at a 50 percent discount on their “surrender value�”38
The program proved extraordinarily successful� In 1953, for instance, 372 
insurgents surrendered, compared with only seventy-three captured�39 During 
the entirety of the program, 2,702 insurgents surrendered, compared with only 
1,287 captured�40 Seventy percent of defectors cited the program as having influ-
enced their decisions to defect� This number, a RAND study notes, “leaves out 
of account those who were captured, wounded, or killed on the basis of defector 
intelligence� It also ignores the profound effect which surrenders had on morale 
in the insurgents’ camps�”41
What can the Malayan Emergency tell us with regard to modern rewards pro-
grams? Among other lessons, three are particularly instructive� First is the pro-
gram’s recognition that “large public bounties on the heads of terrorist leaders, 
coupled with their continued immunity from the government, were inadvertently 
turning them into objects of hero worship among the rank and file�” So British 
authorities stopped advertising maximum rewards; instead they announced base 
reward amounts, with the provision that the reward could be much higher�42
The second lesson learned is that rewards can generate or encourage vigilante 
justice—a rewards program is a modern-day “Wanted Dead or Alive” campaign�43 
While this would be a valid critique of the Malayan rewards program, both the 
DoD and DOS rewards programs are limited by statute to “nonlethal” assistance�44
Finally, the British program highlighted the “blood on the hands” issue� 
Should a reward be paid to an individual who has participated in acts of terrorism 
or violence? If so, is there a limit to the acceptable level of violence? For instance, 
what if, in 2002, Ayman al-Zawahiri had offered to give up Osama Bin Laden? 
The answers to such questions likely are situation dependent� The British in 
Malaya struggled with this question, modifying their position several times over 
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the course of the program� One commentator summarized the moral quandary 
as follows:
[T]o the soldiers on the ground it seemed almost surreal that “terrorists who were 
caught were treated like murderers, while those who surrendered were ‘treated like 
kings�’” That this dilemma was keenly felt by the men on the spot cannot be over-
emphasized� Many argued that it was morally indefensible that a man caught with a 
truckload of supplies intended for the terrorists could be prosecuted and sentenced to 
death, whereas a terrorist with “several brutal murders to his discredit” could decide 
to surrender, “walk out of the jungle and get a job�”45
Reasoning that anything that brought the war to a faster conclusion was morally 
justified, the British in August 1950 stopped prosecuting those with “blood on 
their hands�”46
MOTIVATION
Motivating People
A rewards program constitutes a government attempting to entice a person to 
do something (provide information assistance) in exchange for an incentive 
(money)� Understanding a person’s motivation allows the rewarding government 
to aim its rewards programs better, such that they produce the maximum amount 
of information for the minimal cost� Hugh Greene, for example, understood that 
the Malayan insurgents were motivated by money, and he structured the British 
program accordingly�
Psychologists generally categorize motivation as either internal or external�47 
Intrinsic motivation is internal—it arises from within the individual�48 External 
motivation is the result of outside pressures on the individual, such as rewards 
and punishments�49 An intrinsically motivated person receives satisfaction from 
the activity itself, whereas the externally motivated person receives satisfaction 
from the result�50
Rewards programs are external motivations designed to encourage action 
(providing information) toward the desired outcome� While the desired outcome 
is easy to understand, it is devilishly difficult to predict the behaviors that will 
lead to that outcome—and, by extension, the incentives that will encourage these 
behaviors� Many rewards programs target complex environments in which myr-
iad internal and external motivations may be in play� Misidentifying motivations 
for providing information can render a rewards program ineffective quickly�
Studies by psychologists in the early 1970s were “the first of many to illustrate 
the paradox that extrinsic rewards can undermine intrinsic motivation�”51 The 
relationship between reward and motivation, however, is exceedingly complex� 
When the reward is external to the activity, for instance, numerous studies have 
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found that “using an extrinsic reward to motivate someone to do something that 
the person would have done anyway could have detrimental effects on the quality 
and creativity of the person’s performance and on the person’s subsequent moti-
vation to perform the activity once the extrinsic reward was received�”52 External 
rewards can cause people to “lose touch with their natural interests, psychological 
needs, and intrinsic satisfactions�”53
Edward Deci and Richard Ryan published a seminal paper on the subject in 
1985� In it they argue that, in instances where “the primary significance of [the] 
event for [the rewardee] is that it conveys [the rewardee is] being controlled,” it 
will “decrease [the rewardee’s] subsequent motivation�”54 This paper generated 
a flood of studies and papers reaching varying conclusions� A comprehensive 
review of the research in 1996 concluded that “(1) the detrimental effects of re-
wards occur under highly restricted, easily avoidable conditions; (2) mechanisms 
of instrumental and classical conditioning are basic for understanding incremen-
tal and detrimental effects of reward on task motivation; and (3) positive effects 
of rewards on performance are easily attainable using procedures derived from 
behavioral theory�”55
Deci and Ryan formulated their work into a theory they dubbed cognitive 
evaluation theory, which holds that “events that negatively affect a person’s au-
tonomy or competence diminish intrinsic motivation, whereas events that sup-
port perceived autonomy and competence enhance intrinsic motivation�”56 Again 
conducting a meta-analysis of their theory and its scholastic progeny, Deci and 
Ryan concluded that “tangible rewards made contingent on task behavior tend 
to be experienced as controlling and to undermine intrinsic motivation�”57 The 
solution is to structure rewards that “minimize the control in the situation by 
making the rewards nonsalient, by using an autonomy-supportive interpersonal 
style, and by highlighting competence clues�”58
Surprisingly, the research that Deci and his colleagues conducted came up 
with findings that were even more unexpected with regard to the person provid-
ing the reward� In a study of teachers and students and the effects of rewards on 
performance, the researchers found that teachers who endorsed the concept of 
rewards for performance had a negative effect on their students’ performance� 
The researchers found that other measures of external control (e�g�, grades) were 
“highly detrimental to � � � self-motivation�” A further conclusion was that where 
external mechanisms (e�g�, grades) were motivating, they often motivated the 
wrong behavior (e�g�, a desire to get a good grade as opposed to a desire to master 
the material)�59
Deci, Ryan, and others also have conducted a great deal of research on the 
separate but related issue of intrinsic versus extrinsic aspirations� RFJ and all 
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similar rewards programs presume that the rewards offered (money) will moti-
vate persons to provide information� These programs offer, in effect, a promise 
to fulfill what Deci refers to as the “American Dream”—where “wealth and fame 
are believed to produce happiness and well-being�”60 Unsurprisingly, this may not 
be the desired end state for everyone� The research suggests that “overinvestment 
in the extrinsic ‘having’ goals may be harmful to, rather than the foundation 
for, well-being and life satisfaction�”61 This phenomenon appears to have cross-
cultural application� Deci, Ryan, and others argue that “intrinsic pursuits such as 
relatedness, growth, and community are likely to directly satisfy basic psycho-
logical needs for autonomy, relatedness, and competence[,] � � � [while] placing 
heavy emphasis on pursuit of extrinsic goals and rewards such as money � � � can 
provide only indirect satisfaction of these basic needs and may actually distract 
from or interfere with their fulfillment�”62
Identifying the importance of intrinsic motivation is only half the equation; 
it is equally important to understand how to structure a rewards program to 
target intrinsic motivation� With regard to the latter, there are, of course, various 
schools of thought� Adherents of cognitive evaluation theory hold that “intrinsic 
motivation springs from two innate sources (the need for competence and the 
need for self-determination)�”63
The psychologist Abraham H� Maslow provides another perspective� Maslow 
theorized that humans are driven by wants and needs—specifically, unsatisfied 
needs�64 Satisfied needs, Maslow argued, do not motivate behavior� Maslow or-
ganized all needs in a hierarchy and theorized that the needs at each level must 
be satisfied in full before the individual will be motivated by higher-order needs� 
At the base level are physiological needs (breathing, food, water, etc�), followed 
by safety (of self, family, food, property, etc�), love (friendship, family), esteem 
(confidence, achievement, respect, etc�), and finally self-actualization�65 In other 
words, if a person is starving, his or her entire motivation for action will be to 
satisfy that unsatisfied need�
Interestingly, a study of the U�S�–South Vietnamese rewards program Chieu 
Hoi found that the program attracted defectors, “since it provided for all their 
needs such as shelter, food, medical care, clothing, and also saved them from 
the threat of the US army�”66 Soldiers, Vietcong or otherwise, are not motivated 
by other needs until these fundamental needs are met� Once that level of need is 
satisfied, the individual is motivated by subsequent unfulfilled needs at higher 
levels of the hierarchy� Unsurprisingly, a RAND study of the British rewards-for-
information program in the Malayan Emergency found that “[u]ntil the govern-
ment could provide a defector or informer the protection he needed, the program 
got nowhere�”67
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Motivating Informants
Applying Maslow’s model to a rewards paradigm produces some interesting 
insights� Take, for example, a farmer living in Pakistan’s Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas who knows the location of Sirajuddin Haqqani and the existence of a 
reward for him� The farmer realizes that his life will be upended if he provides the 
information about Haqqani—doing so has the potential to disrupt his hierarchy of 
needs� Being a rational person, the farmer will weigh that potential cost (disrup-
tion) against the benefits of providing the information (cash)� A cash reward can 
provide for the basic needs (e�g�, food, water, shelter, clothing)� Then the farmer 
will consider his other needs, specifically his personal and financial security�
Here is where the current rewards systems break down� The farmer recognizes 
that his personal security will be threatened once he provides information against 
the Taliban—a concern that will be heightened if he is paid an in-kind reward 
(e�g�, a new goat suddenly shows up on his doorstep)� He quickly realizes that a 
reward cannot guarantee physical security, so his only realistic option would be 
to move away� The DoD rewards program acknowledges this problem, noting in 
the case of Iraq that “[l]arge reward amounts for the Iraqi people primarily pro-
vide an expeditious means to leave the country, and an average citizen and their 
family are at risk if they come into a sizeable amount of U�S� dollars�”68 Moving 
away, however, would disrupt the farmer’s familial relationships and his sense of 
belonging in the community� His attention then will shift to whether and how a 
reward can fill these unsatisfied hierarchical needs� Current rewards programs 
provide nothing in this regard; not only do they fail to fulfill an informant’s 
unsatisfied needs, but they have the potential to disrupt needs that currently are 
fulfilled�
Another interesting case study is the Taliban foot soldier living day to day in 
the same camp as Sirajuddin Haqqani� How can a rewards program incentivize 
him? Or, viewed another way, what is motivating the soldier not to provide in-
formation? To answer this question, it can be instructive to look at what put the 
foot soldier in the camp in the first place� To recruit a member successfully, the 
Taliban must be able at a minimum to convince him that it can satisfy his basic 
needs (e�g�, food, water, and shelter)� If the recruit is truly destitute and starving, 
this may be the only motivation he needs� The Taliban offers further incentives 
to motivate behavior, such as a sense of belonging, friendship, recognition, self-
esteem, and even the prospect of self-actualization�
To motivate the foot soldier to give up his comrade, friend, or leader or to quit 
the Taliban, the rewarding agent must be able to satisfy these needs of the reward 
recipient that suddenly no longer will be fulfilled once he takes action against the 
Taliban� In a study of the Chieu Hoi program, researchers found that the reasons 
cited most frequently for defecting were “the physical hardships, the economic 
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needs of the family back home, the desire to evade criticism or punishment, fear 
of death, and homesickness�”69 The British in Malaya distributed “thousands of 
leaflets carrying photographs showing healthy-looking [former insurgents], ap-
parently happy and reunited with their families�”70
In contrast, the U�S� programs, as currently structured, fail to satisfy even the 
most basic need of personal safety� Proponents of the program would argue that 
the cash payment allows the recipient to move to ensure his and his family’s secu-
rity� This argument assumes they have the ability and desire to travel� There also 
may be physical, bureaucratic, and political impediments (e�g�, health, passports, 
visas, finding a new home country that will take them) that would prevent such 
individuals from traveling� But even assuming a rewardee and his family can and 
will travel, when they move away from their community the hierarchical needs 
that community formerly supplied (love, esteem, achievement, etc�) no longer 
will be fulfilled�
Like the hypothetical farmer, the foot soldier is a rational actor who will weigh 
the benefits and costs of providing the information� Unless the reward can miti-
gate the disruption to his hierarchy of needs, the reward will do little to motivate 
him� With regard to awards, Professor John Esposito has noted that “[y]ou have 
to be sure that people are protected � � � , because in order for the system to work 
well, there should be complete anonymity�”71
It is worth noting that Maslow’s theory does not apply perfectly to this subject� 
Organizations rooted in religious doctrine have the capacity to attract adherents 
who are willing to forgo basic needs in exchange for self-actualization� A monk, 
for example, may be willing to forgo physical comfort and secular community 
acceptance in a quest for spiritual fulfillment� Al Qaeda may attract individuals 
willing to forgo the fulfillment of basic needs such as physical safety in exchange 
for self-actualization (i�e�, martyrdom)� Maslow’s hierarchy provides little guid-
ance about how to motivate such individuals�
Yet despite the gaps in Maslow’s theory, it provides a relevant and useful illus-
tration of a fundamental point: in most instances, money alone will not motivate 
people to provide information if their personal safety cannot be guaranteed�
On the broader point of applying psychological models to the structuring of 
rewards programs: no model can provide the details� Even if one accepts that 
rewards must address hierarchies of needs, those needs are very situation de-
pendent� Consider two hypotheticals� In the first, the informant is a U�S�/Afghan 
citizen whose family lives in the United States; in the second, the informant is 
an Afghan citizen whose family lives in Afghanistan� The needs of these two 
individuals are different� Similarly, programs have to be adapted to the cultural 
environment in which they are implemented� Wisely, the DoD rewards program 
in Afghanistan is based on Afghan culture�72
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Program Models
Minimizing the Reward Profile. Given the issues addressed above, consider-
ation should be given to approaches that address these issues� The first approach 
would seek to provide rewards in a way that minimizes the conspicuousness of 
the reward� A minimized-profile rewards approach provides the dual benefits of 
reducing threats to an informant’s safety and reducing the appearance of con-
trol, to avoid undermining intrinsic motivation� Various methods are available 
to minimize a reward’s profile� For instance, rather than soliciting information 
from individuals, information can be solicited from and rewards paid through 
organizations (neighborhoods, companies, government agencies), with the or-
ganization reaping the benefits collectively in the form of in-kind rewards�
Providing rewards across a large organization significantly reduces the threat 
of retribution, thereby reducing individual members’ concerns for their safety� 
Naturally, under this reward paradigm, the organization as an entity will reap a 
greater short-term reward than the individual members of the organization; the 
owners of a factory, for instance, benefit from a new piece of equipment� The 
long-term benefit, however, accrues to everyone: a more productive business 
leads to economic stability and long-term security�
Another method would be to provide rewards in the form of annuitized pay-
ments� Rather than being paid in a lump sum that would increase scrutiny on 
the informant, the reward would come in small payments over a long span of 
time (e�g�, a few dollars a week for many years)� A related tool could be the use of 
“micro” rewards� A micro rewards program would seek small bits of seemingly 
inconsequential information� The idea is that the information requested would 
be so innocuous that it would not cause the informant any of the concern about 
potential disruption to his life that might result from giving up more-significant 
information� For instance, how many cars pass a given intersection in a given 
day? When was the last time you saw somebody in the village you did not know? 
The key to this program is the relative anonymity of the rewarding party’s in-
volvement in the program and restricting the requests to very low-level, seem-
ingly innocuous information� The downside to this model is the possible flood 
of information, much of which will be useless�
On this point, a relevant case study concerns a competition that the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sponsored in 2009� DARPA was 
interested in exploring how social networking can be applied to solving prob-
lems� For the competition, it required participating teams/individuals to find “10 
8-foot balloons moored at ten fixed locations in the continental United States�”73 
Just before the competition began, the balloons were floated surreptitiously at 
random locations in nine states� The winning team found all ten balloons in less 
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than nine hours� Its performance beat that of the other four thousand participat-
ing teams so roundly that it shocked DARPA, which had scheduled the competi-
tion to last two weeks�74
This case study is interesting and relevant for two reasons� Critical to the 
winning team’s success was its ability to work through thousands of tips in an 
extremely short period� Over the course of the competition, the four thousand 
teams’ social networks were churning out significant amounts of information; 
indeed, many of the teams engaged in disinformation campaigns intended to 
mislead other teams� Despite this, the winning team was able to parse all the 
information coming in and separate the quality information from the useless or 
misleading�75 This demonstrates that there is a mechanism that can be applied 
to a problem set such as this, allowing the user to evaluate lots of small bits of 
information and identify the valuable ones�
Furthermore, the DARPA competition itself could provide a model for re-
wards programs� The key to the winning team’s success was its incentive struc-
ture� DARPA offered a total of forty thousand dollars in prize money� The win-
ning team allocated this evenly among the ten balloons, giving each a “value” of 
four thousand dollars� Two thousand dollars went to the person who found each 
balloon� This was hardly unique; most other participating teams offered some 
reward for finding balloons� What set the winning team apart is that it then gave 
one thousand dollars to the person who had referred the balloon finder to the 
team’s website (if there was no referral, the finder received two thousand dollars 
and the other two thousand dollars went to charity)� Then the team gave five 
hundred dollars to the person who referred the referrer, $250 to the person who 
referred that person, and so on�76
This diffuse incentive structure essentially propagated itself over existing so-
cial networks: people were incentivized to get as many friends working for the 
winning team as possible� The speed with which this propagated itself is remark-
able� Each of the five members of the team sent out an e-mail explaining the com-
petition and the incentive structure� Within forty-eight hours, team members 
had five thousand people signed up to assist them�77 This likely could be repli-
cated to address any discrete problem or pursue any piece of information� While 
networked computers, e-mail, and websites make this incentive structure easier 
to manage and propagate, it could be done in the absence of computers through 
phone networks or even word of mouth� The British rewards-for-information 
program employed a similar model, paying members of the public a cash reward 
for assisting terrorists in surrendering�
The minimized-profile rewards model is not without its downsides� Substan-
tially increasing the number of rewards paid greatly complicates management of 
the program� Rewards must be tracked and paid� Regardless of the sophistication 
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of the algorithm used to sort the data, each piece of the data would have to be 
entered into the system� Further, providing small payments over a long period 
creates an ongoing concern for the safety of the informant�
Maximizing the Reward Package. A program that minimizes the reward profile 
seeks to satisfy an informant’s need for security by keeping the reward clandes-
tine� An alternative model would address this need by maximizing the reward� 
Maximizing does not refer to the dollar value of the reward; as noted above, 
money alone rarely satisfies a person’s psychological needs, and may have the op-
posite effect� Rather, maximizing refers to a program that creates award packages 
that, along with providing monetary rewards, also ensure the informant’s safety�
In a rare congressional hearing on RFJ, Representative Brad Sherman noted 
that after giving the United States information, some informants “might find 
their country of origin to be a dangerous place�”78 He asked DOS’s Robert A� 
Hartung whether the department has the authority to provide visas as part of the 
reward� After some back-and-forth, Sherman summed up the issue: “But if we 
really provided the fine print on the Web site the way you would in a securities 
offering, we would have to asterisk and say whether or not we help you avoid 
death is subject to our sole determination as to whether you are in danger[;] and 
whether or not we can let you live in the United States, even if we think that is 
necessary for your protection, is subject to the determination of other agencies�”79
The most obvious maximized rewards package would combine a cash award 
with the guarantee of a new identity and permanent residency in another loca-
tion� The RAND report on the Chieu Hoi program found that one of the major 
deficiencies of the program was a failure to “aid [defectors’] reintegration into 
South Vietnam�”80 While informants today are relocated in some instances, a po-
tential informant may not know this, or may not want to entrust his safety to the 
bureaucratic vagaries of the rewards system� Thus, the State Department should 
advertise the possibility of visa packages, citizenship, and similar benefits�
Further, the broader the incentive package, the more psychological needs it 
will fulfill� For instance, money and moving expenses may satisfy an informant’s 
physiological and safety needs, but accepting them obliterates the fulfilling of 
needs that his family and community currently perform� Moving the family with 
the informant satisfies a portion of the informant’s needs, but fails to address 
needs that the community satisfies (a sense of belonging, self-esteem, respect, 
etc�)� A maximized reward would protect the informant and his immediate fam-
ily, plus his extended family, his close friends, or both� For example, rather than 
paying a ten-million-dollar reward and moving five people, the rewards package 
might pay five million dollars and move a dozen people� The greater the chance 
that an informant can live safely with his family and friends, the greater the 
chance the informant will consider coming forward�
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Implications for the Commander
While commanders on the ground have no control over the structure or adminis-
tration of DOS’s RFJ program, they should be aware of the program’s existence—
and its limitations� Commanders may well find themselves in circumstances in 
which they are recommending a reward from RFJ� Further, DoD regulations 
require coordination between DOS and the combatant commanders on rewards 
programs�81
Combatant command staffs should structure their rewards programs to al-
low for minimized-profile rewards� Commanders on the ground should think of 
ways to minimize rewards’ profiles while considering the various negative aspects 
of the rewards-for-information programs� Finally, all users of the DoD rewards 
program should track rewards given and information provided rigorously so the 
effectiveness of a program can be measured objectively�
Rewards programs plainly have a role in a counterterrorism fight� The British 
program in Malaya provides a powerful example of a dynamic rewards program, 
one carefully constructed to target the motivation of the targeted individuals� 
Several factors contributed to the success of the British program, foremost a keen 
understanding of the motivational and cultural components of the program and a 
willingness to adapt the program continually to changing circumstances�
The U�S� rewards programs have tremendous potential� They are firmly es-
tablished, well organized, and well funded� It is also clear that rewards can yield 
information leading to the capture of terrorists� Where programs focus on “suc-
cess” rather than effectiveness, however, their full potential is left unrealized� 
All rewards programs would benefit from objective evaluations and functional 
definitions of success that take into account the benefits and costs of a given 
program� The work that psychologists have produced since the 1970s provides a 
useful model from which to construct a better rewards program—or, at a mini-
mum, a good place to begin the conversation on how best to employ rewards to 
catch more terrorists�
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RESEARCH & DEBATE
STRATEGIC CULTURE IS NOT A SILVER BULLET
Antulio J. Echevarria II
Frank Hoffman’s review essay “Strategic Culture and Ways of War: Elusive Fiction 
or Essential Concept?,” which appeared in the Spring 2017 issue of the Naval War 
College Review, has mischaracterized my argument regarding strategic culture 
and, more generally, has misrepresented my book Reconsidering the American 
Way of War� I therefore would like to clarify both—my position on American 
strategic culture and the purpose of my book—for 
this journal’s readers� Frank Hoffman and I have 
agreed on many issues over the years, and I ap-
preciate the time he put into generating a detailed 
review essay; yet we clearly have our differences�
On the question of strategic culture, I certainly 
do believe that culture is important and that we 
should try to understand it—ours and others’� But 
there are huge risks in doing so, and buyers need 
to be aware of them before they buy� Since Jack 
Snyder introduced the concept in 1977, the study 
of strategic culture has grown into an almost-
desperate search for a silver bullet, a cure-all: if 
we could just fix American strategic culture, we 
could cure U�S� strategic thinking� But the concept 
has taken on a life of its own—and not a good 
one� The concept’s proponents have failed to ex-
ercise discipline when defining it, and they have 
employed it too enthusiastically, without a critical 
eye or a healthy dose of skepticism� Buyers need to 
Professor Antulio J. Echevarria II is the editor of the 
U.S. Army War College quarterly, Parameters� He 
holds a doctorate in modern history from Prince-
ton University, and is the author of five books— 
After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before 
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the American Way of War (Georgetown University 
Press, 2014), and Military Strategy: A Very Short 
Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2017)—as 
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tegic thinking, military theory, and military history. 
He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, the 
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is working on a book about the nature of America’s 
modern wars for Cambridge University Press.
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know there are ample historical examples to prove almost any theory of strategic 
culture—as well as its opposite�
In their enthusiasm to find a cure for U�S� strategic thinking, the concept’s 
proponents merely have paid lip service to the difficulty of defining it, then have 
moved swiftly on to advancing their own theories� Most of these definitions are 
arbitrary, not based on rigorous inductive analysis� This problem is a critical 
one for any social science, because if a concept cannot be defined inductively, 
it cannot be studied scientifically� Unfortunately, the terms culture and strategic 
culture have become all but ubiquitous, encompassing virtually any conceivable 
variable that possibly could influence a key leader’s decision� Worse, the concept 
has become highly politicized� It is now a political catchall for every policy aim or 
military approach one party does not like, particularly when a war is under way, 
and at the same time it serves as a means to advance each party’s own agendas�
Consequently, no generalizable conclusion nor observation can be drawn 
from the many studies of strategic culture that have proliferated over the years� 
In short, the field is in disarray precisely because most scholars are self-defining 
strategic culture, which means there is no conceptual foundation on which to 
build knowledge�
While this state of affairs is an academic’s dream, it is a policy and military 
practitioner’s nightmare� Academics earn their credentials and build their repu-
tations by developing unique or contending interpretations—by challenging the 
status quo� But practitioners need more than unique theories, because they must 
bear the heavy burden of responsibility: they must decide whether to put lives 
and treasure at risk, and they are held accountable when things go wrong� This 
is not to say that academics are irresponsible; the good ones are not� But even 
the good ones never have to order people into harm’s way; that means academics 
can afford to be experimental in their thinking and to advance ideas that are not 
quite ready for prime time� Practitioners, on the other hand, can benefit from 
the intellectual stimulus that such cutting-edge ideas afford� But when it comes 
to choosing courses of action that might have to be sold to Congress and to the 
public, they need concepts that have a reasonably solid foundation, especially 
when the stakes are high� Sadly, that is not the case with strategic culture� My 
argument in Reconsidering the American Way of War is simply that no scholar 
yet has made a truly compelling case for an American strategic culture, and thus 
it remains too nebulous and unreliable for the realities that policy and military 
practitioners typically face�
I am all for self-critical analysis, and I have written on that topic a great deal 
over the years� Critical thinking is the practitioner’s best ally� But to solve a prob-
lem we first must understand what it is� In this case, it is not clear that we do� 
The problem is that the American way of war has had many more successes than 
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failures� The differential in favor of successes is quite significant and it applies to 
all kinds of wars—large, small, and in between� That needs to be explained� But 
existing theories of strategic culture cannot do so� The problems inherent in the 
concept obscure not only what is wrong with U�S� strategic thinking but how to 
fix it�
With regard to the overall purpose of Reconsidering the American Way of 
War, I endeavored to make that clear in the book’s introduction, but perhaps I 
should have been more explicit� In contrast to Russell Weigley’s 1973 classic The 
American Way of War, which focused mainly on our strategic theories and ideas, 
my aim was to look for patterns in the way we actually practiced war� The history 
of ideas has fallen out of vogue for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is 
the gap that always exists between what people say they are doing or going to do 
and what they actually do� I decided to close this gap, at least in part, between 
Weigley’s American Way of War as a history of ideas and the many narrative 
histories we already have that tell us what happened� In a sense, I played Marx to 
Weigley’s Hegel in an effort to identify any consistent patterns in our approach to 
doing, rather than merely thinking about, war�
Accordingly, the book’s chapters are short� It was unnecessary to describe ev-
ery battle or engagement in detail; such descriptions already exist in hundreds, if 
not thousands, of other works� The readers of this journal likely know where to 
find them� Some of our largest and longest wars have been characterized by the 
application of strategic patterns that represented no significant changes; hence, 
there was no need to drag out the discussions of those conflicts� The book in-
cludes details only insofar as they affected the general pattern (or patterns) that 
drove a conflict� Moreover, the chapters are designed for a staff college or war 
college curriculum that likely would include other readings� I regret not includ-
ing maps in the book, as they would have made the patterns more obvious to the 
reader, but the publisher vetoed that idea because it would have driven the cost 
of the book too high� However, the West Point military atlases serve the purpose 
and are available free online�
My analysis of U�S� military practice uncovered six basic patterns of military 
strategy in our wars: annihilation, attrition, exhaustion, decapitation, coercion, 
and deterrence� Interestingly, instead of overwhelming kinetic force, as Hoffman 
and others argue, the strategic pattern that emerges most frequently in our way 
of war is decapitation—the idea of replacing a leader whom we do not like with 
one we do, through kinetic or nonkinetic means or some combination of the two� 
There are various concrete reasons for the recurrence of this pattern, which I dis-
cuss in the book and thus will not repeat here� But, once again, this observation 
points to the gap between what we say we do strategically and what we actually 
do, or attempt to do, in practice�
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To sum up, my argument is not that we do not have a strategic culture, or that 
culture itself is not important; my point is that strategic culture is not the silver 
bullet its proponents want it to be� Whatever American strategic culture is, was, 
or might be, it is too elusive to pin down� Nor can we compare it to its British 
or Russian counterpart to identify what is uniquely American about our way of 
war versus what has been imported from elsewhere, or which aspects really are 
driven by the conditions and requirements of warfare—modern industrial-age 
warfare and its reliance on wholesale attrition, for instance—rather than a general 
culture� To be sure, Americans do have a way of battle, as I have said elsewhere� 
It is also true that the evolution of operational art over the twentieth century has 
hampered the U�S� military’s ability to think strategically� But these conditions 
were not always true� I am working on a book now that will offer one defensible 
explanation for how and why our major failures and successes occurred� I would 
be very pleased to have it reviewed in this journal�
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REVIEW ESSAYS
the case for hard power
Dov S. Zakheim
The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power & the Necessity of Mili-
tary Force, by Eliot A� Cohen� New York: Basic Books, 2016� 
285 pages� $27�99�
Eliot Cohen’s The Big Stick is a well-crafted paean to muscular interventionism� 
Its central argument is that only the United States can ensure international stabil-
ity; that it can do so only if it continues to maintain the military superiority that 
has enabled it to dominate international affairs since the Second World War; and 
that to be credible it must be both ready and willing to employ force even when 
its more narrowly defined national interests are not being challenged� The book 
is neither a neoconservative nor a liberal-interventionist tract� Yet it is notewor-
thy that these are the only two political ideologies that essentially escape Cohen’s 
critical pen�
Cohen argues that America, and only America, can preserve global order� He 
recognizes that Americans are war weary; the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are 
well into their second decades, with no end in sight� Yet he asserts that, just as 
withdrawal from either country would harm American interests seriously—he 
notes that President Obama belatedly came to the same conclusion—so too 
would American reluctance to go to war whenever and wherever the internation-
al order again comes under serious threat� For that 
reason he rightly has very little good to say about 
neo-isolationism, or, to be more precise, a return 
to America’s strategic posture prior to its entry into 
the First World War� It is no longer enough, he 
posits, to focus solely on narrow self-interests and 
Dov S. Zakheim was Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) from 2001 to 2004 and Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Planning and Resources) from 
1985 to 1987.
© 2017 by Dov S� Zakheim
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self-defense, even if leavened by participation in the global market and member-
ship in the United Nations� There simply are no good alternatives to American 
leadership� The kind of global order that a China or a Russia might impose, as-
suming that it has the ability to impose any order at all, would undermine the 
values that Americans and the citizens of their allies hold most dear�
In making his case against not only neo-isolationism but the downgrading of 
the centrality of force in American security policy, Cohen critiques five variations 
of arguments to support a modern-day version of the posture first articulated 
by George Washington in his Farewell Address� Cohen is highly skeptical of the 
case put forth by Steven A� Pinker, among others, that the world is becoming a 
more peaceful place and America no longer need act as the world’s policeman� 
Cohen rightly points out that the trends that underlie Pinker’s calculations are 
belied by the horrific number of deaths in the two world wars, in particular� 
Moreover, Cohen argues that a significant reason for the decline in the number 
and magnitude of wars since the end of the Second World War is the dominant, 
and generally benign, influence of the United States on the international security 
environment� Statecraft matters: the choices politicians make can and do mean 
the difference between war and peace� As he puts it, “the deliberate action of one 
state above all—the United States—has had something to do with the relative 
peacefulness of the world after 1945� � � � [I]t follows that an American decision 
to stop acting that way could yield a far nastier twenty-first century than the one 
Pinker expects” (p� 10)�
A prominent critic of the Trump administration during its first months in 
office, Cohen also assails the notion—dear to both the Clinton and Obama ad-
ministrations (especially the latter)—that it was the employment of soft power 
that most effectively furthered American interests worldwide� Soft power is the 
concept that Harvard University professor Joseph Nye developed to describe the 
noncoercive ability to shape the preferences of others through the attractiveness 
of culture, political values, and foreign policies� Cohen does not reject the notion 
of soft power entirely, but his argument is that without the availability, and at cru-
cial times the employment, of credible hard power, soft power cannot be relied on 
to protect America’s interests and those of its allies or others whom it might wish 
to support� He focuses on the limits of sanctions, and offers examples to under-
score his contention that soft power is not enough� Sanctions may have brought 
Iran to the negotiating table, but they did not put a halt to its nuclear program� 
Nor have sanctions stopped Russia from annexing Crimea or supporting Ukrai-
nian separatists� Sanctions are indiscriminate, and often penalize a state’s inno-
cent populace more than its guilty leaders� Once sanctions are removed—as they 
were, for example, under the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 
better known as the Iran nuclear deal—they are almost impossible to restore�
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Cohen acknowledges that sanctions are an important tool of foreign policy, 
and at times are highly effective, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia being 
prime examples� Given the limitations of sanctions, however, Cohen feels that 
hard power needs to be mustered to assure the United States that its policy goals 
will be met; in the case of Iran, he seems to call for a blockade of that country’s 
shipborne commerce� He fails to examine what the Iranian reaction might be—
the very second- and third-order consequences that worry him when discussing 
sanctions—or whether a blockade would involve the United States in yet another 
Middle Eastern war� Nor does he outline how hard power might be applied to 
prize Crimea from Vladimir Putin’s clutches�
Cohen has little time for those who argue that America should not act as the 
world’s policeman simply because of its “irreducible strategic incompetence” 
(p� 19)� He examines several variants of their position, all of which derive from 
the assertion that America’s wars since the Second World War have not been 
particularly successful� For example, some argue that America’s bureaucratic 
“pathologies” prevent it from exploiting American military power to its greatest 
effect, while others go further and assert that American intervention is more 
destructive than salutary�
Cohen rightly notes that inaction can be as dangerous as action� Moreover, not 
all American wars have been failures: both the Korean War, which literally saved 
South Korea, and the 1991 Gulf War are very much examples to the contrary� 
Cohen goes further, however� Even the Vietnam War was not, in Cohen’s view, a 
complete failure, since, as Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew put it, the war “bought time 
for the rest of southeast Asia�” Cohen may go too far in seeking a silver lining for 
the Iraq War� Perhaps, as he asserts, “the story is not yet fully written” (p� 21)� Still, 
it is a bit much to argue for the value of removing a dictator with nuclear ambi-
tions when those ambitions were not remotely realized, and in the face of both 
ongoing chaos in Iraq and Iran’s increasing domination of Iraq, to a degree that 
would have been impossible had Saddam remained in power�
Cohen quickly puts paid to the argument, enunciated by President Obama, 
that the United States should concentrate on “nation building at home�” He notes 
that defense spending as a percentage of gross national product was considerably 
lower during the Obama era than during most of the Cold War, which neverthe-
less witnessed major domestic initiatives ranging from Medicare and Medicaid to 
the Clean Air Act� The Trump administration actually agrees with its predecessor 
that one cannot acquire both guns and butter on a massive scale, but its budget 
assigns a higher priority to increased defense spending at the expense of numer-
ous domestic programs� Cohen’s advocacy of higher spending for both military 
and nonmilitary programs reflects a cherished view common to all intervention-
ists, whether of the neocon or the liberal variety� It is a policy that was enunciated 
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forcefully by the liberal Democratic senator Henry M� Jackson, a consistently 
strong supporter of the Vietnam War, whose acolytes include interventionists 
such as Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Frank Gaffney, and Elliott Abrams�
Cohen reserves his most trenchant critique for so-called realists� He ascribes 
to realists the view that “the world having resolved itself [after the Second World 
War and the Cold War] into a more familiar pattern of competing powers, the 
United States has far less need to meddle in matters abroad” (p� 11)� Just as Cohen 
cites Nye as the father of soft-power theory, so he cites John Mearsheimer as the 
archetypal “realist�” But whereas Nye truly did conceive of the concept with which 
he is associated, Mearsheimer hardly represents all, or even most, realists� After 
all, Mearsheimer considers interventionist foreign policy elites to be, as Cohen 
puts it, “the chief threat to the United States”—a position that actually mirrors the 
“irreducible strategic incompetence” school of thought�
More characteristic of the realist position are the views, and the actions while 
in office, of President George H� W� Bush, his Secretary of State James Baker, and 
Brent Scowcroft, his assistant to the president for national security affairs (known 
as the national security adviser)� That team, which many consider to have con-
stituted the most competent national security leadership since the Second World 
War, was hardheaded enough to play at most a limited role as the Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact collapsed, and, for that matter, with regard to intervening 
on behalf of the Kurdish and Shia uprisings in the aftermath of the First Gulf 
War� Yet it did not hesitate to mass and deploy over a half million troops to push 
Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, or, on a far lesser scale, to invade Panama and 
spirit that country’s military dictator Manuel Noriega to Miami, where he was 
sentenced to forty years in prison� Realists, pace Cohen, do believe in interven-
tion, only that it should be far more selective than what interventionists, whether 
of the neocon or liberal “responsibility to protect” variety, would prefer�
Cohen himself is inconsistent when writing about the Bush team’s policies: in 
one place (p� 5) he states that the 1991 war was an example of “ample quantities” 
of hard power; elsewhere (p� 32) he writes that the United States went to war 
“with the strong belief that it knew the lessons of Vietnam—make wars short, 
violent, conventional and end cleanly,” implying that otherwise Bush would not 
have employed hard power to save Kuwait� Yet Bush and his advisers had no way 
of knowing how long the war would last; in fact, they seriously overestimated 
the capabilities of Iraq’s forces� They also assumed that Hussein might resort to 
chemical weapons; they went ahead and attacked anyway� When Cohen then 
notes that the result of that war was an “escalating military action against a still 
defiant Iraq through the 1990s,” he neglects to point out that the Air Force’s 
operations over both northern and southern Iraq resulted in no losses and with 
monetary costs (not to mention human costs) that were a tiny fraction of those 
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incurred during the 2003 war and its ongoing aftermath� Moreover, it is Cohen 
himself who argues that a key element of hard power is the ongoing deployment 
of forces after fighting has died down, if not ended—which is exactly what Opera-
tions NORTHERN WATCH and SOUTHERN WATCH were all about�
Cohen also asserts that realists consider hydrogen bombs to be “the great 
equalizer of international politics” and, in effect, welcome nuclear proliferation� 
This too is a mischaracterization of all but the most extreme positions on this is-
sue� Certainly the George H� W� Bush team did not take that position, nor do the 
vast majority of realist thinkers�
In Cohen’s view, “the most fundamental principle of contemporary realism[—] 
� � � that all states are alike, that they have interests, and will use power to protect 
and further those interests” (p� 12)—is true only to a point� He argues that “even 
a slight knowledge of history” would demonstrate that Hitler was not Bismarck, 
and that the reichsführer was prepared to go to far greater murderous lengths 
than the Iron Chancellor ever would have contemplated� Yet this argument is 
beside the point: it is the very nature of realism to recognize a threat for what it 
is� The British and French in the 1930s refused to recognize the threat that Hitler 
posed, not because they were realists, but because they were appeasers�
Finally, Cohen argues that “realists have trouble taking sub-state or trans-
state actors seriously” and fail to appreciate the intangibles, such as the power of 
faith and ideology� Moreover, when he calls realists “coolly detached secularists 
themselves � � � [who] find it difficult to take seriously talk of caliphates or hid-
den imams” (p� 13), he appears to be referring to the so-called realism of Barack 
Obama, who is not, as it happens, devoid of religious instincts� Indeed, many 
neoconservatives as well as liberal interventionists are themselves highly secular 
and do not have the faintest idea regarding the religious motivation of people in 
other parts of the world, be they substate actors or government officials�
Cohen’s critique of realists, many of whom, such as Scowcroft, opposed the 
intervention in Iraq, does not mean that he views the Iraq War as an unmitigated 
success� Still, even as he bemoans the American missteps in addressing the af-
termath of the 2003 war, he seems to grasp at any opportunity to downplay the 
effects of those missteps� Thus he posits that “behind the intent to overthrow the 
regime was a desire not so much to remake the Arab world altogether, but to in-
flict a blow that would shock it” (p� 35)� It is not at all clear that this was the case� 
For some officials, the intent was indeed to remake the Arab world� For others, it 
was to create a liberal democracy in Iraq, which proved to be nothing more than 
a pipe dream� Cohen also argues that the cost of the war was far less than some 
have estimated� He is probably correct; but nonetheless the opportunity cost of a 
war that consumed at least half a trillion dollars was massive�
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Finally, while Cohen admits that waterboarding and similar techniques were 
politically counterproductive, he argues that they “probably” yielded useful in-
formation� He is correct if referring to a case in which a prisoner had actionable 
intelligence about a so-called ticking bomb� Yet former military officers ranging 
from Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis to Senator John McCain, himself a former 
prisoner of war, insist that more-benign techniques would have been far more 
successful and would not have violated international law—the latter a point that 
Cohen does not address at all�
Ultimately, Cohen acknowledges that the Iraq War was “a mistake,” one that 
cost America dearly in terms of its alliance relationships� But, having argued so 
strenuously against the war’s critics, his admission seems nothing more than a 
grudging concession to reality�
Turning to America’s diminishing military arsenal, Cohen argues vigorously 
for a major naval and long-range aviation buildup, which would be the most ef-
fective way to deter China in particular� He also calls for accelerated moderniza-
tion of the American strategic nuclear arsenal, on the grounds that nuclear weap-
ons actually could be used� China, Iran, North Korea, and others are expanding 
their arsenals; presumably they have not ruled out employing these weapons 
during, or even at the start of, a conflict with an adversary�
Cohen also joins the growing call for significant reform of the Department 
of Defense acquisition system� And he argues for maintaining, and therefore 
funding, America’s network of overseas bases, which not only reassure allies but 
ensure that conventional conflicts will not touch American shores� None of these 
programmatic efforts, he argues, should come at the expense of America’s uncon-
ventional forces, which will continue to be a necessary instrument for fighting 
nonstate actors such as jihadists, as well as for training friendly but less developed 
forces� Indeed, his chapters on the threats that China, Russia, Iran, and jihadists 
pose provide the meat of his argument for hard power and the justification for 
both his policy and programmatic prescriptions�
Cohen stresses the importance of space and cyberspace, which, together with 
the oceans, he terms “the commons,” all of which America is best positioned to 
defend� And he strongly advocates investments to protect American interests in 
all three of those domains� He also calls for American intervention in what he 
labels ungoverned space, meaning states that have collapsed or are on the verge 
of doing so� He recognizes that America cannot intervene in every civil war, but 
seems more willing to have Washington engage in such conflicts if they take place 
in the Middle East than in sub-Saharan Africa�
Cohen’s final chapter is a critique of Caspar Weinberger’s oft-repeated prin-
ciples regarding the use of military force, which first were enunciated in 1984� 
He challenges Weinberger’s assertion that the United States should not commit 
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forces to overseas combat unless they are protecting America’s vital interests or 
those of its allies� He notes that American interventions in Grenada, Bosnia, 
and elsewhere hardly affected those vital interests� Indeed, it can be argued that 
America should not have intervened in Bosnia, just as it did not intervene in 
the far worse situations in Cambodia and Rwanda, where, since genocide was 
involved, the moral imperative for intervention was much stronger� But Wein-
berger presided over the invasion of Grenada because American citizens were 
being held hostage by a regime supported by Communist Cuba; surely, protection 
of the country’s citizens is an American interest� Perhaps Weinberger’s definition 
should now include “friends and partners” as well as allies, but the principle of 
national interest, broadly defined—as it was with respect to Grenada—is still 
sound, unless, as Cohen appears to postulate, the bar for American military in-
tervention overseas should be considerably lower�
Cohen challenges Weinberger’s second condition for intervention, which calls 
for “the clear intention of winning�” Cohen asserts that the term winning is not 
as clear as Weinberger indicates� But Weinberger’s point was that the intention 
should be to win; if not, what exactly should be the reason for committing Ameri-
can blood and treasure to an overseas adventure?
Weinberger’s third point was that America should commit forces to combat 
only if the political and military objectives are clearly defined, and if there is a 
clear understanding of how those forces are to achieve those objectives� In this 
case, Cohen is correct that there is no way to predict the outcome of the use of 
force� Still, there should be a clear sense of why those forces are being committed, 
even if the outcome is uncertain� Indeed, it is arguable that Weinberger was fully 
aware of the difficulty of predicting outcomes; it is evident in his fourth maxim, 
that the relationship between American objectives and the forces committed to 
achieving them must be reassessed continually and adjusted if necessary�
Cohen claims that Weinberger’s fifth principle, that the United States should 
not commit forces to battle without “some reasonable assurance” of popular and 
congressional support, “assumes too much� It is often the case that the American 
people lend their support to successful enterprises and turn away from unsuc-
cessful ones” (p� 215)� Cohen misunderstands Weinberger’s intent; “reasonable 
assurance” is not a guarantee� Weinberger’s point was that if there was significant 
doubt that congressional and popular support would last throughout the lifetime 
of the military intervention, one should question whether to launch it in the first 
place�
Finally, Cohen asserts that Weinberger’s principle that committing U�S� forces 
to combat should be a last resort “falls apart upon close inspection” because “one 
always has the option of giving the enemy what it wants�” It is true that appease-
ment is an option, but Weinberger, who was hardly an appeaser, clearly did not 
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see it as a viable one� Moreover, Cohen implies that the use of military force 
should not be a last resort, yet throughout his volume he advocates the impor-
tance of diplomacy, which the United States presumably should employ prior 
to committing forces overseas� In sum, it is not Weinberger’s principles, which 
reflect the views of most realists, that are not viable; they fall apart only if one 
adopts Cohen’s interventionist philosophy�
Cohen outlines six principles of his own, none of which really contradicts 
Weinberger’s� His first principle is “understand your war for what it is, not what 
you wish it to be”; that is, avoid rigid comparisons with previous conflicts� He is 
correct, of course, but nowhere did Weinberger advocate “fighting the last war,” 
or any previous kind of war, for that matter� Cohen’s second principle calls for 
adaptability as a conflict progresses and its nature changes� In so doing he is echo-
ing Weinberger’s admonition that the relationship between wartime objectives 
and the forces committed to conflict calls for continual reassessment�
Cohen’s third principle is that the nation must be prepared for a long war even 
if its objective is a short one� Weinberger’s emphasis on the importance of clearly 
defined military objectives while stressing the need for reassessing the link be-
tween forces and objectives would appear to indicate, in agreement with Cohen, 
that if a war must be fought for a longer period than originally anticipated to meet 
national objectives, then forces must be committed to that longer-term effort�
Weinberger’s six principles did not address Cohen’s fourth: “while engaging 
in today’s fight, prepare for tomorrow’s challenge�” However, Weinberger cer-
tainly would have agreed with Cohen; the former actually coauthored (with Peter 
Schwei zer) an entire volume on that very subject, entitled The Next War (Regnery, 
1996)� Weinberger identified possible future conflict scenarios with China, North 
Korea, Iran, and Russia (all of which Cohen discusses at length) and even Japan(!) 
(which Cohen does not)� Interestingly, the book’s introduction was written by 
Margaret Thatcher, who as prime minister led her country in a successful war 
that no one anticipated, the 1982 Falklands conflict, and who herself identified 
yet another potential threat that Cohen addresses, that of Islamic extremists�
Weinberger also would have agreed with Cohen’s fifth principle: “adroit 
strategy matters; perseverance usually matters more�” The former Secretary of 
Defense simply put it differently when he asserted that “if we decide to put troops 
in a combat situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear inten-
tion of winning�” Winning may well mean something different in the twenty-first 
century than in Weinberger’s day, but if that is not the objective, why expect the 
nation to persevere?
Indeed, Cohen himself refers to winning in his final principle: “a president 
can launch a war; to win it, he or she must sustain congressional and popular 
support�” Weinberger’s principle on this account was not really all that different: 
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he simply stated that a president should not commit forces to combat “without 
reasonable assurance” of popular and congressional support� As already noted, 
“reasonable assurance” is not a cast-iron guarantee� It calls for constant monitor-
ing to validate that assurance—exactly as Cohen requires�
That Cohen’s disagreements with Weinberger may be less substantive than he 
feels they are should not detract from the value of his own set of principles� In-
deed, the breadth of Cohen’s book is striking, and his analyses are always cogent� 
Finally, agree with him or not, Cohen makes one of the strongest cases on record 
for a robust interventionist policy� If for no other reason, his book should be 
required reading for analysts, strategists, and policy makers when they evaluate 
options for strengthening what is perceived widely as America’s currently dimin-
ished influence on the world stage�
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Naval War College Review, Autumn 2017, Vol. 70, No. 4
Charting a Course: Strategic Choices for a New Administration, 
edited by Richard D� Hooker Jr� Washington, DC: National 
Defense Univ� Press, 2016� Available at ndupress�ndu�edu/� 381 
pages� 
Charting a Course is a compendium of analyses and recommendations from the 
scholar-fellows of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), the primary 
research center of National Defense University (NDU), along with a few indi-
viduals from NDU colleges� It is the result of a yearlong project to address defense 
and foreign policy issues in a manner useful to an incoming presidential admin-
istration� It aims to make new officeholders aware of the facts and nuances the 
popular media often overlook� As might be expected, most of the INSS fellows are 
also practitioners with considerable government experience� Thus, the volume is 
more than a theory-based academic report; it incorporates a healthy dose of the 
art of the practical� It is also honest, the editor and authors admitting up front 
that “[w]e see no silver bullets, no elegant solutions to the complex problems we 
face” (p� xiii)� Rather, it focuses on insights and options�
Editor Richard Hooker, director of INSS, leads off with the expected introduc-
tion to the book’s seventeen chapters, but it raises some interesting issues that 
the reader needs to keep in mind while reading the rest of the book� Particularly 
noteworthy is the question whether we can continue to treat the reemerging great 
powers of Russia and China as “simultaneously benign partners and aggressive 
adversaries” (p� ix)� Hooker suggests that this divergent approach—seeking po-
litical or economic cooperation from nations that refuse to accept global norms—
makes it hard to develop a coherent strategy or 
respond to their actions in a consistent manner�
On a broader level, Hooker’s individual work, 
“American Grand Strategy” (chapter 1), seeks to 
refute the charge that the United States does not 
have a grand strategy� While admitting that no for-
mal grand strategy document exists, he maintains 
that the core interests of the United States and 
its means of securing them have been consistent 
throughout America’s history as a world power� 
NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb   10 8/7/17   11:58 AM
140
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 4, Art. 23
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/23
 R E V I E W  E S S AYS  1 3 5
However, his definition of the term is essentially military and practical: “the 
use of all instruments of national power to secure the state” (p� 1)� Others might 
wonder where messianic efforts to promote global democracy—which historians 
such as Walter A� MacDougall (in Promised Land, Crusader State) charge have 
been the dominant U�S� foreign policy since the 1880s—fit into Hooker’s con-
struct; but they do not� Hooker proceeds in a highly rational manner, assessing 
potential actions in terms of ends, ways, and means, as befits someone with expe-
rience on the National Security Council (NSC) staff� But if only political decision 
making—and its end results—were that rational!
The following sixteen chapters break nicely into the two categories of func-
tional (future conflict, defense policy, defense budget, national security reform, 
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and cyber policy) and regional (Asia- 
Pacific, NATO/Europe, Russia, Middle East, South Asia, Africa, Latin America, 
central Asia, and the high north / Arctic)� The “swim lanes” are therefore well 
established, eliminating both the overlaps and gaps that are typical in edited 
volumes of individual contributions� Overall, the book is well organized and 
superior, in terms of balance, to many other academic compendiums�
It is impossible in limited space to review every chapter; most have important 
takeaway ideas that could provoke many an enlightened discussion� But necessity 
focuses the spotlight onto those with the most original and powerful insights�
Chapter 2, “The Future of Conflict” by Thomas X� Hammes, has a fine discus-
sion of nonstate military actors, hybrid warfare, and the proliferation of technolo-
gies, about which he has written in the past� But it also suggests that the “return of 
mass to the battlefield” and the “return of mobilization” will be features of future 
wars, two elements that strategists have discounted recently� In Hammes’s con-
struction, mobilization refers more to industrial production than to manpower� 
Obviously, the wars he envisions will not be the short ones that many senior 
military leaders seem to expect�
Frank G� Hoffman’s “U�S� Defense Policy and Strategy” (chapter 3) is similarly 
well written� He too advises decision makers to “prepare for longer and harder 
wars” and emphasizes “versatility” in force design, with capabilities that are use-
ful “across the broadest possible spectrum of conflict�” However, he takes the 
contrarian viewpoint even further by advising the Department of Defense (DoD) 
to “reestablish a ‘win two modern MTW’ [major theater war] force construct” 
and shift resources to the U�S� Army so it can apply decisive force on the future 
battlefield� Such has not been the policy of the past two decades, and many think 
the construct “unaffordable�”
Michael J� Meese approaches his quantitative measures in “The American 
Defense Budget 2017–2020” (chapter 4) from the same perspective that former 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen expressed: “[t]he single 
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biggest threat to national security is our debt” (p� 62)� Given all other expendi-
tures, Meese sees no way that an increase in the defense budget can be financed� 
However, he would like the administration to recognize that DoD already has 
made greater efforts to cut personnel costs (witness the changes to the retirement 
system) and health care than any other government agency, and Congress needs 
to make similar cuts in entitlement programs� He also notes that there are too 
many flag and general officers for the size of the current force�
Christopher J� Lamb’s “National Security Reform” (chapter 5) is a summary of 
his previous writings advocating specific steps to reform national security deci-
sion making, particularly the NSC system� The problem, as Lamb describes it, 
is that “[a]s the security environment grows increasingly complex and dynamic, 
the current system remains unable to coordinate multiple elements of power” (p� 
83)� Lamb sees the need for three steps in particular: (1) legislation that allows 
the president to empower “mission managers” to lead interagency missions, (2) 
a concerted effort by the president to create collaborative attitudes and behaviors 
among cabinet officials, and (3) adoption of a new model of an assistant to the 
president for national security affairs (known as the national security adviser 
[NSA])� The first two recommendations are necessary to ensure that mission 
managers (who would be subject to Senate confirmation) get the resources to 
actually carry out policy, not just draft it�
The new-model NSA would manage and deconflict the mission managers, 
while also being an honest broker concerning cabinet equities� But the mission 
managers would be responsible for the results, not the “omnipresent, omni-
scient, and omnipotent” NSA that many expect today, but that “does not exist 
and never has�” (Sorry, Dr� Kissinger�) Lamb uses the example of General James 
Jones, USMC (Ret�), as NSA� Jones was praised for his collaboration and process 
management, but was criticized for not working “himself into a state of utter ex-
haustion” by dominating policy debates, putting cabinet members in their places, 
and shadowing the president continuously� Lamb maintains that it is the process, 
not the person, that can deliver success� (Sorry again, Dr� Kissinger�)
Among the regional chapters, James J� Przystup and Phillip C� Saunders lay 
out a concise statement of U�S� national interests in the Asia-Pacific (chapter 9), 
with the maintenance of rules-based norms of international behavior (such as 
in the South China Sea) being the most difficult to achieve� However, they point 
out a factor often overlooked in all the media and business hype about China’s 
inexorable economic growth: “The relationship with Beijing will be challenging, 
but Chinese internal economic and political problems are likely to give U�S� poli-
cymakers more leverage” (p� 198)� Perhaps it is time to wish for an Asian “color 
revolution”?
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While not as contrarian toward current policies, the chapters on NATO (by 
Charles L� Barry and Julian Lindley-French) and Russia (by Peter B� Zwack) do 
suggest that NATO must both deter and reassure Russia, and that expansion 
beyond the current membership probably would give Putin and his successors 
an excuse to divert Russian attention from the country’s declining economic con-
dition� However, the alleged U�S� promise not to expand NATO made to then– 
Russian president Boris Yeltsin cannot be found in writing and cannot be veri-
fied, despite what current Russian president Vladimir Putin believes�
In his chapter on South Asia, Thomas F� Lynch III points to an “escalating 
proxy war between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan,” something that certainly 
has not received a lot of press in the United States (beyond that concerning the 
Kabul parliament building and Salma Dam [the “Afghan-India Friendship 
Dam”]) (p� 271)� Lynch includes intelligence activities the two nations have con-
ducted in Afghanistan as but one piece of his overall discussion of competition 
throughout Asia and India-Pakistan tensions in particular� One hopes that he or 
other scholars will research this proxy war in greater detail�
Although not the most detailed discussion, that in chapter 12, Denise Natali’s 
“The Middle East,” has one of the most direct recommendations concerning U�S� 
decision making: “the United States should not attempt to fix failed states� Nor 
should it seek to resolve protracted conflicts without the necessary requisites 
in place, namely political conditions and regional actors committed to making 
necessary compromises” (p� 258)� Instead, the United States “should selectively 
engage and support traditional partners who can serve as strategic anchor points 
in the region” (p� 249)� The first irony of these recommendations is that the 
George W� Bush administration came into office with the same view (or at least 
the president did), but did an about-face after 9/11, attempting to use the invasion 
of Iraq to redirect the Middle East toward (at least somewhat) democratic gov-
ernance� The second irony is that our pre–President Carter foreign policy was to 
rely on Saudi Arabia and Iran as the “strategic anchor points in the region�” Iran is 
now hostile and near-nuclear and Saudi Arabia is a kingdom forged by force that 
seems to promote religious extremism� Israel is, of course, a democratic pillar� 
But reading Natali’s chapter makes one think the United States should just step 
away from the Israeli-Palestinian peace process until the actors are “committed 
to making necessary compromises”—another contrarian recommendation (and 
one with which former president Carter certainly would not concur)�
After lauding the stronger chapters, it is appropriate to identify the problem-
atic� Chapter 8, “Cyber Policy,” is one of the longest chapters, but also the most 
contradictory and—to anyone concerned about the potential dominance of gov-
ernment bureaucracy over the private sector—the scariest� The authors begin by 
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creating an excellent model of the relationships among technology (“the range of 
the possible”), law (“the limits of what is permissible”), and government policy 
(“the realm of the preferable”) (p� 151)� But, as in the rest of the chapter, the au-
thors’ enthusiasm becomes a runaway engine, and they proclaim their model to 
be a “common operating picture” when it is only a conceptual model�
The authors excoriate the federal government for its “industrial age” organi-
zation of departments and agencies that results in a “pile-up of ‘cross-cutting’ 
issues—particularly those generated by the disruptive information/digital age,” 
and they recommend a bewildering array of “issue-specific fusion centers” run 
by “supervisory czars�” While similar in concept to Lamb’s proposal, it diverges 
in scope, with potentially sixty-five centers for cyber issues alone (if I read their 
diagram correctly) (p� 152)� Where we would get the people and funding is un-
examined� Worse, they appear to contradict themselves, suggesting the creation 
of a Department of Cyber, with U�S� Cyber Command located under it instead of 
DoD� They justify this as “[f]ollowing the U�S� Coast Guard precedent of having 
one of the Armed Forces report to an agency other than DOD” (p� 155)� Obvi-
ously, U�S� Cyber Command is not its own armed force, and it exists primarily 
to support the other combatant commanders—hard to do if you are funded and 
directed by a nondefense agency�
The authors conflate information (data, television, film, music, etc�) with in-
formation technology / cyber, and there seems no aspect of cyber in which they 
do not want the government involved: reviewing, requiring, investing in, estab-
lishing connections with nonstate actors, tapping private-sector research, etc� It is 
as if government, not the private sector, is the driver of information technology, 
rather than but one of its consumers� Some of the recommended actions border 
on the patronizing: “[c]onduct outreach to address public fears that AI [artificial 
intelligence] may cause loss of jobs or that autonomous machines may threaten 
public safety” (p� 164)� At this point in AI’s development, who can say that it will 
not cause the loss of jobs or threaten public safety? Part of the chapter’s seem-
ing breathlessness is caused by the authors’ desire to reinforce their insistence 
that cyber is a war-fighting domain “fully as significant as the land, sea, air, and 
space domains�” But is not cyber a tool, an enabler that facilitates action within 
the physical domains? Have we not become dependent on cyber voluntarily? 
The authors conclude with a campaign promise–like statement: “The potential 
opportunities found within the domain of information and cyberspace are seem-
ingly limitless” (p� 168)� That overweening attitude is what makes their chapter 
(and recommendations) so scary�
While not as problematic, chapter 7, “Combating Terrorism,” is the shortest 
chapter and comes across as weak� Perhaps that is because terrorism is discussed 
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in the regional chapters as well� However, the chapter does have a good treat-
ment of the rivalry between the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al 
Qaeda that points to the fact that local terrorist groups ally with the most suc-
cessful umbrella organization� The definition of successful seems determined by 
which organization currently gets the most media coverage� There is a notably 
brief suggestion that the attack in San Bernardino, California, was connected to 
ISIL; however, that incident is not mentioned again, whereas other attacks are 
given more detail� One wonders whether that simply reflects the Obama admin-
istration’s reluctance to tie the San Bernardino attack to Islamic terrorism, lest it 
give a hoodlum an excuse to attack a mosque�
The author provides a good discussion on the threat of veteran Islamist foreign 
fighters from the various Middle Eastern wars returning to commit terrorist acts 
in their home countries, but then makes the following curious statement: “Some 
countries, such as Russia, have decided to revoke the citizenship of their foreign 
fighters� But it is not in the interest of the United States to allow these fighters to 
remain in Syria or relocate to another conflict” (p� 143)� But where do we want 
them to go? Not San Bernardino� The solution—which is not one—is that “[t]he 
issue of returnees should receive more diplomatic emphasis, forethought, and 
planning,” and United Nations help is suggested (p� 143)� Guantánamo or its 
equivalent is not discussed�
In summary, Charting a Course—including those chapters not reviewed—is an 
excellent and up-to-date summary of the national security issues that President 
Trump’s administration will face, written by the most practical group of experts 
one might assemble� Whether one does or does not agree with the recommen-
dations, most are argued logically and boldly� As the new DoD officials wait to 
be confirmed, they should read this book before they are inundated by policy 
papers� So should all other students and practitioners of national security affairs�
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BOOK REVIEWS
ROUGH WATERS
Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US 
Military, by Derek S� Reveron� 2nd ed� Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ� Press, 2016� 256 pages� 
$98�95�
Exporting Security will surprise even the 
most learned defense experts in its fram-
ing of the extraordinary changes to U�S� 
military force employment today� Faced 
with new threats, or security deficits, 
from “subnational, transnational, and 
regional challenges to global security” 
(p� xi), today’s national leadership has 
directed defense forces to take on a new 
and more meaningful peacetime role� 
This revision of Dr� Reveron’s 2010 book 
on security cooperation and the chang-
ing face of today’s military will reshape 
views of the armed forces’ role in 
national security by highlighting its new 
focus on developing partnerships� These 
changes are additive� Defending our 
nation and our way of life through the 
maintenance of superior war-fighting 
capabilities is still primary, but the 
national approach to addressing the gaps 
between stability and conflict is remark-
ably different and requires close scrutiny�
The term security cooperation has been 
in use for less than twenty years, appar-
ently first used when Congress renamed 
the Defense Security Assistance Agency 
the Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency in 1998� Yet in that short span 
the practice has evolved quietly into 
“a key pillar of military strategy” (p� 
4), one that thus far has stirred limited 
academic or government dialogue� 
That is changing, and Reveron skill-
fully lays out the context within which 
this dialogue should be conducted�
Exporting Security explains the popular-
ity of security cooperation among 
presidential administrations through 
well-targeted examples of recent armed 
forces engagement, chosen to illustrate 
specific purposes� Security deficits have 
root causes� In some cases, security 
cooperation activities are designed 
to address these causes, while others 
are intended to help partner nations 
develop the capacity to address both 
cause and deficit� In almost every case, 
security cooperation activities addition-
ally serve to build trust� Trust—and 
common security deficits—form the 
foundation on which desired defense 
partnerships and coalitions are built�
Reveron invests considerable effort in 
examining the government’s rationale 
for developing security partnerships� 
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Pursuing global stability today requires 
more than just unilateral Defense 
Department actions to address security 
deficits that may be “simultaneously 
military, economic, social, and political” 
in nature (p� 8)� Security cooperation 
provides the United States with tools 
to shape partnerships so as to build 
coalitions, gain access, strengthen na-
tional governance, build partner nation 
security capacity and confidence, deter 
bad actors, and fulfill alliance respon-
sibilities; however, Reveron emphasizes 
that security cooperation efforts, more 
often than not, fail to achieve these 
objectives� Nonetheless, he contends that 
the value of the successes outweighs the 
cost of the failures; but the U�S� taxpayer 
deserves a better return on investment�
A full chapter is committed to explain-
ing sources of resistance to the military’s 
changing role� Some officials express 
concern about the military’s growing 
influence in shaping foreign policy 
through peacetime engagement, while 
others perceive these activities as 
taking resources and attention from the 
military’s primary war-fighting role� 
Elaborating on these concerns, Reveron 
examines government interagency 
dynamics related to foreign policy im-
plementation, especially those between 
the State and Defense Departments� 
Is Defense, with its new authorities, 
becoming too autonomous, at the cost 
of State’s role in leading foreign policy? 
Regardless of the answer, the recent 
proliferation of Title 10 (Defense De-
partment) programs literally has forced 
the agencies to find more-productive 
ways to plan and integrate their efforts� 
This is a dynamic that Exporting Security 
might have addressed in greater detail�
Reveron consistently emphasizes the 
preventive intent behind cooperative 
engagement� Military activities in 
support of maritime domain awareness, 
counterinsurgency efforts, combating 
terrorism, antipiracy campaigns, disaster 
relief, medical/dental deployments, 
education in good governance, and 
similar efforts garner most of the book’s 
attention� These efforts with partner 
nations form the cooperative basis for 
addressing today’s security deficits, and 
successes in these arenas are win-win 
scenarios� But today’s changing focus 
also brings a new approach to coalition 
war fighting—with similar preventive 
effect, one hopes—through initiatives 
such as increased international of-
ficer presence on U�S� military staffs, 
cooperative deployments, and high-end 
foreign military sales acquisition� Added 
attention to these influences on coalition 
war-fighting capabilities would have 
made the book’s message more complete�
Combatant-command and U�S� Secu-
rity Cooperation Office (SCO) staffs 
scattered globally deserve more atten-
tion� Combatant-command staffs are 
charged with synchronizing engagement 
activities to develop effective theater 
campaign plans� The proliferation of se-
curity assistance programs, partnerships, 
and engagement activities conceived 
to address security deficits makes it 
increasingly difficult for staffs to succeed 
in these efforts� For the same reasons, 
SCO staffs are challenged to orchestrate 
security cooperation efforts effectively in 
each country� Failure to equip prop-
erly these components of the security 
cooperation community—which operate 
outside the Washington beltway, and 
therefore with less visibility—puts 
their ability to accomplish partnership 
development objectives at risk�
Exporting Security “offers a framework 
to understand the change and to 
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illustrate how the military is changing 
from a force of confrontation to one of 
cooperation” (p� 224)� But this strategic 
pillar is still a work in progress, as 
the United States seeks out the most 
effective formulas for achieving national 
objectives via security cooperation� 
Congressionally approved security 
assistance programs will be shaped more 
effectively� Interagency policy and plan-
ning will be refined� Better assessment, 
monitoring, and evaluation methods will 
be implemented� Military services will 
learn to execute engagement activities 
that simultaneously sharpen war-
fighting skills and build partner capacity� 
The underrepresented tool to accelerate 
this progress is insightful academic and 
government dialogue� Dr� Reveron has 
laid a solid foundation on which this 
dialogue should build� Then perhaps the 
taxpayer can look forward to a better re-
turn on security cooperation investment�
MICHAEL MCCRABB
How Everything Became War and the Military 
Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon, by 
Rosa Brooks� New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016� 
448 pages� $29�95�
This is a history of modern war, 
particularly America’s war against 
terrorists since the attacks of September 
11, 2001� Rosa Brooks analyzes the 
forces and principles underlying 
modern conflict, including history, 
international relations, international law, 
political-military relations, and domestic 
politics� She has produced a fascinating, 
realistic, and at times humorous look 
at our struggles to make sense of it all�
The book begins with a Pentagon 
meeting whose purpose is to decide 
whether and when to launch a drone 
attack on an Al Qaeda operative� Brooks 
takes the reader on a journey that 
ultimately addresses two simple but 
important questions: Is war or peace 
the norm, and what rules apply?
Brooks reviews conflict in Rwanda in 
1994, Bosnia in 1995, and Kosovo in 
1999, parts of a continuum stretching 
until today� Since the Peace of Westpha-
lia in 1648, sovereign states have formed 
the basis of international relations, but 
recently civil wars and revolution have 
spilled across state borders, upsetting 
international law and order� Many 
of these states, such as Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, and Afghanistan, never 
enjoyed a firm footing in statehood� 
Interstate conflicts with fixed begin-
nings and ends, such as the two world 
wars, are distant memories� Modern 
war is both boundless and endless�
Using historical examples, Brooks argues 
persuasively that war is the norm, peace 
the exception� Our concept of peace 
arose only around the middle of the 
nineteenth century� In 1863, the Lieber 
Code codified law-of-war traditions for 
Union troops in the American Civil War� 
In 1864, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross was founded to ease 
the burdens of war� Our international 
institutions are predicated on the belief 
that we can limit war in space and 
time while maintaining our humanity� 
Our current “war” against terrorists, 
however, does not fit this paradigm� 
Use of “enhanced interrogations” and 
targeted drone attacks, and even our 
definition of our enemy, push our 
notions of law into uncharted territory�
How do common notions of human 
rights fare in this environment? Brooks 
revisits this idea throughout� Do 
states have a responsibility to protect 
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their citizens? Do other states have a 
responsibility to intervene when citizens’ 
states do not? Do human rights trump 
sovereignty? For over two decades, we 
have failed to answer these questions� 
If the “international community” 
has no answer, how can we expect 
fighters—a young soldier battling 
Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan or 
a drone pilot sitting in an operations 
center tracking a suspected terrorist in 
Yemen—to answer them? The received 
law of war was not designed for this�
Efforts to fit modern war into this 
structure create more problems in 
turn, undermining both domestic 
and international law� The rule of 
law, Brooks argues, is critical to all 
societies and to international order� 
One solution she suggests is to update 
our laws and international structures, 
as challenging as that task might be� 
We should think of war and peace as 
poles on a spectrum, and envision that 
we move closer to one or the other over 
time� We should reject rigid definitions 
of war as an all-or-nothing concept�
Brooks argues that endless war 
undermines American institutions as 
well as the rule of law� The Department 
of Defense has assumed missions 
that it is ill equipped by culture and 
training to perform—such as nation 
building and civil reconstruction—at 
the expense of other agencies that 
traditionally have carried out American 
public policy and diplomacy overseas, 
such as the State Department� Brooks 
submits that, for policy implementation, 
the military has become a one-stop 
shopping center—like Walmart�
Brooks’s tale also chronicles a 
personal journey� As the child of 
antiwar activists, then throughout her 
career as a law professor, human rights 
lawyer, State Department lawyer, and 
Defense Department official, she has 
experienced and here relates her close 
encounters with most of the subjects 
about which she writes, in part owing 
to her marriage to an Army Special 
Forces officer� Anyone who has served 
in the Pentagon in any capacity will 
get a chuckle or two from Brooks’s 
tales of her time in this unique place�
This book is informative, enlightening, 
and entertaining� As director of national 
security legal studies at the Army War 
College from 2000 to 2006, I struggled 
to answer the same questions Brooks 
addresses in her book� How Everything 
Became War and the Military Became 
Everything should be required reading 
for anyone interested in military strategy 
and national security, or anyone who 
wonders how we got where we are today 
and how we might find a better way�
THOMAS W� MCSHANE
Rough Waters: Sovereignty and the American Mer-
chant Flag, by Rodney P� Carlisle, with Bradford 
Smith� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2017� 304 pages� $31�95�
Rough Waters is a historical review of 
the use and significance of the port of 
registry (which yields a “flag state”) 
of merchant vessels� Author Rodney 
Carlisle has revisited his prior work 
Sovereignty for Sale: The Origins and 
Evolution of the Panamanian and 
Liberian Flags of Convenience (Naval 
Institute Press, 1982, out of print) 
and augmented it with his other prior 
periodical work to provide a deeper 
history of the use of merchant ship flags�
Generally speaking, Rough Waters is 
well researched—with the profound 
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exception of the defamatory analysis 
of and allegations about the Liberian 
registry during the period 2001–2003� 
The source of most of this misinforma-
tion is provocative allegations deriving 
from a commercial lawsuit, as well as an 
inaccurate reference to a UN report� The 
lawsuit was withdrawn and the allega-
tions were never substantiated, as they 
were and remain patently false� Further-
more, the author’s incorrect and loosely 
referenced opinion that the Marshall 
Islands flag constitutes a de facto second 
U�S� registry cannot go unmentioned� 
Contrary to the statement that the 
Marshall Islands flag registry has been 
structured along the Delaware domestic 
model to aid U�S� strategic interests, 
the reality is that the Marshall Islands 
registry was formed by copying Liberian 
law and constitutes an impropriety 
constructed for commercial purpose and 
private financial gain� For these reasons, 
this reviewer is unable to recommend 
Rough Waters, or to endorse it as an 
accurate review of the impact of foreign 
flags on the American merchant fleet�
Rough Waters attempts to address the 
role of foreign flags in the decline of the 
American merchant marine� Despite 
providing some evidence to the contrary, 
the author articulates a one-sided thesis 
that foreign flags predominantly are 
used for sinister or nefarious purposes� 
He further suggests that commercial 
interests, in their taking advantage 
of less-developed nations, were the 
predominant cause of the collapse 
of the U�S�-flag fleet� Curiously, the 
book chronicles, yet fails to highlight, 
that one of the most prevalent flags of 
convenience throughout history was the 
British flag—and the greatest facilitator 
of alternative registration of U�S�-owned 
ships was the U�S� government�
Rough Waters describes in interesting 
detail the intentional use of nonnational 
flags as a means to mislead, to dissuade, 
and often to evade pursuit by navies and 
other authorities� Whether it was the 
slave trade, the Southern or Northern 
fleets on either side of the U�S� Civil War, 
rum-running during U�S� Prohibition, 
or U�S� involvement in World War I and 
the early half of World War II, the lack 
of technology during these eras meant 
that identification of a ship’s national-
ity depended on visually sighting the 
flag flying on its stern� This made use 
of the flag ripe for manipulation�
While some of these practices indeed 
were nefarious, others served legitimate 
purposes, and the U�S� government 
encouraged them� During the Civil 
War, ships changed flag because the 
Northern and Southern governments 
could not protect them� In the 1870s, 
building ships in the United States was 
expensive, so shipowners sought to 
construct and register ships abroad—a 
situation that continues today� In the 
lead-up to both world wars, the U�S� 
State Department and the U�S� Shipping 
Board facilitated transfer of the major-
ity of U�S� ships to the Panamanian 
flag� Despite the assertion in Rough 
Waters that use of Panama’s flag was 
immoral, the political landscape and 
the rise of fascism in Europe made use 
of a foreign flag a political necessity�
Of particular interest to Review readers 
may be elements of Alfred Thayer 
Ma han’s theories on sea power� Rough 
Waters illustrates the practical impos-
sibility of even the world’s greatest 
navy protecting domestically registered 
commercial ships in all the far reaches of 
the earth� History provides only a very 
few examples of the U�S� Navy coming 
directly to the aid of a merchant ship� In 
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each of those cases, logistical conve-
nience and a specific political interest 
were the determining factors for inter-
vention� If a merchant vessel possesses 
strategic interest, its flag has never pre-
vented the U�S� Navy from taking action�
Currently, almost 75 percent of the 
world’s global trading merchant fleet 
is registered with ten flag states� Of 
these ten, only those of Greece and the 
People’s Republic of China are consid-
ered “national flags�” The remaining 
64 percent of these commercial ships 
are registered in Panama, Liberia, the 
Marshall Islands, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Malta, the Bahamas, or Cyprus� Rough 
Waters fails to consider or identify the 
impacts of shifts in global trade and 
trade economics, technology, and ship 
ownership, construction, financing, 
and crewing, which are the realities 
that underlie the choice of a flag state� 
Very few ships are owned by “pure” 
U�S� companies, and the global use 
of global flags did not cause the col-
lapse of the U�S� merchant marine�
SCOTT BERGERON
Practise to Deceive: Learning Curves of Military 
Deception Planners, by Barton Whaley� Annapo-
lis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016� 256 pages� 
$39�95�
This is a quirky yet ultimately enjoyable 
book� The association of the author, 
Barton Whaley, with the U�S� intelligence 
services dates back to the Korean War� 
He earned his undergraduate degree 
from Berkeley and his PhD from MIT� 
Over the course of his career Whaley 
worked with or for the U�S� Army, 
the Naval Postgraduate School, and 
the director of national intelligence� 
A� Denis Clift, president of the Na-
tional Intelligence University, referred to 
Whaley as “the undisputed dean of U�S� 
denial and deception experts�” Whaley 
died in 2013, leaving behind several 
completed volumes and a legacy as a 
man with a passion for and an encyclo-
pedic knowledge of military deception�
A central assumption of Practise to 
Deceive is that the only tool that has a 
hope of “dispelling the fog of war” is  
intelligence—but it is the task of the 
deception planner to keep that fog 
thick� When deception planners do 
their job right, the enemy must deal 
with uncertainty, and surprise can 
be achieved� This is not exactly new 
ground� Many students of history, as 
well as most current members of the 
national security enterprise, are aware, 
at least to some degree, of famous 
deception operations� These range from 
the Trojan horse of Odysseus to the 
deployment of the imaginary First U�S� 
Army Group to southeast England in 
the months before D-day 1944� Whaley 
reminds us that deception plans do not 
just appear; they are the brainchildren 
of talented individuals—the deception 
planners� Practise to Deceive neglects 
neither deception plans nor deception 
operations, but its primary intent is to 
shed light on those planners and how 
they think. As it turns out, that is a 
pretty tall order� In addition, Whaley 
tells readers they should walk away 
with an awareness of the threats that 
enemy deception efforts pose and how 
we can improve our own efforts�
Unfortunately, the book’s structure 
does not lead the reader to a 
rapid understanding of the mind of 
the deception planner� Indeed, most 
readers, particularly those unfamiliar 
with the subject, will be well served to 
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read the executive summary first to 
get some understanding of the nature 
of deception in all its many aspects�
The book also contains a discussion of 
the personality type of the successful 
deception planner� Readers will not be 
surprised to learn that such persons 
differ greatly from successful military 
commanders� Those commanders 
are vital, however, as they possess the 
power to approve the deception plan, 
must play an active role in deception 
planning to increase the odds of success 
and victory, and often serve as a bridge 
between the freewheeling planner and 
the more rigid military hierarchy� A 
short introduction and part 1, written 
in Whaley’s own voice, lay out his ideas 
about the commander, the deception 
planner, and the deception plan�
Part 2, the heart of the book, consists 
of eighty-eight individual case studies 
of deception operations� Arranged 
thematically, the cases range chrono-
logically from the biblical period to 
the modern day, and in scope from 
brief tactical encounters to drawn-out 
strategic operations on a massive scale�
The cases themselves are something 
of a hodgepodge� Some, such as the 
decision by Sir Garnet Wolseley to 
approach Egyptian defenses at Tel el 
Kebir at night, are only a few paragraphs 
in length� Others are painfully sparse 
on information, such as the case study 
that consists merely of an acknowledg-
ment that Admiral William F� “Bull” 
Halsey had a “dirty tricks department�” 
In contrast, other case studies are very 
detailed with regard to personalities and 
actions� Among these is an excellent 
look at Operation BOLO, designed by the 
legendary Colonel Robin Olds, USAF, 
who used electronic deception to lure in 
North Vietnamese MiGs with Air Force 
Phantoms� The action is described in de-
tail, as is the personality of Colonel Olds�
As with Olds, Whaley is not shy about 
discussing the personal character and at-
tributes of many of the officers featured 
in the case studies� Douglas MacArthur 
is acknowledged for mastering the 
Machiavellian art of “divide and con-
quer” among his subordinates� General 
Orde Wingate and T� E� Lawrence both 
are identified as “duplicitous�” Several 
individuals are examined at different 
points in their careers, allowing the 
reader to appreciate their approach to 
deception operations over time� These 
include the actor Douglas Fairbanks 
Jr� when serving as a USN lieutenant 
commander during 1944 in Italy� Also 
covered are Fidel Castro, First Lord of 
the Admiralty Winston Churchill, and 
Ian Fleming’s older brother, Peter�
Part 3 of Practise to Deceive lays out a 
rather detailed approach to planning a 
deception operation and a discussion 
of the major factors to be considered� 
These include such topics as policy 
constraints, the relationship of com-
manders to their staffs, and various 
cultural factors� Two actual examples of 
deception plans are provided: the first is 
the deception plan the Germans created 
to support Operation BARBAROSSA; the 
second is a British tactical-level plan that 
Peter Fleming authored to support op-
erations against the Japanese in Burma�
It is easy to see how, in the hands of a 
lesser author and editor, Practise to De-
ceive could lose an audience rapidly� But 
Whaley’s passion for deception shines 
throughout the book, and over time 
the author’s dry and ready wit becomes 
more and more pronounced, to good 
effect� Readers who, on the basis of prior 
experience, expect compilations of many 
case studies to be dull and plodding 
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examples of the writer’s art will be pleas-
antly surprised, for thought-provoking 
and fascinating assertions abound� For 
example, Whaley believes that some 
societies are more deceptive than others, 
“but only during any given slice of time�” 
Deception is also, according to Whaley, 
a mind game that can be learned, 
although certain types of people, 
including magicians and practical jokers, 
may find the game easier to master�
Despite taking the reader on a 
rather fast-paced ride over centuries 
of deception efforts, Whaley makes 
several points with care� The first is that 
deception operations are not guaranteed 
success� Two failures cited are the Bay of 
Pigs invasion, for which Whaley holds 
CIA veteran Richard Bissell responsible, 
and the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue 
mission, with Jody Powell coming in 
for censure� The second point is that 
deception operations are not important 
in and of themselves; they are only as 
important as the degree to which they 
support the commander’s operational 
plan and allow the attainment of desired 
objectives� As we face a future in 
which deception operations can be 
expected to flourish, Whaley’s caution-
ary note is well worth remembering�
RICHARD J� NORTON
Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the 
Emerging US-China Rivalry, by Lyle J� Goldstein� 
Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ� Press, 2015� 
400 pages� $29�95�
Numerous Western observers—expert 
and otherwise—have opined about the 
implications of the rise of China� A 
small number address the implications 
for hundreds of millions of people 
who have moved from subsistence 
living into the middle classes� A few 
more address the consequences for the 
world’s economy, environment, or rule 
of law� But most focus on an emerging 
rivalry with the United States and the 
possibility it will lead to superpower 
conflict� Of these, Naval War College 
professor Lyle Goldstein is virtually 
alone in mapping out specific plans 
to avoid friction, de-escalate tensions, 
and cultivate peaceful coexistence; the 
others offer “realist” solutions designed 
to isolate, deter, or defeat China�
Dr� Goldstein—the founding director 
of the College’s China Maritime Studies 
Institute, and fluent in Mandarin—
brings the right tools to the task of 
analyzing the United States–China 
rivalry and setting a course toward 
peaceful coexistence� A political 
scientist with strong appreciation for the 
influence of history on strategy, he has 
read widely in Chinese and English to 
understand how academics and leaders 
in each country view their nation’s 
experience, interests, and destiny� By 
sorting out these perspectives, Goldstein 
works like a mediator to chart the 
narrow and winding pathways to trust 
and cooperation� He dedicates nine 
chapters to distinct issues that divide the 
United States and China, categorized by 
region (for instance, Japan or the South 
China Sea) or by sector (the economy or 
the environment)� After describing the 
overall picture, each chapter examines 
interpretations in the West and then in 
China, offering particularly valuable 
insights into the perspectives of Chinese 
military and strategic thought leaders�
Having toured the strategic horizon 
and explained the relevant attitudes 
and interests, the author then lays out 
“cooperation spirals”—plans whereby 
NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb   8 8/7/17   11:58 AM
154
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 4, Art. 23
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/23
 B O O K  R E V I E WS  1 4 9
each side can take concrete, sequential 
steps to reduce the threat they are 
perceived to pose and to increase op-
portunities for cooperation� These plans 
generally start out small, then grow in 
ambition� Many focus on measures that 
reduce the appearance of an aggressive 
U�S� militarized posture—for example, 
standing down AFRICOM or reducing 
the number of troops stationed on 
Okinawa� In recognition of the fact  
that the United States can afford some 
rebalancing, subsequent steps include 
expanding China’s military commit-
ments—for instance, to a joint antipiracy 
force for Aden or a trip-wire force based 
in North Korea� Meeting China halfway 
is not just a slogan� Goldstein under-
stands that the Chinese (indeed, much 
of the world) view America’s history as 
one of nearly continuous aggression, 
and they need to see retrenchment 
before they will trust the United 
States not to threaten their regime�
Written in 2014 and published in 
2015, the book is still highly topical 
and informative about Chinese-U�S� 
relations, and the concept of cooperation 
spirals remains appealing� Readers 
will note, however, that we live in 
interesting times� The Philippines’ 
position has undergone two dramatic 
shifts, first in prevailing in the South 
China Sea arbitration and then with 
the election of Rodrigo Duterte and the 
subsequent warming toward China� 
Likewise, the new U�S� president, Donald 
Trump, canceled the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, announced a withdrawal 
from the Paris Climate Accord, and is 
taking a much more aggressive attitude 
toward Iran—each of which moots 
one of Goldstein’s cooperation spirals� 
Finally, China’s trillion-dollar com-
mitment to the Belt and Road project 
likewise signals a shift in ambition 
and interests� So, while Goldstein’s 
insights and his concept for reconcili-
ation remain powerful, policy makers 
today will need a new set of plans�
This remains an important book for 
anyone seeking to understand U�S�-
Chinese relations, particularly those 
seeking peaceful solutions so as to 
avoid the so-called Thucydides trap�
MARK R� SHULMAN
Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the 
World’s Oceans, by James Stavridis� New York: 
Penguin, 2017� 384 pages� $28�
Admiral James Stavridis’s maritime opus, 
Sea Power, is a tour de force that ranges 
across the global commons of the world’s 
vast sea-lanes and both near-littoral 
and distant shores� With four decades 
of distinguished maritime service in the 
U�S� Navy, the admiral (now retired) is 
uniquely qualified to evaluate current 
geopolitical maritime realities� Stavridis 
brings that strategic perspective to 
his historical contextualization of 
how and why oceans have impacted 
seafaring and landlocked civilizations 
and nation-states differentially�
Stavridis is a prolific author, having first 
been published, early in his naval officer 
career, in U�S� Naval Institute Proceed-
ings. As someone who has embodied 
that institution’s motto to “dare to 
write, think, and speak to advance the 
understanding of sea power,” he now 
fittingly serves as chair of the institute� 
As he does in that role, in Sea Power 
Stavridis continues to lead and shape 
the intellectual conversation surround-
ing sea power and the sea services�
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These contributions to scholarly mari-
time and policy discourse run deep—but 
they are not silent� The lessons that Sea 
Power offers should echo around the 
globe, like pulses of sonar, ready to be 
received and analyzed by an internation-
ally dispersed community of naval 
and military strategists in allied and 
competitor nation-states� In particular, 
the admiral’s clear-eyed warnings and 
policy prescriptions regarding China, 
Russia, North Korea, Iran, and ISIS are 
sure to make waves on distant shores�
Sea Power is the most recent link in a 
chain of American maritime strategy 
that connects back to Alfred Thayer 
Mahan’s seminal treatises of the 1890s� 
Stavridis revisits Mahan’s underappreci-
ated work The Problem of Asia: Its Effect 
upon International Politics through a 
twenty-first-century lens—its discussion 
of a persistent geopolitical choke point 
resonates today� In fact, Stavridis invokes 
Mahan to articulate an updated case 
for an American naval supremacy and 
strength that—when closely aligned 
with the efforts of allied nations—can 
ensure the U�S� Navy’s ability to defend 
the homeland, project power, deter 
aggression, and maintain open sea-lanes 
for global commerce, communica-
tions, and freedom of navigation�
Notwithstanding Sea Power’s ambitious 
subtitle—The History and Geopolitics of 
the World’s Oceans—the book should be 
comfortably navigable by a broad range 
of readers, even those less familiar with 
naval history or maritime strategy� As 
he did in his earlier book The Accidental 
Admiral: A Sailor Takes Command at 
NATO (Naval Institute Press, 2014), 
the author writes with a dry wit and 
an engaging manner, highlighted 
by numerous historical insights and 
cultural references� Moreover, Stavridis’s 
autobiographical anecdotes draw from 
his fascinating, globe-spanning naval 
career that began with service as a sur-
face warfare officer and culminated with 
a stint as Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe—the first Navy admiral in his-
tory to hold this command� The reader 
is treated to frequent, self-deprecating 
life lessons in leadership, including a 
vignette illustrating how a carton of 
cigarettes may have determined whether 
he ran his ship (and future) aground in 
Egyptian waters earlier in his career�
Dedicated “to all the sailors at sea,” 
Sea Power, like the works of Mahan, is 
destined to become required reading 
for midshipmen at the U�S� Naval 
Academy and the officer candidates in 
Naval Reserve Officers’ Training Corps 
programs before they embark on careers 
in the U�S� Navy� It is no accident that 
this admiral has been a mentor to many 
men and women who have served 
with him in the U�S� Navy “wherever 
the wind and waves have taken them,” 
buoyed by the wise counsel and 
leadership lessons evident in Sea Power�
PHILIP M� BILDEN
Outsourcing War: The Just War Tradition in the 
Age of Military Privatization, by Amy Eckert� 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ� Press, 2016� 183 pages� 
$39�95�
In what proves to be both an insight-
ful and informative book, this latest 
publication on the just war tradition 
integrates the disciplines of applied 
ethics, international politics, and 
military strategy� As associate professor 
of political science at Metropolitan 
State University of Denver, Amy Eckert 
draws attention to the development of 
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private military companies (PMCs) as 
nonstate actors in support of warfare� In 
this provocative work, Eckert sets out to 
detail the phenomenon of the privatiza-
tion of the military as a paradigm shift 
in recent years and its repercussions for 
strategic programming� Eckert con-
textualizes the growth of PMCs within 
the evolving history of just war theory 
and presents the ethical justification for 
war as a dynamic core of principles that 
have been reconceptualized and applied 
in different time frames� Accordingly, 
Eckert proposes a series of qualifications 
to the current use of PMCs through a 
reformulation of just war principles�
Eckert notes the rapid expansion of 
PMCs, contrasting the First Gulf War, 
during which the ratio of contractors 
to military personnel was one to 
fifty, with the later U�S�-led Iraq and 
Afghanistan campaigns, in which PMC 
contractors outnumbered military 
members altogether� The end of the 
Cold War, the reluctance of nations to 
subsidize large militaries, the lack of 
public support for foreign endeavors, 
and the trend toward a market ideology 
that seeks the cost-effective savings 
that private corporations can provide 
explain in part the rapid increase of 
PMCs within the state’s arsenal of 
logistical and operational support�
The advantages of PMCs, as Eckert 
outlines, include executive privilege, by 
which governments generally can hire 
PMCs without congressional oversight, 
public debate, or headlines publicizing 
casualties or losses; the economic 
savings of military outsourcing, which 
proponents argue is conducive to fiscal 
responsibility and a corporate search 
for the lowest costs in a competitive 
global market; and deniability, because, 
while a government may not be involved 
in kinetic conflict officially, it can 
deploy PMCs covertly to accomplish 
national security objectives� PMCs, 
observes Eckert, offer “maximum 
freedom with minimal responsibility�”
However, Eckert highlights a number 
of disadvantages of PMCs� Owing to 
the private/public divide, corporate 
contractors have very little account-
ability to the states that hire them� 
Travesties such as the Abu Ghraib 
scandal reflect ethical and legal viola-
tions outside the reach of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice� High-profile 
PMC failures, such as the Blackwater 
incidents in Iraq (2005–2007), can 
become embarrassing liabilities for 
the governments that hire PMCs� The 
government lacks control once the PMC 
contracts are signed� And PMCs—like 
any other private company—act out 
of a profit motivation, and are directly 
obligated to their corporate sharehold-
ers, not the military chain of command�
Consequently, Eckert reformulates 
the jus ad bellum (law of going to war) 
requirements in ways that address the 
role of PMCs� For instance, when a state 
deliberates whether to wage a war, policy 
makers must evaluate the criterion of 
proportionality� That is, even for a war 
with a just cause, the potential gains 
must outweigh the costs� Eckert argues 
that, in contrast with their contemporary 
practice, states that hire PMCs must 
include the deaths of PMC personnel 
in past conflicts in their public records, 
then extrapolate from the public records 
potential contractor fatalities as a factor 
in their calculations of whether, in a 
projected pursuit of war, the gains will 
outweigh the losses� Equally dramatic in 
effect, Eckert recommends that for jus in 
bello (the law of conducting war) PMC 
employees have the status of “civilian 
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combatants,” with both the protections 
and restraints implied, and that PMCs, 
along with the state governments, have 
a shared responsibility to conduct the 
war in a way that is consistent with 
command and control accountability�
Outsourcing War is a compelling analysis 
of the reemergence of nonstate actors 
in the implementation of warfare� 
With scholarly credibility and political 
savvy, Eckert displays an understand-
ing of both the past and the present 
as the just war tradition impacts the 
future development of PMCs, offering 
reasonable solutions to the current 
problems posed by the outsourcing of 
war� In applying the jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello modifications to the status 
and conduct of PMCs, Eckert’s central 
assertion in Outsourcing War makes us 
wonder whether these modifications 
negate the very reasons for using 
PMCs in the first place� This question 
raises even further the critical issue of 
whether it is more important to alter 
PMC practices to align with just war 
principles or to alter just war principles 
to align with PMC practices� Eckert 
seems to advocate a middle course that 
balances the time-honored principles 
of the just war tradition with the 
reality of contemporary PMC practices 
through responsible applications, and 
that balance is one for policy makers, 
academics, and warfighters to debate 
in the outsourcing of war to PMCs�
EDWARD ERWIN
Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the 
Great Campaigns, by John T� Kuehn� Santa Bar-
bara, CA: Praeger, 2015� 249 pages� $60�
John Kuehn’s objective is to analyze the 
Napoleonic Wars “along principally 
operational lines” (p� xi)� Kuehn claims 
that, of the three levels of war, “the 
one that is least understood and 
written about resides in that always 
uncomfortable middle ground, the 
operational level” (p� x)� He explains 
that he chose the period of the French 
Wars (1792–1815) because they lend 
themselves “particularly well to an 
operational-level analysis” (p� ix)� His 
goal is to provide “something of an 
impressionistic result that suggests the 
operational-level approach adopted here 
illustrates effectively the more esoteric 
concept of operational art—how military 
genius, as best defined by Clausewitz, 
operated in space and time in the un-
certain environment at the operational 
level during the era of a veritable ‘God of 
War’” (p� xi)� In particular, Kuehn, who 
holds the General William Stofft Chair 
for Historical Research at the U�S� Army 
Command and General Staff College, 
maintains that “an operational examina-
tion of Napoleonic campaigns has value 
because so many of their characteristics 
resemble current American military 
thought and practice” (p� 9)�
The book begins with an interesting 
discussion of the evolution of the 
operational art as a level of war to be 
studied� Kuehn provides definitions 
and an explanation of his methodology, 
which is to analyze Napoleonic opera-
tions through the frameworks provided 
by the Soviet school and by James 
Schneider, formerly of the U�S� Army 
Command and General Staff College� 
Successive chapters generally follow the 
chronology of the coalition wars that 
France fought between 1792 and 1815� 
Chapter 3, which covers the War of the 
Second Coalition, examines Russian and 
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French operations in Italy and Switzer-
land but does not include Napoleon’s 
second Italian campaign� Chapter 4 is 
devoted to an interesting study of the 
naval war between Great Britain and 
France, in particular the operational 
art of Admiral Horatio Nelson, which 
is well done� Kuehn concludes his book 
with a very short epilogue that covers 
Napoleon’s last campaigns in 1814 and 
1815� No bibliography is included�
Professor Kuehn makes it very clear that 
his conclusions are not based on archival 
research or a fresh look at the primary 
sources: “[M]ost of the sources used for 
this book are secondary and may appear 
dated with respect to their interpreta-
tions� They are used to get basic facts, 
which at the operational level of war 
are largely established” (p� xi)� His notes 
demonstrate a heavy dependence on Da-
vid Chandler, John Elting, Steven Ross, 
Christopher Duffy, Rory Muir, Gunther 
Rothenberg, and Charles Oman� One 
curious omission is the works on 1806, 
1807, 1809, 1813, and 1814 by the early-
nineteenth-century British staff officer 
Francis Loraine Petre, who provides 
much better operational studies than 
does Chandler� Moreover, only a handful 
of references were drawn from recent 
scholarship by Roger Knight and Alex-
ander Mikaberidze� Completely missing 
from Kuehn’s notes are Huw Davies’s 
groundbreaking 2012 work Wellington’s 
Wars: The Making of a Military Genius, 
which might have persuaded Kuehn that 
his interpretation of Wellington’s way of 
war needed some revision, and John H� 
Gill’s three volumes on 1809, Thunder 
on the Danube� Conversely, Kuehn 
consulted Gneisenau’s life of Blücher, 
which must be used with extreme 
caution because at times it borders 
on fiction� For example, the Krümper 
system did not produce 150,000 
trained men in three years (p� 175)�
The problem with Professor Kuehn’s 
research is that the “basic facts” these 
dated works provide are the material 
from which he draws his conclusions, 
and they are not always accurate� 
Moreover, the work is replete with 
generalizations and oversimplifications 
that likewise are not always accurate� 
For example, Yorck did not conduct 
“extensive negotiations” with Clausewitz 
in December 1813 (p� 174) but with the 
Russian general Diebitsch; Germany did 
not explode in revolt in early 1813 (p� 
179); and the “ubiquitous Czernicheff 
and his Cossacks” were not responsible 
for the destruction of Girard’s division 
on August 27, 1813 (p� 195)—that was 
the work of Prussian general Hirschfeld’s 
mainly Landwehr (militia) brigade of 
twelve thousand men, supported by 
Czernicheff ’s five Cossack regiments, 
at the battle of Hagelberg� Blücher’s 
army in 1815 was not “a veritable 
Prussian Grande Armée” (p� 209), as 
it lacked any reserves or specialized 
units at the army level, and 75 percent 
of one of its four corps consisted of 
newly raised Landwehr, while another 
corps was 50 percent Landwehr�
This reviewer had hoped that with 
ABC-CLIO’s acquisition of Praeger 
some quality-control measures would 
be introduced to the latter’s publishing 
process; sadly, this has not been the case� 
Although no fault of his, Kuehn’s book is 
in dire need of professional copyediting� 
Misspellings, omissions and commis-
sions in punctuation and capitalization, 
missing diacritical marks and nobiliary 
particles, redundant vocabulary, and 
less-than-clear sentences mar this book� 
Kuehn is not entirely blameless� Minor 
yet irritating errors such as “the army of 
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Prussia created by Frederick the Great 
and his father Frederick William II” (p� 
16) undermine the author’s credibility� 
Austria’s Hofkriegsrat was not “also 
known as the Aulic Council” (p� 24); 
they were very different entities�
Maps are an issue as well� The maps in 
this book would have been considered 
archaic fifty years ago; today they are 
abominable and practically illegible— 
a magnifying glass might be of some 
assistance� Any operational study 
depends on good maps to help the 
reader understand the course of the 
campaigns, but this reviewer gave up 
on trying to use this book’s maps�
It is difficult to state where this book 
fits in the massive literature on the 
Napoleonic Wars� This study can be seen 
as an extension of Robert M� Epstein’s 
1994 work Napoleon’s Last Victory and 
the Emergence of Modern War� Kuehn 
does accomplish his stated goal of 
describing the Napoleonic “campaigns, 
armies, and leaders using the lens of 
operational art” (p� 10)� However, the 
descriptions of the campaigns are not 
detailed enough for any but a Napole-
onic Wars expert to grasp the points that 
Kuehn is trying to make� He admits that 
some will object to his use of twentieth-
century military theory to explain 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
events (p� xi)� Kuehn does have moments 
of brilliance, especially in the chapters 
on the evolution of the operational art 
and the naval duel, as well as the short 
paragraphs he employs to summarize 
his chapters, but in the end an analysis 
based on outdated scholarship provides 
a weak foundation that jeopardizes 
the stability of the entire structure�
MICHAEL V� LEGGIERE
Hunters and Killers, by Norman Polmar and Ed-
ward Whitman� Vol� 2, Anti-submarine Warfare 
from 1943. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2016� 272 pages� $49�95�
Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943 is 
the second volume in a comprehensive 
history of the impact of the submarine 
on maritime warfare� Engaging their 
significant expertise in the history of 
naval warfare and military technology 
research and development, authors 
Norman Polmar and Edward Whit-
man chronicle the development and 
employment of the submarine as a 
weapon of war at sea and the result-
ing response by navies to counter 
the effectiveness of the submarine 
through antisubmarine warfare (ASW)� 
This book examines submarine and 
antisubmarine technology, tactics, and 
doctrine chronologically, commencing 
with World War II submarine operations 
in the Atlantic and Pacific and culminat-
ing with twenty-first-century ASW 
concepts and contemporary issues�
This history captures the asymmetry 
between the submarine and antisub-
marine warfare as these two forms of 
maritime warfare competed for tactical 
and operational superiority� The book 
discusses contributions the science and 
technology community made to ASW, 
as well as the actions of operational 
and tactical innovators� The scientists 
and innovators collectively developed 
ASW capabilities that reignited further 
competition between the submarine 
and the ASW operator� The book’s 
chronological approach studies the 
pace and trajectory of evolutionary and 
revolutionary changes in submarine 
operations and antisubmarine warfare by 
explaining the tactical and operational 
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challenges facing submarines and ASW 
forces� The authors then describe and 
assess the subsequent reactions of navies 
to mitigate or eliminate each advantage� 
The book stimulates the reader to assess 
retrospectively the inflection points at 
which the hunters became the hunted�
Of particular value is the authors’ 
examination of antisubmarine warfare 
across the broad spectrum of ASW 
methods, technology, doctrine, and 
tactics. Anti-submarine Warfare from 
1943 includes study of the contributions 
to antisubmarine warfare made by 
ships, submarines, and aircraft, but also 
the maturing science and technologies 
that enabled other forms of ASW� For 
example, the book explains the develop-
ment and employment of acoustic 
systems by describing the development 
and use of active and passive shipborne, 
air, and fixed sonar systems� In addition, 
the authors examine the impact on ASW 
of nonacoustic methods, illuminating 
the important contributions made by 
espionage, cryptographic systems and 
communication intercepts, electro-
magnetic effects, infrared and laser 
systems, and subsurface wake detection�
In the first four chapters of Anti- 
submarine Warfare from 1943, the 
authors evaluate submarine warfare 
and antisubmarine warfare during 
World War II in the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans� Numerous engagements 
are detailed describing the tactical 
contributions of World War II ASW 
ships, aircraft, and submarines to U�S� 
and Allied efforts to wrest the advantage 
away from the Axis submarine force� 
The book captures the multidomain ap-
proach to the period’s ASW operations�
Not surprisingly in a study of antisub-
marine warfare after World War II, five 
chapters of the book identify and analyze 
Cold War influences on submarine 
operations and antisubmarine warfare� 
This history captures the nature and 
intensity of the U�S�-USSR Cold War 
ASW competition� That competition is 
placed in the context of national military 
strategies, technological developments, 
operational doctrines, and tactics� These 
chapters reflect on submarine and 
antisubmarine warfare during a long 
period of not-quite-war, but definitely 
not peace, in the security environment�
Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943 is a 
holistic study of antisubmarine warfare 
that provides an opportunity to think 
critically about history’s most impactful 
developments in submarine warfare 
and ASW operations� Readers might 
expect the authors to engage their expert 
knowledge of ASW history to assess 
which events or developments in anti-
submarine warfare were most impactful 
in the competitive and dynamic relation-
ship between the submarine and ASW 
forces, but the authors allow readers to 
develop their own assessments and judge 
the short-term and enduring signifi-
cance of ASW technological and tactical 
initiatives and developments over the 
history of antisubmarine warfare�
Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943 
will be of great interest to readers with 
tactical and technical ASW experience� 
For an ASW expert, the book offers the 
opportunity to reflect on previously 
obtained knowledge and experience and 
holistically reflect on antisubmarine 
warfare and submarine operations across 
the broad spectrum of ASW concepts� 
For the ASW novice, this book provides 
historical perspective on and context 
for decades of ASW developments� An 
appealing feature of this book is that 
the authors eliminate the incredibly 
detailed technical parameters that can 
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dominate any discussion or assessment 
of ASW operations� For the reader 
seeking that type of detail, the book’s 
extensive footnotes and bibliography 
are valuable sources for research on 
several types of technical informa-
tion, tactics, and historical events�
Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943 
stimulates the reader to think critically 
about the trends and inflection points 
in the lethal relationship between the 
submarine and ASW operations�
SEAN SULLIVAN
Honor before Glory: The Epic World War II Story 
of the Japanese-American GIs Who Rescued the 
Lost Battalion, by Scott McGaugh� Boston: Da 
Capo, 2016� 304 pages� $25�99�
What is as stirring as a tale of a “lost 
battalion”? The story elements are 
simple� A hard-fighting group of 
American soldiers gets out in front 
of advancing troops and eventually is 
surrounded by the enemy� A prolonged 
fight ensues as the battalion fights 
for its life, while other U�S� and allied 
forces mount repeated attempts to find 
and then rescue the lost battalion�
Perhaps the most famous of all U�S� lost 
battalions was a force of slightly more 
than 550 men, primarily from the 308th 
Battalion of the 77th Division, during 
the Meuse-Argonne offensive of October 
1918� Low on food, water, and other sup-
plies, the battalion withstood repeated 
German attacks for six days� When 
finally “rescued,” the battalion had 
only 194 men� On relief of the 308th, 
the battalion’s commander, a bespec-
tacled major from Wisconsin named 
Charles Whittlesey, was promoted 
immediately and soon after received 
the Congressional Medal of Honor�
In World War II, the title of “the lost 
battalion” was worn by the 1st Battalion, 
141st Infantry Regiment of the Army’s 
36th Infantry Division� The 141st was 
a Texas National Guard outfit and, like 
the 308th twenty-six years earlier, it had 
its brush with fame during a wet and 
cold October in France� On October 23, 
1944, the 141st was ordered to advance 
into the Vosges Mountains� Members 
of the 141st were assured that a “strong 
force” would follow them� The terrain 
was steep and heavily forested, with but 
a single logging road� The Germans, 
with their usual tenacity and competent 
generalship, conducted a tenacious 
defense over ground they knew well�
The battalion made good progress on 
the 23rd, advancing four miles along 
the logging road, and the advance 
continued the next day; the battalion 
reached its objective after covering 
six more miles� Shortly afterward the 
Germans conducted a heavy artillery 
bombardment� An effort was made to 
reinforce the battalion with light tanks 
and artillery, but it failed owing to the 
dense forest� By dusk, the 1st Battalion 
was surrounded—cut off from resupply, 
medical aid, and reinforcements� If not 
relieved, destruction by or surrender 
to the Germans appeared inevitable�
Major General John Dahlquist, com-
manding the 36th Division, set about 
organizing a relief� He chose the 442nd 
Regimental Combat Team to serve as 
his primary assault force� Although 
the 442nd troops had just been taken 
off the line for some well-deserved 
rest and resupply, their reputation as 
highly competent assault troops was 
a major factor in Dahlquist’s decision� 
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Colonel Charles Pence, commanding 
the 442nd, was not surprised by the 
selection� Word of the 1st Battalion’s 
difficulty had spread quickly, and Pence 
already had ordered planning to begin�
The men of the 442nd, although 
annoyed at having to leave their rest 
areas almost as soon as they arrived, 
got the job done� During five days of 
intense fighting the unit advanced, 
through terrible terrain and against good 
defenses� The 141st’s situation remained 
precarious, with only intermittently 
successful airdrops and propaganda-
leaflet shells used to resupply the troops� 
Senior leaders grew increasingly 
frustrated and personality clashes more 
frequent, especially when General 
Dahlquist, fearing he would be relieved 
for failure in command, became more 
and more micromanagerial in directing 
the rescue effort� On October 30, lead 
elements of the 442nd made contact 
with the surviving members of the 141st� 
According to one scholar, the 442nd lost 
fifty-four men killed in action and 156 
wounded in reaching the lost battalion; 
211 soldiers of the 1/141 were rescued�
If this were all there was to the story, it 
still would be worth the telling; however, 
there is more� The 442nd was a nisei 
outfit� Its ranks were filled with Japanese 
Americans from Hawaii and elsewhere 
in the United States� Many of the latter 
had left internment camps to fight 
for the country that had forced their 
families from their homes and placed 
them under armed guard and behind 
barbed wire� Yet the 442nd was the 
most decorated unit of its size in the 
U�S� Army� (Sadly, McGaugh reminds 
the reader, superior service would not 
be enough to protect at least some 
members of the 442nd from unyielding 
race prejudice even after the war�)
McGaugh—a former newsman, the 
author of more than half a dozen books, 
and the current marketing director of 
the Midway Museum—knows a good 
war story when he sees one� Honor before 
Glory is a battle study, a tale of shared 
hardship and forged bonds similar to 
Stephen Ambrose’s Band of Brothers� The 
work also may be read as a broader story 
of nisei soldiers, who were subjected to 
pernicious racism, institutional bias, and 
belated attempts to right past wrongs�
With so many potential avenues to 
explore, it should not be a surprise that 
Honor before Glory sprawls� Although 
all the aforementioned elements are 
touched on, none are developed as 
fully as they might be� To some degree, 
there was nothing McGaugh could do 
about this� The problem with writing 
the next Band of Brothers is that there 
are not that many “brothers” left� 
Ambrose’s book was published in 1992, 
McGaugh’s in 2016; in the intervening 
twenty-four years, the survivors of the 
Second World War have continued to 
dwindle in numbers, and neither the 
442nd nor the 141st has been spared 
in this regard� For a group memoir to 
be successful, there needs to be some 
undefined, yet real, critical mass of 
memories� The remaining voices of the 
442nd continue to tell an exceptional 
story, but there were only fifty or so 
oral interviews from the men of the 
442nd, and considerably fewer from 
their counterparts in the 141st� To his 
credit, McGaugh tried to find German 
voices to add to the story, but time has 
taken a toll on former enemies as well�
Honor before Glory also could use some 
improvement as a battle study, begin-
ning with more and higher-quality maps 
and illustrations� For all its difficulty, 
the relief of the 1/141 was a small battle� 
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Although McGaugh provides a glossary 
of names and an order of battle, more is 
needed, including a detailed time line� 
McGaugh also would have been well 
served by including more information 
on German movements and actions� Of 
course, it may have been that the men 
of the 716th Volksgrenadier Division 
and other German units did not feel 
the same sense of urgency to capture 
the battalion as U�S� commanders felt 
to save it, and simply did less than U�S� 
forces� More information regarding the 
quality of German troops and the types 
of equipment each side carried would 
be welcome� However, again to be fair 
to McGaugh, given the passage of time, 
the loss of records, and the inherent 
difficulty of identifying exact locations 
on a seventy-year-old battleground, 
answering these challenges is not easy�
The story of the nisei is too big for 
this book, even when the focus is 
narrowed to only the nisei in the 442nd, 
but McGaugh makes the most of the 
opportunity� He reminds the reader that 
the nisei went through basic training in 
Louisiana and other southern locales 
where race prejudice was palpable� In 
discussions of the 442nd’s exemplary 
combat record, a frequently encountered 
explanation is that the men of the 442nd 
felt they had something to prove—they 
wanted to lay down irrefutable 
evidence that they were as good as or 
better than any other U�S� soldiers�
McGaugh offers two alternate or 
supplementary explanations to this more 
common one� The first—and more  
disturbing—is that the 442nd gained 
more combat decorations and awards for 
heroism because it deliberately was used 
in dangerous situations and missions—
and this was because the men, being 
nisei, were seen as expendable� Some of 
the survivors of the 442nd voice this the-
ory with conviction, but similar claims 
are likely to issue from any unit that 
had fought hard, then was pulled out of 
a rest area to fight some more� Having 
allowed this notion to see the light of 
day, McGaugh just leaves it, without 
refutation, confirmation, or even a 
personal opinion, requiring readers to 
make up their own minds� The other 
possible explanation is more intriguing� 
McGaugh suggests that the nisei may 
have fought so well because they were 
nisei� Concepts of honor and duty were 
part of their identity� Many owned and 
some wore the senninbari, the “belt of 
1,000 stitches” that female relatives made 
to protect their loved ones from harm� 
Perhaps the men of the 442nd fought so 
well because they had been brought up 
amid a blend of powerful social/civic 
expectations and community values 
that owed as much to Japan as to the 
United States� Unfortunately, having 
brought up this possible explanation 
for the demonstrated valor of the 
nisei, McGaugh again simply leaves 
the reader to individual speculation�
In the final portion of the book, 
McGaugh illuminates yet another way 
in which the nisei were undervalued 
by the nation they served� Dozens of 
nisei soldiers were nominated for the 
Medal of Honor during the war; only 
two of the awards were approved� In 
1997, the Army reviewed the original 
nominations, and the review board 
subsequently recommended that 
twenty-two of the nisei soldiers be 
awarded the Medal of Honor, as their 
immediate commanders had intended� 
McGaugh provides descriptions of the 
combat actions of three of these men, 
and those accounts leave little doubt 
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that in these three cases, at the very 
least, the upgraded award was justified�
Being identified as “the lost battalion” 
rankled survivors of the 141st, who 
claimed they were neither lost nor 
rescued� The first claim is true: the 
battalion’s location was known from 
beginning to end� The second claim is 
harder to adjudicate� As the five days 
wore on, food, ammunition, medical 
supplies, and other necessities dwindled 
to dangerous levels, and the battalion 
was judged unable to effect its own 
extraction� McGaugh makes a compel-
ling case that this was indeed a rescue�
At the end of the day, despite minor 
flaws, Honor before Glory is a book 
worth reading� The story of the nation’s 
nisei families and their soldier sons’ 
battle experiences remains well worth 
telling as an example of extraordinary 
patriotism and courage in the face 
of reprehensible actions taken out 
of pain, prejudice, and fear�
RICHARD J� NORTON
Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War: Just War 
Theory in the Twenty-First Century, ed� Fritz All-
hoff, Nicholas G� Evans, and Adam Henschke� 
New York: Routledge, 2015� 418 pages� $245�
In an anthology of provocative and 
insightful essays both comprehensive 
and diverse in nature, the editors of 
this work on just war theory make a 
significant contribution to the genre 
of applied ethics� Allhoff, Evans, and 
Henschke enlist professors, retired 
military officers, journalists, theologians, 
and computer scientists as essayists to 
examine the efficacy and applicability of 
the just war tradition vis-à-vis the latest 
developments in technology, culture, 
and politics� Although the writing style 
is accessible to the novice who wants 
to understand better the essentials 
of just war theory, this collection of 
essays provides the scholar-warrior and 
professor with substantive research and 
the latest modifications to a theory that 
has been tried and trusted for millennia� 
The editors incorporate a wide range 
of theorists, including both those who 
reject the just war tradition as obsolete, 
given the evolution of warfare, and 
those who support just war criteria as 
reliable principles for the conduct of 
warfare in the twenty-first century�
In this exciting forum of ideas, oppo-
nents and proponents of just war theory 
introduce concepts worthy of serious 
consideration� While the book resembles 
a recent installment of the Star Wars 
movies in its probing of the morals of 
unmanned drones, lethal autonomous 
robots, cyberspace nonkinetics, and 
more, the writers call on the great phi-
losophers of the past to help address the 
latest trends and projections of national 
security measures� Under the category 
“Theories of War,” contributors critique 
and defend the criteria to justify the 
commencement of war (jus ad bellum), 
the criteria by which war is conducted 
(jus in bello), and the criteria by which 
war is concluded with postconflict 
stabilization, reconstruction, and hu-
manitarian assistance (jus post bellum). 
The editors do not stack the deck to bias 
the reader toward or against just war 
theory, and this illustrates the distinct 
virtue of this scholarly undertaking: its 
diversity of themes and perspectives�
Whether it is Jeff McMahan’s argument 
that the soldier has an epistemic respon-
sibility to ascertain whether the war in 
which he or she fights is just, or Richard 
Werner’s psychological thesis that most 
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wars are justified as in-group exception-
alism and collective self-deception, or 
Jeff Whitman’s insistence that just war 
theory in its criteria toward war and in 
war minimizes the suffering of combat, 
the editors expose the reader to age-old 
debates and new-age innovations� For 
instance, what are the moral implica-
tions of the child-soldier who constitutes 
a lethal force but in some ways is still 
not accountable as an adult warrior? 
How does just war theory interface with 
the increasing use of private military 
contractors within the world’s armed 
services, as combatants or civilians? 
Are robotic warriors morally culpable, 
or are their software programmers? 
Can scientists produce research papers 
on the positives of the latest medical 
breakthrough without also considering 
the multiuse of viruses for human harm? 
Can nonkinetic information attacks on, 
say, banks constitute acts of aggression 
that warrant a kinetic response of 
self-defense? Are torture and indefinite 
imprisonment acceptable as an ethics of 
exceptionalism for terrorists? All these 
questions and more acquaint scholar and 
student alike with the burgeoning moral 
dilemmas of war in the last decade�
Poised between the idealism of pacifism 
on the one hand and the cynicism of 
realism on the other, theorists on all 
sides of the debate directly state or 
indirectly insinuate the value of just 
war theory� Critics suggest just war 
theory’s value by making improvements 
that presuppose its core principles as 
foundational standards from which 
to upgrade� Just war advocates and 
revisionists apply the necessary criteria 
to the changing landscape of war, 
maintaining that the principles are 
flexible enough to embrace the latest 
invention, yet firm enough to respect the 
collective wisdom of bygone centuries�
The just war tradition is not a static 
canon of dogmatic tenets, but rather 
a dynamic canon of robust precepts 
that are adaptable but faithful to the 
central concepts of justice� After all, 
policy makers and warfighters, in 
contemplating the tremendous costs of 
war and peace, cannot easily turn a deaf 
ear to great thinkers such as Aristotle, 
Cicero, and Aquinas, to name only a few� 
Indeed, to deny the validity of the just 
war tradition would be to countermand 
the Geneva Conventions, international 
humanitarian law, and the UN Charter, 
all of which are predicated in some way 
on the insights of those ancient and 
ageless core premises known as just war 
theory� As long as philosophers and 
ethicists deliberate the values of justice 
and peace pertaining to statecraft, just 
war ideas will be relevant, and so will 
any compendium of essays that explore 
the topics of jus pax (the law of peace)� 
Illuminating and profound in scope, the 
Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War is 
one of the best additions to the just war 
dialogue in many years and promises 
to inform the scholar-warrior on the 
most challenging issues of our day�
EDWARD ERWIN
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
Scott Bergeron is the chief executive officer of the Liberian registry, the U�S�-based manager of the 
world’s second-largest ship registry, and is responsible for ensuring the regulatory compliance of 
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over 4,200 commercial ships representing 150 million gross tons� Mr� Bergeron has seagoing ex-
perience with the U�S� Merchant Marine and gained practical knowledge of vessel ownership and 
technical management throughout his career�
Philip Bilden is a philanthropist and national security advocate� He graduated magna cum laude 
with a bachelor of science in foreign service from Georgetown University, where he also received 
the President’s Cup as the top graduate of Georgetown’s Army ROTC brigade� He is an MBA 
graduate of Harvard Business School�
Edward Erwin serves as command chaplain of Naval Air Station Sigonella, Sicily, Italy� He holds a 
doctorate in theology and ethics from Duke University�
Michael V. Leggiere is professor of history and deputy director of the Military History Center at 
the University of North Texas� He is the award-winning author of five books on Napoleon and his 
wars�
Michael McCrabb is the strategic planner for the Naval Education and Training Security Assistance 
Field Activity in Pensacola, Florida� He is a retired naval officer who graduated from the U�S� 
Naval Academy in 1978 and the U�S� Naval Staff College in 1991�
Thomas McShane is a retired U�S� Army colonel who was an Army judge advocate general (JAG)� 
He served in Operation DESERT STORM and in Europe during the Kosovo campaign� He taught at 
the Army JAG School, at the Army War College, and, following his retirement, at the Army Com-
mand and General Staff College at Fort Gordon, Georgia, where he was an associate professor and 
campus director� He has published articles in Parameters, Military Review, and Army Lawyer�
Richard J. Norton is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College� He is a retired 
naval officer and holds a PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University�
Mark R. Shulman teaches and writes on international law and history topics, with a special focus 
on great-power relations�
Sean Sullivan is an associate professor at the Naval War College and a retired U�S� naval officer 
who served for more than a decade at sea in surface combatants, destroyer and amphibious squad-
rons, and the Third Fleet, participating in the planning and execution of U�S�, allied, and coalition 
antisubmarine warfare operations, exercises, and training events�
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-
ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.
 The Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program (CNO-PRP) en-courages sailors at all ranks and grade levels to seek to enhance their profes-
sionalism by reading books of consequence� The CNO has identified more than 
150 titles for consideration in such professional-development efforts�
We begin with a question: What is the true measure of a sailor’s identity? We 
often wrap ourselves in the defining terms of rates, designators, skills, and rank� 
Of course, these are important—they give structure to a system that manages tal-
ent and promotes individuals on the basis of performance and ability, establish 
incentives and organize pay scales, and create a unique culture that both pervades 
our institutional identity and transcends history� This is the identity of the Navy 
as a whole, not of the individual, and rightly the focus is on the organization, the 
unit, and the collective nature of sailors deploying together in harm’s way�
Another question should be asked, however, especially when considering the 
old adage that the whole is often greater than the sum of its parts� Is the measure 
of an individual really a matter of collar devices, chevrons, or warfare devices? 
Or is it the individual’s qualities—innate or learned—that engender a sense of 
purpose, or simply place weighted value on the characteristics that sailors should 
reflect—the core values, if you will? Together, sailors adopting the Navy’s core 
values make the organization stronger� These values are primarily personal, but 
they are intertwined with the core attributes delineated in the CNO’s “Design for 
Maintaining Maritime Superiority�”
Cohesion of a fighting force depends on having trust and confidence in each 
other and in the chain of command� Sailors are called on to serve the ship and 
each other, especially in combat, and trust in one’s shipmates must be based 
on shared principles and a core identity� As stated in the Design, “Four core 
attributes of our professional identity will help to serve as guiding criteria for 
our decisions and actions� If we abide by,” or internalize, “these attributes”— 
integrity, accountability, initiative, and toughness—“our values should be clearly 
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
evident in our actions�” Deckplate education provides skill development through 
hardscrabble work and the satisfaction of knowing a job has been done well� A 
classroom, even if that classroom is a berthing space or barracks room, provides 
space for intellectual growth that supplements and strengthens the person and 
the organization�
The CNO-PRP provides a list of books that discuss core attributes of a profes-
sional identity� Books on leadership, management, philosophy, ethics, learning, 
perseverance, and teamwork—all terms familiar to sailors—blend stories of suc-
cess and failure that shape the world in which we live and the nation and Navy we 
serve� Reading others’ stories, theories, and philosophies entertains and educates, 
but it also allows us to grapple with ideas that are not our own� We learn by fus-
ing the lessons of history with our own knowledge, beliefs, and values� The core 
attributes are foundational in our professional lives, but we must dedicate time 
and effort to reflecting on why they are important� In doing so, we permanently 
embed these attributes in the foundation of our Navy for the current and future 
generations of sailors�
Thankfully, we have some resources to guide us� 
• Integrity—upright and honorable conduct—requires conscious decisions in
tough situations� Consistent adherence to our core values defines who we
are as individuals and builds trust among people� In the CNO-PRP, Joseph J�
Ellis’s book His Excellency: George Washington and The Road to Character by
David Brooks offer testimony on the worth of personal integrity�
• Accountability—holding each other to objective standards—keeps us focused
on the mission� Often we bemoan the repetition of general quarters and
man-overboard drills, but when the time comes we must be able to stand
shoulder to shoulder, with the understanding that everyone knows how to
do the job� General Stanley McChrystal’s Team of Teams and Simon Sinek’s
Leaders Eat Last are powerful tomes that argue that we are better in groups
than as individuals acting alone�
• Initiative—approaching situations with open minds and ownership—pro-
motes a willingness to challenge the status quo, but always with the mission
in mind� “Ship, shipmate, self�” Leadership on the Line by Ronald A� Heifetz
and Marty Linsky and The Rules of the Game by Andrew Gordon illustrate
the importance of accountability�
• Books such as The Conquering Tide by Ian W� Toll and Matterhorn by Karl
Marlantes illustrate the importance of toughness� Resilience in combat and
an ability to carry the fight to the enemy despite overwhelming odds are
hallmarks of our service� We “Don’t give up the ship�”
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These examples found under the Core Attributes section of the CNO-PRP 
website are complemented by many other titles, many available in e-book or 
audiobook format� We encourage all sailors to visit the website or social media 
pages of the CNO-PRP and the Navy General Library Program� The resources are 
free of charge to sailors and are an essential part of the self-education so critical 
to the future of our Navy�
CAPTAIN TIMOTHY URBAN, USN, DEPUTY PROGRAM MANAGER, CNO-PRP
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